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Investments in human capital and the associated development of cognitive skills have
a demonstrated relationship with economic growth (Hanushek and Wößmann, 2008).
However, while improving, many developing countries still lag behind developed
countries in access to education and have students that substantially underachieve
relative to their counterparts in developed countries (Pritchett, 2013). With the
potential growth benefits in mind, ensuring and increasing access to high-quality
education has become a key development goal.
Policies designed to ensure access to a quality education must address a number
of questions: are supply-side policies to increase access to education sufficient to spur
demand? If the policies do increase demand, is there an access-quality tradeoff where
a rapid influx of students decreases the education quality? Is increasing educational
attainment sufficient to improve labor market outcomes or are there other binding
constraints? Finally, in many developing countries, the transition into the labor
market is slow and youth underemployment is high for individuals of all education
levels; if formal education is insufficient to secure a position in the labor market, can
policies that promote self-employment and entrepreneurship speed up this transition
1
and help young adults earn an income?
In this dissertation, I address these questions using a combination of govern-
ment policy changes in Kenya and a randomized evaluation of a non-governmental
organization’s labor market intervention implemented in Nairobi, Kenya.
In my first paper, I examine the Kenyan government’s 2008 abolition of tuition
for public secondary schools, showing that it dramatically increased the proportion
of students continuing from primary to secondary school, particularly from areas
with low initial primary to secondary transition rates. Using this regional varia-
tion in exposure to the program together with birth-cohort variation, I show that
post-primary education in Kenya delays childbirth and related behaviors, and shifts
employment away from agriculture towards skilled work. Despite concerns over the
quality impact of this rapid expansion of schooling, there is little evidence that sec-
ondary school completion examination grades deteriorated in regions more impacted
by the program.
In the second chapter, I focus on a Kenyan government program that upgraded
selected secondary schools to a higher-quality national tier and examine whether
the program improved student educational outcomes, as measured by student sec-
ondary school completion examination results. The program impact is identified by
comparing student outcomes at upgraded schools to student outcomes at schools
that met the government’s upgrade eligibility criteria, but were not selected for the
upgrade program. To avoid potential composition changes resulting from the pro-
gram, I examine only cohorts already enrolled in the schools prior to the upgrade
announcements. Using this difference-in-differences approach, I find evidence of het-
2
erogeneous program impact: while the program had no measurable impact for girls,
the program improved overall examination scores for boys. The improved scores for
boys appear to be driven by shifting up the lower tail of the test score distribution.
Finally, recognizing that in many developing countries, education is often not
sufficient to ensure that individuals are able to enter the formal labor market, in my
third paper which is co-authored with Maddalena Honorati, Pamela Jakiela, and
Owen Ozier, I focus on a non-governmental organization’s approach to addressing
high youth underemployment in a developing country context by examining the
impacts of a multifaceted labor market intervention implemented in Nairobi, Kenya.
We benchmark the program impact against a cash grant of comparable value to the
program and find that both programs increase self-employment and income in the
short run but that these impacts do not persist into the second year of the program.
3
Chapter 2: The Impacts of Free Secondary Education: Evidence
from Kenya
2.1 Introduction
Over the past 15 years, countries throughout sub-Saharan Africa have abolished
school fees for primary education (UNESCO, 2015). These policies have been shown
to increase educational attainment across a variety of contexts and among the most
vulnerable populations.1 Free primary education programs also coincided with the
rapid increase in the region’s net primary enrollment rate from 59% in 1999 to 79% in
2012 (UNESCO, 2015).2 A small number of countries have recently expanded their
free education systems to include secondary school.3 Whether these supply side
policies are sufficient to increase educational attainment at the secondary school
level remains to be seen.
There are a number of reasons why we might expect a more muted demand
1See, for example the analysis of programs in Kenya (Lucas and Mbiti, 2012a), Malawi (Al-
Samarrai and Zaman, 2007), Tanzania (Hoogeveen and Rossi, 2013), and Uganda (Deininger, 2003;
Grogan, 2009; Nishimura, Yamano, and Sasaoka, 2008).
2For a broad review of interventions targeting schooling access and quality, including easing
financial constraints, see Murnane and Ganimian (2014) and Petrosino, Morgan, Fronius, Tanner-
Smith, and Boruch (2012). The global net enrollment rate rose from 84% to 91% between 1999
and 2012.
3Secondary school fees were eliminated in Uganda (2007), Rwanda (2007, 2012), Tanzania
(2016), for girls in The Gambia (2001-2004), and selectively for schools in relatively poorer areas
in South Africa (2007).
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response to free secondary education programs than has been observed for free
primary education programs. First, the opportunity cost of schooling is likely to
increase with child age, so that the opportunity costs of attending secondary school
will typically exceed those of attending primary school.4 Second, these opportu-
nity costs may be particularly important in settings with low returns to secondary
education, where it may be optimal for individuals to forgo secondary schooling
entirely: in contexts where secondary schooling does not increase cognitive skills,
the returns to education are likely to be low, and the demand response to a free
secondary education policy is likely to be small.5 Even in contexts where secondary
schooling does increase cognitive skills, it may still be optimal to forgo schooling if
the expected demand for secondary school graduates is low. Third, parents may be
responsible for selecting the schooling level of the child but may not have incentives
fully aligned with the child’s long-term earnings potential (Baland and Robinson,
2000). In this case, parents may be less responsive to a free secondary education
policy, opting instead to enter the child into the labor market. Finally, individuals
or parents may underinvest in secondary schooling if they are misinformed about the
returns to further schooling (Jensen, 2010).6 This may be particularly important at
the secondary school level in areas with low educational attainment, and where the
4All countries in sub-Saharan Africa, except Liberia and Somalia, have ratified the International
Labour Organization’s Minimum Age Convention (1973) mandating minimum ages of labor market
participation between 14 and 16.
5While it is generally the development of cognitive skills, and not schooling attainment, that
is important for individual earnings (Hanushek and Wößmann, 2008), recent evidence has found
relatively low returns to additional schooling when credentials are held constant, implying a large
signaling benefit (Eble and Hu, 2016).
6There are a number of behavioral reasons one might underinvest in education, such as present
bias, overemphasis on routine, and projection bias (Lavecchia, Liu, and Oreopoulos, 2015).
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community perception of the value of secondary education may be low. If access
to free secondary education does increase educational attainment, then we might
expect such a policy to impact a range of demographic and economic outcomes.
Increased educational attainment is likely to have broad demographic impacts;
Schultz (1993) describes the negative relationship between parental education and
fertility as “one of the most important discoveries in research on nonmarket returns
to women’s education.” There are three main mechanisms through which education
is likely to impact fertility (Ferré, 2009). First, secondary school students may learn
about contraceptive methods leading to lower rates of unintended pregnancies. If
women are getting pregnant earlier than they would like, this knowledge could help
them delay pregnancy until they are ready. Second, education may shift preferences
towards fewer, higher quality children (Grossman, 2006). Third, if having a child
precludes the mother from continued schooling, young women may delay sexual
activity to ensure that they can finish their schooling. Regardless of the mechanism,
delaying age of first birth and lowering desired fertility could have long term benefits
for the mother and child. Childbearing at a young age and high total fertility have
been linked to deleterious impacts on both the mother and child, including higher
morbidity and mortality, lower educational attainment, and lower family income
(Ferré, 2009; Schultz, 2008).7
Additional education is also likely to impact labor market outcomes (Hanushek
7The longer terms impacts of women delaying marriage is more nuanced. Delaying marriage
without an accompanying increase in educational attainment has been shown to lead individuals
to partner with lower cognitive ability spouses. In contrast, individuals who delayed marriage
while also increasing their schooling attainment have been shown to partner with more educated
husbands (Baird, McIntosh, and Özler, 2016).
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and Wößmann, 2008; Heckman, Lochner, and Todd, 2006; Goldberg and Smith,
2008). Potential impacts of education on occupational choice may be particularly
important as labor flows from low-productivity sectors to high-productivity sectors
have been shown to be a key driver of development (McMillan and Rodrik, 2011;
McMillan, Rodrik, and Verduzco-Gallo, 2014). Free secondary education policies
may stimulate economic growth if they provide the cognitive skills required for
occupations in higher productivity sectors.
An important caveat is that lowering the cost of education may adversely im-
pact student learning. A rapid influx of students together with an inelastic supply
of education inputs may dilute per-student resources.8 If these inputs enter posi-
tively into an education production function, a dilution is likely to decrease student
achievement.9 Additionally, lowering the cost of schooling may induce lower-ability
students to attend secondary school, decreasing average peer quality. In the presence
of positive peer effects, this would lower student learning. An impact on academic
achievement, as measured by test scores, combines a deterioration of per-student
resources with a change in the composition of the student body. An increase in test
scores indicates that the price decrease enabled high performing, credit-constrained
individuals to attend secondary school, overcoming the negative impact of a dilution
8Teacher supply has been shown to be a constraint at the primary school level in developing
countries where there are relatively few secondary school graduates to teach future students (An-
drabi, Das, and Khwaja, 2013). Teacher supply at the secondary school level may be particularly
inelastic as a result of small tertiary education systems; countries in sub-Saharan Africa have an
average tertiary education gross enrollment rate of 6% (UNESCO, 2010).
9The distribution of a fixed supply of teachers within a national school system contrasts with
some of the U.S. research on exogenous increases in the number of students. For example, an influx
‘Katrina children’ had little impact on per-student resources due to displaced teachers entering the
same school systems as displaced students leading to no impact on non-evacuee students’ learning
(Imberman, Kugler, and Sacerdote, 2012).
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of resources.
This paper examines the impacts of a national free secondary education (FSE)
program in Kenya on educational attainment and achievement, and uses the pro-
gram as an instrument to examine the impact of education on fertility behaviors
and labor market outcomes. There are three primary contributions of this paper.
First, I present the first evaluation of a national secondary school fee elimination
program implemented without gender or socioeconomic eligibility restrictions. Sec-
ond, I present new evidence on the impact of secondary education on both labor
and non-labor market outcomes. Finally, I compile and use new data on educational
achievement at the individual level for all students who completed secondary school
to evaluate the impact of the policy on academic performance.
My identification of causal impacts exploits region and cohort-specific vari-
ation in the treatment intensity of individuals exposed to the program. Regional
variation in treatment intensity stems from heterogeneous pre-program primary to
secondary school transition rates across Kenya: regions with low pre-FSE primary to
secondary transition rates experienced larger increases in secondary schooling rates
as a result of the program.10 The cohort variation arises from the timing of the
program: individuals above secondary schooling age at the time of the program’s
implementation in 2008 would have had to return to school to take advantage of
FSE rather than simply continue their schooling from primary to secondary school.
I use these sources of variation to measure the impact of FSE on educational attain-
10The transition rate is unrelated to overall county educational attainment. Rather, it measures
the proportion of students who progress to start secondary school after finishing primary school.
Thus, high transition rates can arise in counties where only a small fraction of a cohort completes
primary school but where most of the completers then subsequently start secondary school.
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ment using a difference-in-differences framework. There are two main assumptions
underlying this approach. First, variation in pre-program primary to secondary
transition rates should be attributable to unchanging characteristics of the counties
and second, the pre-FSE time trends across high and low transition rate counties
should be the same. Under these assumptions, the identification strategy differ-
ences out the structural region and cohort differences yielding a consistent measure
of program impact. I present evidence indicating that these assumptions are likely
to be satisfied in this setting. I demonstrate that the pre-program treatment in-
tensity measures are highly correlated across time indicating that differences across
counties in primary to secondary transition rates are due to structural rather than
transitory factors. I also show long term pre-program common trends across high
and low treatment intensity regions and, as a robustness test, explicitly control for
potentially confounding region specific trends.
As my analysis exploits variation in primary to secondary transition rates
rather than the proportion of the population with any secondary schooling, I re-
quire a further assumption that FSE did not differentially change the composi-
tion of primary school completers across treatment intensities. I present analogous
difference-in-difference estimates to demonstrate that FSE intensity is uncorrelated
with changes in the probability of completing primary school.11
My difference-in-difference estimates indicate that FSE increased educational
11Using the primary to secondary transition rate and focusing on the sample of primary school
completers should provide additional power as it restricts attention to individuals who are likely
to be affected by the program; that is, students who do not attend primary school are unlikely to
change their behavior as a result of the program. I confirm that the results are robust to defining
the intensity based on the proportion of the population with any secondary schooling.
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attainment and, contrary to concerns expressed in the local media, had no significant
detrimental impacts on the academic achievement of students. At the mean county
intensity, the program is estimated to have increased schooling by 0.8 years of edu-
cation, with similar results by gender, indicating that the program was successful at
inducing students to continue to secondary school. There is also suggestive evidence
that the program increased the proportion of students completing secondary school,
although this result is not significant across all specifications.12
Building on the demonstrated impact of FSE on educational attainment, I
then use exposure to the FSE program as an instrumental variable to measure the
impact of education on a variety of fertility behaviors. This instrumental variables
approach is most closely related to that of Keats (2014) and Osili and Long (2008)
who examine the impact of free primary education on similar variables in Uganda
and Nigeria respectively. My results suggest education causes large delays for age
of first intercourse (10-20% at each age), age of first marriage (50% at each age),
and age of first birth (30-50%) for each age between 16 and 20. Despite impacts on
probability of first birth, I find no evidence that education decreased women’s desired
fertility or increased contraceptive use. This suggests that the primary mechanism
through which education acted on fertility behaviors is through a confinement effect
whereby women delay intercourse to ensure that they can continue their schooling.
Using the same instrumental variables approach, I also use exposure to the FSE
program to examine impacts of education on labor market outcomes. My estimates
12I run a falsification test where I assume that the program was implemented five years before
its actual implementation and demonstrate that, as expected, the hypothetical program had no
significant impacts on educational attainment.
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show that post-primary education shifts young women into more productive sectors:
decreasing the probability of agricultural work and increasing the probability of
skilled labor while potentially delaying entry into the labor force.
This paper contributes to several literatures. First, it connects with the grow-
ing literature on the impact of education on non-market outcomes. While recent
empirical work in both the United States and Cambodia found little evidence that
education increased the age of first birth (McCrary and Royer, 2011; Filmer and
Schady, 2014), empirical work from developing countries in East Africa has found
that secondary schooling has significant impacts on child bearing decisions (Baird,
Chirwa, McIntosh, and Özler, 2010; Ferré, 2009; Ozier, Forthcoming). These diver-
gent findings suggest that impacts may be conditional on high fertility levels.13
My results also contribute to the literature examining the impacts of formal
education on labor market sector.14 Earlier studies, focusing on outcomes for men,
have found that education increases the probability of wage work (Duflo, 2004)
and decreases the probability of self-employment (Ozier, Forthcoming). My results
for women compliment this earlier work: while I find no impact on wage work or
self-employment, I find that education shifts women across sectors, decreasing the
likelihood of working in agriculture and increasing the probability of skilled work.
I also provide new evidence on the impact of a free secondary education pro-
13An ongoing randomized evaluation of secondary school scholarships in Ghana will examine
the impacts on incomes, health, and fertility outcomes as described in Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer
(2012). Preliminary data from the evaluation has been used to examine the impact of school
management on academic outcomes Dupas and Johnston (2015).
14A related but distinct literature examines the impact of vocational education programs on labor
market outcomes (Attanasio, Kugler, and Meghir, 2011; Bandiera, Buehren, Burgess, Goldstein,
Gulesci, Rasul, and Sulaiman, 2014b; Card, Ibarraran, Regalia, Rosas-Shady, and Soares, 2011).
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grams on academic attainment, building on recent studies in a range of contexts
(Gajigo, 2012; Garlick, 2013; Barrera-Osorio, Linden, and Urquiola, 2007).15 These
studies have found that the programs are successful at enrolling additional students
although the magnitude of estimated effects has varied widely with larger impacts
typically stemming from lower income countries. To date, the literature has not
examined a national FSE program that was offered unconditional on gender or so-
cioeconomic status. Examining a policy that targeted both males and females might
be particularly important if the price elasticity of demand varies across gender.
Finally, my results also contribute to the related but smaller literature ex-
amining the causal impacts of free education policies on educational achievement.
This recent empirical work suggests an optimistic ability of countries to rapidly ex-
pand access through free education programs without negative achievement impacts.
Evaluations of large scale primary education programs have been able to rule out
broad negative impacts (Lucas and Mbiti, 2012a; Valente, 2015), while a smaller sec-
ondary school program in The Gambia was shown to increase achievement (Blimpo,
Gajigo, and Pugatch, 2015). The literature has yet to examine the impact of a
secondary school program at the scale of the Kenya FSE, or one that impacted the
cost of schooling for both males and females. The absolute size of the secondary
school system may be important; there were over 1.3 million students in the Kenyan
secondary school system at FSE implementation, potentially limiting the ability of
policy makers to target attention or resources towards mitigating quality declines.
15There is a related literature demonstrating the sensitivity of schooling behaviors to programs
that lower either basic household costs, such as school feeding programs (Kremer and Vermeersch,
2005), or ancillary education costs, such as school uniform subsidies (Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer,
2015; Evans, Kremer, and Ngatia, 2012).
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Subsequent sections of this paper detail a model of schooling, credit con-
straints, and fertility (section 2.2), provide a background of Kenya’s education sys-
tem (section 3.2), describe the data (section 2.4), examine the impact of FSE on
educational attainment (section 2.5), examine the impact of FSE on fertility and
occupational choice (section 2.6), present reduced form results examining the impact
of FSE on student achievement (section 2.7), and conclude (section 2.8).
2.2 School Attainment, Credit, Ability, and Fertility
I motivate the analysis using a stylized model of human capital investment and
child-bearing adapted from Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011) and Duflo, Dupas,
and Kremer (2015). The model presents conditions under which the expanded access
resulting from free secondary education leads to changes in academic performance,
depending on credit constraints and the ability level of the students induced by
the program to enroll in secondary school. Incorporating child-bearing, I illustrate
that free secondary education should lead to decreased levels of risky behaviors that
preclude attaining further education.
2.2.1 Basic model
Consider a two-period model where a primary school graduate can either enter the
labor force in period 0, or continue to secondary school and delay entry into the
13
labor force until period 1. Preferences are over consumption in the two periods:
U = u (c0) + δu (c1) (2.1)
where u (·) is the period utility function with u′ (·) > 0, u′′ (·) < 0, ct is period t
consumption, and δ is a discount factor. Individuals inelastically supply one unit of
labor in each period and utility is maximized by choosing to either work or attend
school in the initial period. Individuals who have not gone to school can provide
unskilled labor in either period and earn a wage which is normalized to 1. Skilled
labor results from attending school and earns a premium on the accumulated human
capital, h (a), which is increasing in individual ability, a, which itself is drawn from a
distribution F (·) with domain A = [amin, amax]. Attending school in the first period
costs p = pt+pf which is the sum of tuition, pt, and other fees such as uniforms, pf ,
and which can be borrowed at gross interest rate R > 1. The utility that students
obtain from attending school/working are:
Us (a) = u (c0) + δu (c1) = δu (h (a)−R · p) (2.2)
Uw = u (c0) + δu (c1) = u (1) + δu (1) (2.3)
where initial period consumption for students is normalized to zero. Individuals
compare the utility from working, Uw, against attending school, Us, and attend
school if:
Us (a) ≥ Uw (2.4)
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Let a?p be the ability level such that individuals are indifferent, at price p, between
attending school and working in the initial period so that all students with a > a?p
attain greater utility from attending school than from working in the initial period.








Eliminating tuition in this scenario lowers the price from p to pf . A lower price
of schooling increases the utility of attending school at any ability level and serves
to lower a∗ so that a∗pf < a
∗
p. Thus, in addition to those students who would
attend at the full price (for whom a ≥ a∗p), tuition-free schooling also induces lower-
ability students (for whom a∗pf ≤ a < a
∗
p) to attend school. As the only change is
that lower ability students now attend secondary school, it follows that eliminating








I summarize the findings of this section in the following prediction:
Prediction 1. The introduction of free secondary education will increase educa-




I now extend the model of the prior section to introduce the possibility that some
students are credit constrained. Suppose that there is a mass 1 of individuals split
between a fraction, w, who come from wealthy families, while the remainder, 1−w,
come from poor families.16 Suppose also that individuals from poor families are
restricted to borrowing an amount p̄ (a), which is increasing in ability and is such
that the original price of schooling precludes poor students from attending school;
that is, ∀a ∈ A, p̄ (a) < p.17 This credit constraint has no impact on students from
wealthy households who attend school subject to the same ability cutoff level as the
basic model. For students from poor families, the borrowing limit serves to preclude
continued schooling. The mean ability level at p depends only on the ability of
wealthy students attending school and is the same as the basic model.18
Lowering the price of schooling from p to pf increases access and has an am-
biguous impact on average ability. As in the basic model, a decrease in price allows
lower-ability students from wealthy families to attend school. For students from poor
families, the price decrease lowers the cost of schooling so that, with a sufficient price
drop, the cost of schooling for high-ability students falls below their borrowing con-
straint. This increases attendance from students who were, at the original price,
16This setup yields the same Prediction 1 in the absence of credit constraints. Students from
both wealthy and poor families would attend subject to the same ability cutoff as above: a?{p} =
a?{p,W} = a
?
{p,P}. A decrease in price lowers the requisite ability level for both types of students in
the same fashion and Prediction 1 would follow.
17The idea that the borrowing limit is increasing in ability relates to the increased return to
education that high-ability students receive which, in turn, makes creditors willing to lend more.
18While the mean ability level is the same, access is lower as students from poor families with
ability levels above the cutoff are not attending school.
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precluded from schooling by the credit constraints. The mean student quality after

















where a?cc is the lowest ability level such that poor individuals both want to, and
are able to, attend secondary school.19 The mean student ability could be lower
than the original cohort if, for example, either no students from poor families are
induced to go to secondary school (a∗cc > amax) or students from poor families attend




either of these cases, the impact on the mean ability of wealthy students attending
secondary school indicates what will happen to the overall mean ability. In the case
where no students from poor families attend secondary school, then only students
from wealthy families attend school and the new, lower ability wealthy students
cause a drop in the mean ability. In the case where the lower price completely
eases the credit constraints and poor students attend subject to the same ability
cutoff as wealthy students, then average ability among the new poor students is the
same as the average ability among the wealthy students and mean ability decreases.
However, as the borrowing constraint is increasing in ability, in between these two
extremes cases, average ability could increase. This could happen if, for example, the
price drop only eases the credit constraint for particularly high achieving students
from poor families, (when a∗pf < a
∗
cc < amax), and if the poor are a sufficiently large




proportion of the population.20
I summarize this credit-constrained model in the following prediction:
Prediction 2. In the presence of credit constraints, the introduction of free sec-
ondary education will increase educational attainment and lead to an ambiguous
change in the average ability of students who continue through to secondary school.
2.2.3 A caveat on capacity constraints
If the education system can accommodate only a certain number of students and the
highest-ability students who are willing to pay are admitted, the above predictions
change only slightly. Without credit constraints, lowering the price of schooling
serves to lower the threshold ability level for students from all families. These new
students attempting to attend school are lower ability than those already in school
and, with capacity constraints, will be excluded. Thus, in this case, a price decrease
yields no change in average ability.
In the presence of credit constraints, however, all individuals from poor families
are initially precluded from further schooling. When the price drops, high-ability
students from poor families will attend school, displacing low-ability students from
wealthy families. In this case, the mean ability of students increases.
20While I use one density, f , for students from wealthy and poor families in expression 2.7, the
same argument holds if the densities differ. That is, without loss of generality, I could instead allow
the ability density to differ across the populations with fW for students from wealthy families and
a different fP for students from poor families.
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2.2.4 Child bearing
I next incorporate childbirth and sexual activity into the above credit constrained
framework by assuming that children arrive as a probabilistic outcome of unpro-
tected sex.21 Utility now depends on both consumption and the quantity of un-
protected sex which yields a benefit, absent a pregnancy, of µ (s) and is additively
separable from the utility of consumption. I assume that utility is increasing in
unprotected sex to a certain level, s̄, above which utility is decreasing in s: that is,
µ′ (·) > 0 for s < s̄, µ′ (·) < 0 for s ≥ s̄, and µ′′ (·) < 0. I assume that pregnancy it-
self yields a utility benefit, B > 0, and occurs with a probability v (si) which satisfies
v′ (·) > 0 and v′′ (·) < 0. Individuals who have a child are unable to continue their
schooling, so they earn the unskilled labor wage in both periods. The timing is such
that individuals select a level of initial period unprotected sex, realize the pregnancy
outcome, and then in the absence of a birth, select initial period schooling or labor.
Individuals choose a level of unprotected sex to maximize expected utility.
As in the baseline case, there is a threshold ability level, a?, such that individ-
uals from both poor and wealthy families with ability below this threshold prefer to
work in the initial period rather than go to school. For these individuals, the po-
tential arrival of a child does not change the optimal decision as they can still work
in unskilled labor in the second period. As such, for these low ability individuals,
21This addition is an adaptation of the model of education and sexual activity in Duflo, Dupas,
and Kremer (2015).
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there is no expected utility cost of unprotected sex. These individuals maximize:
U = max
s
µ (s) + u (1) + v (s) [B + δu (1)] + (1− v (s)) [δu (1)] (2.8)
which yields the following first order condition:
µ′ (s) = −v′ (s)B (2.9)
which, as both v′ (·) and B are positive, implies that these low ability individuals
choose a sufficiently high level of s, denoted sl, so that sl > s̄ and the marginal
utility of unprotected sex is negative. These individuals set the marginal disutility
of unprotected sex equal to the expected marginal utility gain from having a child.
For individuals with ability a > a?, it is optimal to attend school in the first
period. These individuals maximize:
U = max
s
µ (s) + v (s) [B + u (1) + δu (1)] + (1− v (s)) [δu (h (a)−Rp)] (2.10)
which yields the first order condition that equates marginal costs and benefits of
unprotected sex:
µ′ (s) + v′ (s) [B + u (1) + δu (1)] = v′ (s) [δu (h (a)−Rp)] (2.11)
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which can be rearranged to:
µ′ (s) = −v′ (s)B + v′ (s) [δu (h (a)−Rp)− u (1)− δu (1)] (2.12)
where I denote sh as the level of unprotected sex that satisfies this condition. Equa-
tion 2.12 is similar to the optimality condition of equation 2.9 with the addition of
the second term on the right. From equation 2.4, this second term is positive for
high ability individuals for whom, in the absence of childbearing, schooling is the
optimal decision. This indicates that µ′ (sh) > µ
′ (sl) so that the marginal utility of
unprotected sex is less negative for high ability individuals than low ability individ-
uals. As µ′′ (·) < 0, this finding implies that sh < sl; high ability individuals select
a lower level of unprotected sex than low ability individuals.
For credit constrained high ability individuals from poor families, attending
secondary school is not an option. Rather, these individuals maximize utility by
acting as low ability individuals and selecting a high level of unprotected sex. Low-
ering the cost of schooling from p to pf allows individuals from poor families to
attend school and changes their optimal behavior to incorporate the possibility of
lost income resulting from a potential pregnancy. Thus, lowering the price of school-
ing is expected to lower the incidence of unprotected sex and decrease the rate of
pregnancy by decreasing the rates for high ability individuals from poor families.
This yields the following prediction:
Prediction 3. The introduction of free secondary education will decrease risky be-
haviors that preclude additional schooling.
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2.2.5 Model predictions and implications for analysis
I now summarize the predictions of the above model. The introduction of free sec-
ondary education will increase educational attainment and decrease risky behaviors.
It will also have an ambiguous effect on average student ability depending on the
presence of credit constraints. Without credit constraints, the average ability will
decrease. With credit constraints, the average ability can increase, decrease, or stay
the same.
Free education is likely to impact both average ability, as modeled above, and
the quality of educational resources. Without a large accompanying program to
increase resource quantity or quality, free education is likely to dilute educational
resources. As a result, the impact on student achievement is a combination of this
negative impact on resource quality, together with an unknown impact on mean
ability. A positive or null effect on mean achievement implies an increase in mean
ability sufficient to overcome any negative impact of diluted resource quality and is
indicative of the presence of credit constraints. I take these predictions to the data
in Sections 2.5-2.6.
2.3 Kenya’s Education System and Free Secondary Schooling
In 2003, the Kenyan government implemented a free primary education policy cov-
ering the 8 first years of schooling.22 This was followed up by the passage of a
22Lucas and Mbiti (2012a) describes the introduction of the free primary education program in
their evaluation of the short term impacts of the program.
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free, 4 year, secondary education (FSE) policy in January 2008. The FSE program
covered basic tuition expenses of KSh10,265 (∼USD100) annually and was aimed
at increasing access to secondary schools. In conjunction with the FSE policy, the
Kenyan government also implemented policies designed to increase the capacity of
public secondary schools. The government sought to increase class sizes from 40
to 45 students and increase the standard number of classes per grade per school
to a minimum of three (Ministry of Education, 2008a). The introduction of the
FSE program coincided with a rapid expansion in the number of students attend-
ing secondary school. Figure 2.1 shows the number of students entering secondary
school in each year and demonstrates the rapid growth in admissions which started
following the introduction of FSE and which has continued in recent years.
FSE was implemented as a capitation grant disbursed directly to schools from
the central government in three payments each year. The capitation grant was not
designed to cover all costs of attendance and students were still responsible for costs
of school uniforms as well as infrastructure and boarding fees.23 The capitation
grant was not available to students attending private schools which, as Figure 2.A.2
shows, are generally lower performing than public schools. Using data from the
2005 Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey, Glennerster, Kremer, Mbiti, and
Takavarasha (2011) estimate that households spent an average of KSh25,000 per
secondary school student with approximately KSh10,000 going towards non-tuition
expenditures. These calculations suggest that the capitation grant covered approx-
23Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (2014b) notes that infrastructure fees are
capped at KSh2000 (∼USD25) per year. Approximately 10% of students attend premium tier
public schools where the FSE policy did not completely defray the higher tuition these institutions
are allowed to charge.
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imately 40% of the household cost of a secondary school student.24
At the conclusion of both primary school and secondary school, students take
a set of standardized exams: the Kenya Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE)
is used to determine admission into secondary school while the Kenya Certificate of
Secondary Education (KCSE) determines admission and funding for higher educa-
tion and is also used as a credential on the labor market. The exams are conducted
by a national testing organization and are centrally developed and graded. Ad-
mission to public secondary schools is obtained through a central mechanism that
allocates students based on KCPE scores and student submitted preferences over
schools.25 The Kenyan school year follows the calendar year so that students in the
first FSE cohort took the KCPE in November 2007 and decided whether or not to
continue to secondary school in February 2008.
Within the context of the model presented in the prior section, without credit
constraints, this expansion in access would open up additional slots for lower per-
forming students, decreasing the average ability of students attending secondary
school. Alternatively, with credit constraints, the policy would potentially allow
both high and low ability, credit constrained individuals to attend school, yielding
an ambiguous change in the average ability of students.
24In the 2016/2017 budget, FSE was allocated 1.9% of the total national budget (∼USD320
million).




This paper uses two main datasets: the 2014 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey
(DHS) and an administrative dataset of secondary school completion examination
results.
2.4.1 Demographic and Health Survey
The 2014 Kenya DHS comprises two survey instruments which were administered
to slightly different samples: a short module was administered in all sample house-
holds and is representative of females aged 15-49 at the county level while a full
module was administered to males and females in every other sample household.
The short module includes questions on education, health, and child-bearing his-
tories. The additional modules include questions on income-generating activities,
spousal education and employment, desired fertility, and contraceptive usage.
To focus on individuals who were both near the first FSE cohort as well as
those likely to have completed schooling by the time of the survey, I restrict attention
to DHS respondents born between 1983 and 1996 and who are at least 18 years old
at the time of the survey.26 In my analysis of the impact of FSE, I focus on the
13,605 individuals who have completed primary school.27
26In Section 2.4.3, I use administrative registration data to show that students born after 1990
likely made their secondary education decision in the free secondary education regime.
27Focusing on individuals who completed primary school introduces the potential for selection
bias if the free secondary education policy changes whether individuals choose to complete primary
school. I discuss the validity of this approach and evaluate the robustness of my results to relaxing
this restriction in Section 2.5.1 and Appendix 2.B.3.
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Summary statistics are presented in Table 2.1.28 As the DHS disproportion-
ately targeted women, the sample is 71% female. The average individual has slightly
more than 10.5 years of education, 65% have some secondary schooling and 42% have
completed secondary school.29 Within the sample, the average ages of first inter-
course, marriage, and birth for women are all between 17 and 19. This contrasts
with men, for whom there is a 6 year gap between age of first intercourse and age
of first marriage. A little over one quarter of the sample reports not working. Of
those who are working, the majority are in unskilled work while an equal amount
report either agricultural or skilled work.
Panel B restricts the sample to individuals who have completed secondary
school demonstrating, in the cross section, the later fertility behavior ages. Relative
to the full sample, women are over 1 year older at age of first intercourse, and 1.75
years older at age of first birth and age of first marriage. Smaller delays are seen for
men who complete secondary school among whom age of first intercourse is about 0.5
years later and age of first marriage is 0.8 years later. For employment outcomes,
individuals completing secondary school are slightly less likely to report no work
than the full sample. There is, however, a noticeable shift across sectors: secondary
school completers are about 35% less likely to report working in agriculture relative
to primary school completers and almost 60% more likely to report skilled work.
28Summary statistics for the full DHS are presented in Appendix Table 2.A.1.
29The high disparity between any secondary schooling and the secondary school completion rates
may be due to younger members of the sample still being in school; while the survey does not ask
whether individuals are still in school, 58% of the sample aged 20 or under have some secondary
schooling but have not completed secondary school while the number drops to 25% for those over
age 20. If individuals initially have a noisy signal about their own ability and can gain information
by attending secondary school, FSE may lead to more students trying and quitting secondary
school, as it lowers the cost of gaining more information for marginal students.
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There is no change in likelihood of unskilled labor.
2.4.2 Administrative Test Scores
This paper also uses an administrative dataset of all students who took the KCSE
between 2006-2015 with the exception of the 2012 cohort.30 The KCSE is a national
test administered at the conclusion of secondary school and is used as a credential
in the labor market as well as for admissions decisions into tertiary education. Each
student must take a minimum of 7 exams across four subject categories: three
compulsory subjects (English, Kiswahili, and math), 2 sciences, 1 humanities, and 1
practical subject.31 Each subject is graded on a 12(A)-1(F) scale with a maximum
total score of 84 points.32 Each student is assigned an aggregate grade between
A and E based on their composite score.33 Detailed subject grades are available
from 2009 to 2015 while only the overall letter grades are available prior to 2009. I
standardize grades within each year to account for small differences across years in
the grade distributions.34 As my identification strategy exploits variation in county
level exposure, I exclude national tier schools that draw students from around the
30The test data are a combination of publicly available data from 2006-2010 together with data
scraped from the national examination council’s website for 2011 and 2013-2015. The national
examination council web site did not have the 2012 results publicly available.
31Science options include biology, chemistry, and physics. Humanities options are his-
tory/government and geography. Practical subjects include Christian religious education, Islamic
religious education, Hindu religious education, home science, art and design, agriculture, wood-
work, metalwork, building construction, power mechanics, electricity, drawing and design, aviation
technology, computer studies, French, German, Arabic, Kenyan sign language, music, and business
studies.
32The grading scheme has plus and minus and decreases by one point for each grade type so
that 12 is equivalent to A, 11 is equivalent to A-, and so on.
33Overall KCSE grades are assigned as follows: a score between 84 and 81 is an A, 80 to 74 is
an A-, 73 to 67 is a B+, 66 to 60 is a B, 59 to 53 is a B-, 52 to 46 is a C+, 45 to 39 is a C, 38 to
32 is a C-, 31 to 25 is a D+, 24 to 18 is a D, 17 to 12 is a D- and below 12 is an E.
34Similar results are obtained with the raw test data.
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country, restricting attention to schools that primarily cater to the local county
population.35
Each student record within the dataset is identified by a 9-digit student num-
ber that is unique within each year. The first three digits of the student number
indicate the student’s district, the second three identify the school within a dis-
trict, while the last three denote the student within the school. Additional data on
school characteristics come from the Ministry of Education’s Kenyan Schools Map-
ping Project conducted in 2007, the National Examination Council’s testing center
public/private categorization for 2015, and an individual level examination results
panel for a single cohort who took the KCPE in 2010 and the KCSE in 2014. Table
2.2 presents selected summary statistics for the examination data.
2.4.3 Defining Treatment
Each of the two datasets contains different information about individual exposure
to FSE and requires slightly different treatment definitions. The DHS includes year
and month of birth so exposure can be defined based on birth cohort.36 Conversely,
the administrative examination data do not include comprehensive year of birth
data and require a treatment definition based on examination cohort.
I first consider how to define treatment based on the birth cohort available
in the DHS data. The first cohort able to make their secondary schooling decision
after FSE was implemented completed primary school in 2007. The Kenya National
35There were 18 national tier schools in 2011.
36The DHS does not include comprehensive schooling histories which would indicate who com-
pleted primary school in the FSE period, and clearly delineate treatment.
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Examinations Council (KNEC) calls for students to take the primary school com-
pletion examination between ages 13 and 14 suggesting that the first cohort was
born in 1993 and 1994.37 However, rates of grade repetition are high for primary
school students in Kenya: registration data for the 2014 primary school completion
examination indicates that only 40% of the students who took this exam were in
the 13-14 age range, while over 40% were aged 15-16 years old, and 16% were aged
17 or older.
Figure 2.2 examines the implications of the observed age distribution for cohort
level exposure to FSE. The histogram in the figure plots the age distribution of
the first cohort impacted by FSE, where I assume that the age distribution of the
students who complete primary school in 2007 follows that of the 2014 cohort.38 The
scatter plot depicts the fraction of each cohort exposed to FSE assuming the same
distribution of cohort exposure in subsequent exam years. For example, the oldest
students in the first FSE cohort were aged 19 and were the last of their cohort
to complete primary school. Therefore, the remainder of their cohort completed
primary school before FSE and these 19 year olds are the only ones from their cohort
37The official entrance age to primary school is 6. The KNEC age range assumes that students
start primary school at age 6 and continue through the 8 years of primary school with no grade
repetition. This yields a November exam cohort of 13-14 year-olds.
38Ideally, I would use a pre-period cohort to examine the age distribution but I do not have
the necessary data. I do, however, have data from 2008 for 15 of the 47 counties which together
account for approximately 37% of the population. While this is in the FSE period, there are a
number of reasons to expect that the distribution is indicative of a pre-FSE cohort. First, students
retaking the exam are given identifiable registration numbers so that I can focus only on first time
test takers. Second, as students take the exam after completing primary school, only students who
either dropped out after 7th grade or who completed primary school but did not take the KCPE
could be endogenous first time takers in 2008 in response to the program. I expect these groups
to be small as there are likely frictions to returning to school and because the KCPE results are
used as a credential on the market, most students who reach the exam are likely to take it. With
this in mind, Appendix Figure 2.A.1 compares the age distribution of first time test takers in these
regions in 2008 and 2014. There are not substantive differences in the age distributions suggesting
that the 2014 cohort provides a valid indication of cohort FSE exposure.
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exposed to FSE. Conversely, the youngest students in the first FSE cohort were aged
12. These students were the first in their cohort to complete primary school and were
in the FSE regime, so that all other students in their cohort were also in the FSE
regime. For cohorts of students between ages 12 and 19, some students completed
primary school before FSE while others completed primary school after FSE was
introduced. The figure suggests three general treatment intensity periods based on
student age in 2007: almost all students aged 14 or under in 2007 had access to
FSE and I consider these cohorts treated (born in 1993 or after). Around half of the
students aged 15 or 16 (born in 1991 or 1992) were exposed to FSE and I consider
these cohorts treated in most specifications, although this may reduce power. Only
a small fraction of students who were aged 17 or older (born in 1990 or before) were
exposed to FSE, and I consider these students untreated.39
In my analysis of the impact of FSE on student achievement, I consider treat-
ment based on examination cohort as the administrative examination data does not
have the year of birth for all individuals. FSE was first available for students who en-
tered secondary school in 2008 who would, without grade repetition, take the KCSE
in 2011. Grade repetition is a potential threat to identification using this definition
of treatment. If students entered secondary school in the pre-FSE 2007 cohort but
then took five years to complete secondary school, I would consider them treated.
Grade repetition within secondary school is, however, relatively low; KCSE regis-
tration data show that almost 80% of students proceed through secondary school in
39Appendix Table 2.A.4 presents a robustness check of the results where the transition cohorts
are excluded.
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4 years.40 As such, I consider students who take the secondary school completion
examination in 2011 or later as treated and those who take the exam in 2010 or
earlier as untreated.41 This analytical choice, in the worst case, should only slightly
bias my results towards zero.
2.5 FSE and educational attainment
2.5.1 Identification strategy
I measure the impact of FSE on educational attainment by exploiting cohort-region
variation in exposure to the program using a difference-in-differences approach. Co-
hort variation arises from the timing of the program: individuals above secondary
schooling age at the time of the program’s implementation in 2008 would have had to
return to school to take advantage of FSE rather than simply continue their school-
ing from primary to secondary school. Regional variation stems from heterogeneous
pre-program primary to secondary transition rates across Kenya’s 47 counties. In
counties with high pre-FSE primary to secondary transition rates, there were rela-
tively few students who could be induced by the program to continue to secondary
school. In contrast, in counties with low pre-FSE primary to secondary transition
rates, there was a relatively large number of primary school graduates who could be
40Appendix Figure 2.A.3 presents a histogram of the number of years between primary school
and secondary school completion examinations for students in the 2014 KCSE cohort.
41Students who take the exam between 2008 and 2010 are marginally exposed to FSE in that
their school fees were removed which may lead to higher persistence in secondary school. I focus
on treatment as inducing students to change their secondary schooling decision so I consider these
years untreated as students in these cohorts entered secondary school in the pre-FSE regime.
31
induced by the program to continue to secondary school.42
Based on the program cohort exposure described in Section 2.4.3, I use the
DHS data to calculate the pre-program primary to secondary transition rate for
each county. The rate is calculated as the fraction of primary school completers
who attend some secondary school for cohorts born in the two closest pre-FSE
periods.43 Figure 2.3 shows how the transition rates have evolved over time for
counties with high/low pre-FSE transition rates. While areas with high and low
pre-program transition rates moved similarly before the introduction of FSE, with
a noticeable gap between the two, the rates converged following the introduction of
FSE.
Figure 2.4 presents a histogram of the pre-program primary to secondary tran-
sition rates across counties showing that the rate ranges from 0.34 (Kitui county)
to 0.94 (Mandera county) with a median of 0.659. Figure 2.5 maps the transition
rates. The one obvious pattern in the figure is the high transition rate band across
the North and North-Eastern portion of the country.44 In Appendix 2.B.1-2.B.2,
I confirm robustness of the results to excluding the smallest population counties,
42Using the primary to secondary transition rate and focusing on a sample of primary school
completers should provide additional power relative to an alternative definition based on the pro-
portion of each cohort with any secondary schooling. However, using the transition rate approach
imposes an additional assumption on the difference-in-differences estimates: that FSE did not
differentially induce students to complete primary school. This assumption ensures that there is
no selection bias introduced by a changing composition of the secondary school student body. I
consider the validity of this assumption later in this section.
43I consider the average over two years to ensure that I am not calculating the transition rate
from a small number of observations. 13 counties have fewer than 10 observations in the closest
pre-program birth cohort. The intensity for county k is calculated as Frack =
mk,1989+mk,1990
nk,1989+nk,1990
where nkj represents the number of individuals completing primary school in cohort j and mkj is
the number of individuals who have attended some secondary schooling.
44The transition rate measures the proportion who progress to start secondary school after
finishing primary school and is not related to overall educational attainment.
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which includes these high-transition rate counties and also to excluding the two
major cities: Nairobi and Mombasa.45
To motivate my approach, I first consider the impact of FSE on educational
attainment within a binary treatment difference-in-differences framework. To satisfy
the difference-in-differences setup, I define a binary treatment equal to one for high
intensity counties, where pre-program primary to secondary transition rates are
below the median level, and equal to zero for low intensity counties, with transition
rates above the median level. I then consider the change in outcomes in treated
regions following the introduction of FSE relative to the change in untreated regions.
This identifies the program impact under the assumption that absent the program,
the outcomes of treated regions would have followed the same trajectory of low
intensity regions. This corresponds to a regression of the form:
Sijk = α0 + β1 (Highk ∗ FSEj) + ηk + γj + εijk (2.13)
where Sijk reflects the schooling of individual i in cohort j in county k, Highk is an
indicator variable equal to 1 if county k has a pre-program primary to secondary
transition rate below the median, FSEj is a dummy variable equal to one for in-
dividuals born in cohorts impacted by FSE, and ηk and γj represent county and
45I rerun the analysis without Kenya’s two main cities, Nairobi and Mombasa, to ensure that the
results are not being driven by these cities and the potential noise arising from internal migration.
In the second set, I rerun the analysis without the smallest counties where the estimation of
the primary to secondary transition rates are calculated based on a particularly small sample.
The small counties excluded in the robustness check are Garissa, Mandera, Marsabit, Samburu,
Turkana, and Wajir. A third set of robustness results employs an alternative definition of treatment
intensity that varies over years allowing for earlier cohorts to be impacted by larger younger cohorts.
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cohort fixed effects, respectively.46 The interaction coefficient, β1 is the estimate of
the effect of FSE on education.
There are two main assumptions underlying this difference-in-differences ap-
proach. First, selection bias (treatment intensity) should be attributable to un-
changing characteristics of the counties and second, the pre-FSE time trends across
high and low transition rate counties should be the same. In assessing the first
assumption, it is notable that if capacity constraints at the secondary school level
are binding, then the ratio of primary school graduates to secondary school spots
determines the transition rate. Without large changes in either the number of pri-
mary school graduates or secondary school capacity, the transition rate is likely to
be serially correlated over time. Indeed, the data suggest that the first assumption
is likely to hold: the correlation between the treatment intensity calculated using
the 2 years prior to treatment and 10 years prior to treatment is 0.8. For the second
assumption, Figure 2.3 demonstrates common trends going back 8 years, suggest-
ing that differences across counties in primary to secondary transition rates are due
to structural rather than transitory factors. If the assumptions are satisfied, the
identification strategy differences out these structural county and cohort differences
yielding a consistent measure of treatment impact.
Even under the above assumptions, another threat to my identification is that
the estimated impact may be due to other programs which are correlated with my
treatment intensity measure. With this in mind, I follow Lucas and Mbiti (2012a)
46The usual formulation of a difference-in-differences with two periods includes two dummy
variables in addition to the interaction: one for the treated group and one for the post period. In
the present formulation, these are subsumed by the county and year fixed effects.
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and control for county development funding levels, pre-program unemployment lev-
els, and county specific linear trends.47 The constituency development funding levels
were calculated based on the poverty incidence in 2003 and are reported annually
at the sub-county level which I aggregate to the county level.48 If areas with higher
treatment intensity also received greater development funding, I may conflate the
impact of FSE with the differential funding. To address this concern, I interact the
development funding with cohort dummies. Similarly, I include unemployment levels
interacted with cohort dummies to account for programs that potentially targeted
areas with higher unemployment. I cluster errors at the county level to account for
possible serial correlation within school markets over time.
Forming a binary high intensity variable from the continuous primary to sec-
ondary transition rate entails a loss of information. To use the relative magnitudes
of the transition rates across counties, I define a continuous treatment intensity
measure based on the transition rate as Ik = (1− transition rate) which reflects the
maximum potential increase in the transition rate.49 Thus, the intensity is higher
for counties with low pre-program transition rates where there is greater ability for
FSE to induce students to attend secondary school. I use this treatment intensity in
an analysis analogous to equation 2.13 where the binary treatment intensity variable
47The basic difference-in-differences approach relies on common trends across treated and com-
parison groups. In the above specification with heterogeneous treatment intensities, I can not test
for common trends across the counties but instead include county-specific linear trends as a control
to directly account for potentially confounding trends.
48Constituency development fund allocation data are posted on http://www.cdf.go.ke.
49An alternative analysis that defined treatment intensity as 1/(transition rate) yielded similar
results.
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is replaced with the continuous measure:
Sijk = α0 + β1 (Ik ∗ FSEj) + ηk + γj + εijk (2.14)
where Ik is the treatment intensity for county k. The coefficient β1 is the estimate of
the impact of FSE on education. This regression uses all of the primary to secondary
transition rate information and its estimates should be more precise. I include the
same controls in this continuous intensity analysis as in the binary treatment analysis
described above.
In examining the impact on educational attainment, I focus on the sample of
primary school completers as they are the group most likely induced by free sec-
ondary education to continue their schooling.50 Identification in this framework
requires that FSE did not differentially induce students to complete primary school,
thereby avoiding any potential selection bias introduced by a changing composition
of the secondary school student body. Table 2.3 presents coefficients from regressions
represented by equation 2.14 with primary school completion as the dependent vari-
able. All estimated coefficients are small with two of the 15 coefficients marginally
significant.51 The coefficients for the male only sample are slightly larger in mag-
nitude. Overall, the regressions provide little evidence in support of differential
increases in the likelihood of completing primary school.
I also run a falsification test that examines the impact of a hypothetical pro-
gram introduced for the 1987 birth cohort: five years before the program was actually
50Appendix 2.B.3 presents results relaxing the restriction on primary school completers.
51Appendix Table 2.A.2 presents analogous results for the binary treatment analysis.
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implemented. For this analysis, I use the primary to secondary transition rate in
1985-1986 to identify high/low intensity counties and calculate the continuous treat-
ment intensity measure. This generates estimates for the impact of a hypothetical
program on education levels.52
2.5.2 FSE and educational attainment results
Table 2.4 column 1 presents the standard difference-in-differences estimates repre-
sented by equation 2.13, where each coefficient represents the marginal impact of
being in a high intensity county in the FSE period. Results are presented for both
years of education (Panel 1) and completed secondary school (Panel 2). Column 2
controls for funding made available to counties by the central government through
the constituency development fund mechanism and examines whether changes in
schooling were related to differential funding levels by interacting the levels with co-
hort dummy variables. Similarly, column 3 interacts unemployment levels with birth
cohorts to account for endogenous schooling expansion in response to unemployment
levels. Column 4 adds a county specific linear trend to control for potentially het-
erogeneous pre-program trends. Column 5 controls for both county funding and
unemployment as well as the county specific linear trends. The difference in pri-
mary to secondary transition rates between the high and low intensity regions is
0.21. The results suggest that moving from the low intensity average to the high
intensity average led to an average increase of 0.3-0.4 years of education. The esti-
52In Appendix Table 2.A.3, I also run falsification tests using the basic above/below median
intensity difference-in-differences framework for each of the six years 1981-1986.
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mated coefficients across both genders are similar for the first 3 columns. Including
county trends reveals a potential divergence where the gains in years of education
for males becomes insignificant. This suggests that the earlier estimated impact for
men is explained by pre-program trends. In contrast, controlling for county trends
increases the estimated impact on women’s education. Despite increasing average
education, there is no estimated impact on the likelihood of completing secondary
school across either gender. While these estimates are informative and guide the
interpretation of the results, my preferred specification exploits the full variation in
primary to secondary transition rates by using the continuous intensity measure.
Table 2.5 presents the difference-in-differences estimates represented by equa-
tion 2.14 for years of education (Panel 1) and completed secondary schooling (Panel
2). Results are presented for the entire sample as well as for males and females
separately.53 The consistently positive and significant coefficients across the ta-
ble illustrate that free secondary education induced students in counties with low
pre-program primary to secondary transition rates to continue to secondary school.
While the coefficients are much larger than those presented in Table 2.4, the in-
tensity variable has a different interpretation. While the binary intensity measure
presents the impact from going from a low treatment intensity county to a high
treatment intensity county, the continuous variable presents the expected gain at
a given intensity level. At the mean treatment intensity value of 0.34, the average
years of education are estimated to increase by about 0.8 years which is slightly
53Appendix 2.B.1-2.B.3 presents a series of robustness results that exclude either main cities
(Nairobi and Mombasa), the smallest counties, or including individuals who have not completed
primary school. The results are similar in magnitude and significance to those presented below.
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larger than an estimate based on a comparable increase in the binary treatment
specification. Assuming that all students complete their secondary schooling, this
corresponds to inducing about 57% of students not-transitioning prior to the pro-
gram to transition. The estimated coefficients are similar across all specifications.
Notably, and in contrast with the simple binary treatment specification, the results
for men are significant and similar in magnitude to those of the women only sample.
Panel 2 examines whether greater exposure to FSE is associated with a greater
likelihood of completing secondary school. Both pooled gender and female only
specifications yield coefficients around 0.15-0.25. At the average intensity of 0.34,
this corresponds to a decrease in the drop-out rate at primary school completion of
approximately 20%. Estimates across columns 2-5 remain similarly significant and
with similar estimated coefficients with the controls added.
The gains of around 0.8 years of education at the mean intensity estimated
here are considerably lower than the 1 and 1.5 years of education increase estimated
by Keats (2014) for free primary education (FPE) in Uganda and by Osili and Long
(2008) for FPE in Nigeria, respectively. While smaller than the estimated impacts
for primary school programs, the impacts estimated for FSE in Kenya are slightly
larger than those estimated for a secondary school program in The Gambia. Gajigo
(2012) estimates that the girls’ scholarship program led to an increase of about
0.3-0.4 years of education for female students. The smaller coefficients obtained for
secondary schooling programs relative to primary schooling may reflect the higher
opportunity cost of schooling at the secondary level.
I next examine the results of the falsification test examining the impact of a
39
hypothetical program introduced for the 1986 birth cohort. Appendix Figure 2.A.4
splits the sample based on the calculated treatment intensity, suggesting reasonable
common trends across the bifurcated sample. The two rates continue to share the
same trend after the introduction of the hypothetical program. Table 2.6 presents
the regression estimates analogous to Table 2.5 using the falsification sample and
treatment intensity. The coefficients are small and insignificant reflecting the fact
that the pre-FSE transition rates are not correlated with pre-FSE schooling changes.
These results together suggest that FSE led to large and significant gains in
schooling. I next use exposure to FSE as an instrument to examine the impact of
secondary schooling on the fertility behaviors of young women.
2.6 Education, fertility, and occupational choice
2.6.1 Identification strategy
In this section, I use the relationship between FSE and increased educational at-
tainment established in Section 2.5 as the first stage of an instrumental variables
approach to examine the impact of educational attainment on various demographic
and occupational choice variables.
Figure 2.6 presents Kaplan-Meier estimates of the distribution of age of first
intercourse, age at first birth, and age at first marriage, highlighting the drastically
different age of first incidence among those who attend secondary school relative
to those who do not.54 By age 18 over 28% of women who had not attended sec-
54Kaplan-Meier figures illustrate the probability of survival across different intervals when data
are censored (Kaplan and Meier, 1958). Age at first birth and marriage are reported to the nearest
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ondary school had given birth compared to just 12% for those who had attended
some secondary school, while by age 20, the rates were 56% and 26% for the same
groups. For age of first marriage: by age 18 almost 33% of women who had not
attended secondary school were married compared to just 11% for those who had
some secondary schooling. Results from OLS regressions examining the age of first
incidence for these behaviors are reported in Appendix Table 2.A.5 with large esti-
mated impacts.55 However, relating education to these variables directly is fraught
with endogeneity.56 Using the demonstrated relationship between FSE and increased
educational attainment developed in the prior section, I use exposure to the FSE
program as an instrument for education in regressions examining the impact of ed-
ucation on women’s fertility decisions. This corresponds to estimating equations of
the form:
Sijk = α1 + f (Iijk) + β1Xijk + η1k + γ1j + εijk (2.15)
Pijk = α2 + ξ2Ŝijk + β2Xijk + η2k + γ2j + υijk (2.16)
where the endogenous level of schooling Sijk is instrumented using the exposure to
FSE, f (Iijk), which depends on county and year of birth. In running this analysis,
only the interaction instruments of the first stage are excluded from the second stage.
I include religion and tribe demographic variables as covariates. The identifying
month while age at first intercourse is reported at the year level.
55Similarly, summary statistics presented in Section 2.4.1 illustrate large differences across edu-
cational attainment in labor market sector.
56Omitted variables such as ability and discount rates are likely to be correlated with both
education and childbearing decisions introducing bias into OLS estimates.
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assumption in this instrumental variables approach is that FSE had no direct effect
on the fertility variables other than through its effect on educational attainment.57
Figure 2.7 presents the coefficients on the interactions between county intensity
and year of birth in a regression where the dependent variable is years of schooling.
These coefficients are approximately equal to 0 prior to the implementation of FSE
at which time it jumps to a positive and significant coefficient. All of the subse-
quent interaction coefficients are positive and significant. As expected, the intensity
measure is correlated with attainment gains following the FSE introduction but had
no measurable effect on the education of cohorts who reached secondary school age
before the program was implemented. With this figure in mind, I define my instru-
ment as the interaction between an indicator variable for the post period and the
county intensity measure.58 Thus, the instrument is defined as:
f (Iijk) = ξ1 (Ik × postj) (2.17)
where postj is an indicator variable equal to one for cohort impacted by FSE.
I examine the impact of educational attainment on a number of key demo-
graphic variables: age of first intercourse, age of first birth, age of first marriage,
57For FSE exposure to serve as a valid instrument, two assumptions must hold. First, FSE
must impact educational attainment. The results presented in Section 2.5 indicate that this is
so. Second, the exclusion restriction must hold. This requires that conditional on covariates,
FSE must only impact the fertility variables through its impact on educational attainment. The
exposure of an individual to the program was determined by the individual’s year and region of
birth. After controlling for region of birth and cohort fixed effects, the interactions between cohort
indicator variables and county intensity measures are plausibly exogenous variables, and are used
as instruments in the fertility and labor market equations.
58Appendix tables 2.A.6-2.A.9 present the results including interactions between individual birth
cohorts and the county intensity measure. The results are consistent with the main results pre-
sented below albeit with a slightly weaker instrument.
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desired fertility, and contraceptive use. For each of the age variables, I examine
the impact of schooling on the probability of doing each of these activities before
ages 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20. I report results for both genders pooled and for women
only.59
I use the same approach to examine the impact of education on labor market
outcomes including whether individuals are working and the sector of work. As my
sample includes individuals as young as 18, it is likely that some younger members
of the sample have not yet entered the labor market. This would increase the
proportion reporting no work and potentially underestimate the impact on working
in the professional sector. With this in mind, I progressively restrict the sample to
older and older cohorts to try and focus on individuals who are unlikely to still be
in school. This yields three sets of results; one for individuals aged 18 and over,
another for individuals 19 and over, and a final set for those aged 20 and over.
2.6.2 Impacts of education on fertility
Figure 2.8 and Table 2.7 present the coefficients from the instrumental variable
estimates for the probability of first intercourse, birth, and marriage before each
teenage age. The coefficients for first intercourse are all negative with the magnitude
of the estimated coefficients increasing as the age cutoff increases. Each additional
year of education is estimated to decrease the probability of having first intercourse
at age 16 by around 3 percentage points, rising to almost 8 percentage points by age
59For the male only sample, which is smaller, the instrument fails to satisfy the Staiger and
Stock (1997) recommendation that the F-statistic exceed 10.
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18 and 18 percentage points by age 20 on base rates of 23%, 46% and 70% suggesting
a decrease of between 10-25% at each age. The results appear to be driven by large
effects for women as the coefficients for the pooled sample where men are included
are lower than the women’s only sample. Larger impacts are estimated for age of
first marriage. The coefficients for women indicate a decrease of about 59% in the
likelihood of being married before age 18 and of 47% for being married before age 20.
The results for age of first birth are also consistent across ages with the estimated
coefficients indicate a decreased likelihood of having a first child by age 16-20 of
30-50%.60
Taken together, the estimated coefficients suggest large and significant impacts
of education on delaying these fertility behaviors. The estimated impacts on age of
first birth are slightly larger in magnitude than those estimated by Ferré (2009) who,
in her analysis of adding an additional year of primary schooling in Kenya, concludes
that an additional year of education decreases the probability of teenage childbearing
by 24-29%. In his analysis of the secondary school admissions discontinuity in
Kenya, Ozier (Forthcoming) estimates that secondary schooling almost completely
eliminates teen pregnancy. While my instrument is too weak to examine the impact
of completing secondary school on teenage pregnancy, the estimated coefficient on
each additional year of education suggests that a similar elimination of teenage
pregnancy would arise from a full four years of secondary education. Using the
introduction of free primary education in Uganda, Keats (2014) obtains slightly
60Appendix Table 2.A.5 presents coefficients from OLS estimates of the impact of education on
age of first intercourse, age of first birth, and age of first marriage. The IV estimates are univer-
sally larger than the OLS estimates suggesting downward omitted variable bias due to negative
correlation between family variables, such as income, and fertility behaviors.
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smaller estimates: each additional year of education decreases the probability of first
birth at each age between 16 and 20 by between 5-20%. By contrast, while I estimate
large and significant negative impacts of education on age of first intercourse, Keats
(2014) finds evidence that an additional year of education increased the likelihood
of intercourse by age 18, and estimates insignificant coefficients for other ages. The
apparent incongruity of the Uganda and Kenya results may be due to the different
policies examined and the different ages at which they keep students in school: free
primary education is likely to induce students to remain in school through their
middle teenage years while free secondary education is likely to induce students to
remain through their late teenage years.
Ferré (2009) details three main mechanisms through which education may
delay child bearing: a “knowledge” effect where more educated individuals are better
informed about contraception, an “autonomy” or empowerment effect where women
shift their preferences towards fewer, higher quality children, and an “incarceration”
effect whereby students either spend time in school and therefore have less time to
get pregnant or they may delay childbearing to finish their schooling.61 All of these
effects are potential avenues through which education could also impact age of first
intercourse and age of first birth. If an incarceration effect is the primary mechanism
through which education delays childbearing then the different impact patterns on
age of first birth estimated in this paper and Keats (2014) could be due to the
differing sources of variation: primary education may only impact behaviors around
61Students who get pregnant in Kenya are often asked to leave school. While Ministry of
Education guidelines stipulate that students can remain in school while pregnant and return to
school post-pregnancy this does not always occur in practice.
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the primary age range and impacts decreasing in the late teenage years. In Tables
2.8-2.9, I investigate whether educational attainment changed behaviors or beliefs
corresponding with the first and second of the three mechanisms.
Table 2.8 examines the impact of education on reported contraceptive usage
finding no evidence of increased contraceptive use or access. Table 2.9 examines the
impact of education on desired fertility which is marginally significant for the pooled
sample and negative and insignificant for the female sample. The pooled estimate
of -0.2 desired children is similar to that estimated by Keats (2014), who found
evidence of a large (-0.3) and significant impact. The lack of significant impacts for
women on proxies for both the knowledge and autonomy effects suggests that the
incarceration effect may be the dominant mechanism of behavior change. As FSE
primarily impacted day schools where students return home in the evenings and over
weekends, it seems likely that the measured impacts are not attributable to a direct
confinement effect associated with being separated from individuals of the opposite
gender, but rather to individuals choosing to delay intercourse to ensure that they
can continue their schooling.
2.6.3 Impacts of education on occupational choice
Table 2.10, Panel A presents analogous instrumental variables estimates examining
the impacts of education on women’s sector of work. The results indicate an in-
creased likelihood of skilled work and a decreased likelihood of agricultural work.
The estimates of decreased agricultural work may be attributable to a delayed tran-
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sition to the labor market as many of the younger women in the sample might still
be in school, which would potentially inflate the proportion reporting no work. If
individuals exit secondary school and enter agricultural work, the presented coeffi-
cients overestimate the negative impact on agricultural work. Panel B and Panel C
restrict the sample to slightly older populations to try and decrease the proportion
reporting no work due to continued schooling. As expected, the older samples are
less likely to report no work. While the estimated impact of education on agricul-
tural work decreases slightly in the older samples, the estimated coefficient remains
large in magnitude and significant with no corresponding decrease in impact on
skilled work. This suggests that individuals are less likely to work in agriculture
and more likely to have skilled work. These findings for women complement those
of Ozier (Forthcoming), who found that secondary schooling for men decreased low-
skill self-employment and may have increased formal employment.
While the positive impact I find on skilled work is likely a lower bound, as it
may grow stronger as the sample ages, this shift towards skilled work might not yield
the growth benefits if it comes as a result of signaling rather than an increased stock
of cognitive ability (Hanushek and Wößmann, 2008). However, Ozier (Forthcoming)
presents evidence that secondary schooling in Kenya increases human capital. His
estimates are valid for the inframarginal students that may be impacted by FSE,
suggesting that the sectoral shifts are likely not purely the result of signaling, but
also of increased human capital.
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2.7 FSE and student achievement
2.7.1 Identification strategy
I next examine the impact that FSE had on student achievement by exploiting
the differential exposure to FSE, and the associated differential expansion, across
counties. As modeled in Section 2.2.1, a decrease in the cost of schooling will lead
to a decrease in student achievement unless high-performing students are credit
constrained prior to the program. With this in mind, my analysis of the impact of
FSE on student achievement is a test of credit constraints: an increase in student
achievement indicates that credit constraints precluded high-ability students from
further schooling.
As described in Section 2.4.3, I consider cohorts of students who made the
secondary school entrance decision after the program was announced as treated – the
first cohort entered secondary school in 2008 and subsequently took the secondary
school completion examination in 2011. With this in mind, I set the treatment
intensity to zero for cohorts prior to 2011.62 I first examine the impact of FSE
on overall student achievement by running a regression analogous to equation 2.14
examining student performance on the secondary school completion examination:
Tijk = α0 + β1 (Ik ∗ FSEj) + ηk + γj + εijk (2.18)
62Appendix 2.B.4 presents the results of an alternative analysis where I assume that older cohorts
are impacted by larger younger FSE cohorts and the early FSE cohorts are less impacted due to
smaller cohorts ahead of them.
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where Tijk is the normalized test score of individual i in cohort j in county k. As
described in the model, this regression will conflate a dilution of resource quality
with a changing composition of the student body. If the estimated coefficient of β1
is zero, then counties that expanded their secondary schooling levels more saw no
change in their average performance. With a dilution of existing school resources,
this implies that the average student ability increased which indicates that students
were credit constrained.63 A negative coefficient on average achievement confounds a
dilution of school resources with new student quality and I am unable to determine
the impact of FSE on average student ability. The results from this test, shown
below in Section 2.7.2, are able to rule out large negative impacts.
I then follow Lucas and Mbiti (2012a) and Valente (2015) and examine the
impact of the program on students who likely would have continued through to sec-
ondary school even in the absence of the program. For these students, there is no
change in the composition of the student body so that any measured impact on aca-
demic achievement should be restricted to arise only from the dilution of resources.64
While the preceding analysis suggests that FSE eased credit constraints allowing
both high and low performing students to continue their schooling, for this analysis,
63Redistributing existing resources, such as teachers, across counties would mitigate the dilution
of resources and bias my estimates down. If the program targeted a select population or region,
additional resources could be diverted and offset the dilution with only limited impact on the
resources available to the non-treated population. FSE was implemented at a national level and
thus the estimates are appropriate in incorporating any intentional redistribution of resources
across counties. Empirically, data from Ministry of Education (2008b) and Ministry of Education,
Science and Technology (2014a) do not provide evidence of a redistribution of teachers: the growth
in number of teachers at the regional level is negatively correlated (-0.5) with the mean regional
intensity and only weakly positively correlated (0.1) when excluding three North-Eastern Kenya
counties which experienced a large relative increase in teachers (Garissa, Mandera, and Wajir).
64Lucas and Mbiti (2012a) and Valente (2015) both assume that additional students are lower
performing and use the changes-in-changes approach of Athey and Imbens (2006) to measure the
impact across the upper-half of the distribution.
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I assume that the highest performers would have been able to attend secondary
school even in the absence of the program by raising funds through family or vil-
lage networks.65 The analysis requires that I identify a sufficiently high-performing
sample, based on KCSE score, for whom the introduction of FSE was unlikely to
change their schooling decisions. I use the one cohort of primary school graduates
for whom I have both KCPE and KCSE data to examine the relationship between
primary school and secondary school completion examination results. Figure 2.A.5
shows the proportion of students who completed secondary school in either 2014
or 2015 broken down by their score on the 2010 KCPE. In this period, 90% of the
students who score over 290 points (out of 500) complete secondary school within 5
years suggesting that the remaining uniform, book, and facilities fees are deterring,
at most, 10% of students from continuing to secondary school. I define my sample
so that no more than 5% of students are expected to have KCPE results below this
value; 95% of students who scored 64 or above on the KCSE also scored above 290
on the KCPE and constitute a little less than 10% of the test taking body. I there-
fore restrict attention to the highest performing 10% across counties and assume
that these students are sufficiently high performing that they would have been able
to raise the requisite funds for schooling in the absence of FSE.66 The identification
65Ideally, I would like to examine the likelihood, by primary school completion examination
grade, that students who completed primary school in 2007 continued on to secondary school. If
almost all students who scored above some mark proceeded to secondary school then I could exam-
ine the impact of FSE on the relative performance of students who scored above the mark without
composition effects of additional students induced to attend secondary school. Unfortunately, I do
not have matched primary and secondary school completion examination results for all years and
can only examine the likelihood of completing secondary school for those who sat for the primary
school examination in 2010. This is in the post-FSE period which will inflate the likelihood that
students of any score proceed to secondary school but which I assume is indicative of the pre-FSE
period.
66The cutoff for funded admission to universities, which varies year-to-year, has historically been
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assumption to examine the impact of resource dilution on academic outcomes within
the sample is that the schooling decisions of students who scored in the top 10%
of their county were unaffected by the FSE program.67 While I can also examine
the impact at lower performance levels, these estimates are more likely to conflate
resource dilution together with potential composition changes.
I also examine the impact on the top 10% of the distribution using the changes-
in-changes (CiC) approach of Athey and Imbens (2006). The CiC model is a gener-
alization of the difference-in-differences estimator that estimates the entire counter-
factual distribution of a treated group which is identified under the assumption that
the changes in the distribution of the treated and comparison groups would, absent
treatment, be the same. The standard estimator considers the impact of a binary
treatment across two time periods. I consider the pre- and post-FSE periods and
compare students in counties exposed to a treatment intensity above the median to
those in counties below the median intensity level. The treatment effect at quantile
q is calculated as:
τCiCq = F
−1
Y 1,11 (q)− F
−1
Y N ,11









where FY 1,gt is the cumulative distribution function of group g in time t. The
CiC model imposes three main assumptions.68 First, the potential test scores of
around 64 points.
67I am currently seeking an analogous probability of reaching the KCSE by KCPE score for the
pre-FSE period.
68These are laid out in Athey and Imbens (2006) Assumption 3.1-3.3. An additional common
support assumption (Athey and Imbens (2006) assumption 3.4) requires that outcomes of the









N = h (Ai, Ti) (2.20)
where Ai is an underlying unobserved ability and Ti is the time period in which
the test was taken. Second, CiC imposes a strict monotonicity framework that
the test score production function h (Ai, Ti) be strictly increasing in A. Third, the
underlying ability distribution within a group can not vary over time:
Ai⊥Ti|Gi (2.21)
Focusing on the entire sample of students who sat for the KCSE exam in
the post-FSE period would violate this assumption as FSE would likely have in-
duced not only the credit constrained students to continue their schooling but also
lower-ability students for whom FSE changes their optimal schooling decision. As
described above, I try to satisfy the requirement that the underlying ability dis-
tribution within a group not vary over time by restricting my focus to the highest
performing students. I control for county fixed effects and county linear trends
following the parametric approach suggested by Athey and Imbens (2006).
2.7.2 FSE and student achievement results
In examining the impact of FSE on student achievement, I first confirm that the
growth in secondary school students is evident in the secondary school completion
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examination results. Table 2.11 presents the estimates of the regression represented
by equation 2.18 where the dependent variable is the number of students who sat for
the secondary school completion examination relative to pre-FSE levels. The results
show that more intensely treated counties saw larger increases in the number of test
takers. The gains in test takers are robust to controlling for potentially confounding
programs and funding levels. The estimated impacts are similar gains for males
and females, and are also similar in magnitude to the statistically insignificant gains
estimated above using the DHS data.
Confirming that the FSE growth is evident in the test data, I next consider
the impact on average test scores. Table 2.12 Panel A presents results examining
whether average test scores decreased in areas that more intensely treated. The
pooled results presented in columns 1-2 indicate small impacts as the estimated
coefficients of -0.007 and 0.07 standard deviations suggest that at the average in-
tensity of 0.34 the estimated impact is about 0.02 standard deviations. To put this
coefficient into perspective, I run a simulation to estimate the effect of the program
without credit constraints where I assume that the program induced lower-ability
students to continue their schooling. This simulation yields an estimated impact of
about -0.3 standard deviations.69 This null result is indicative of credit constraints,
as the negative impact of a dilution in educational resources requires an increase in
average ability to yield no overall impact.
With the near zero estimated coefficients providing evidence in support of
69Appendix C describes the simulation and Appendix Table 2.C.1 presents the estimated treat-
ment coefficients.
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the presence of credit constraints, I next consider the impact of the program on
the scores of students at the very upper end who may have taken the exam in the
absence of FSE. Panel B of Table 2.12 presents the results associated with equation
2.18 where the sample is restricted to individuals who scored above 64 on the KCSE.
The results rule out large negative impacts and are suggestive of positive impacts.
Finally, Table 2.13 uses the changes-in-changes methodology to examine whether
FSE differentially impacted students across the top of the score or ability distribu-
tion. One of the nine coefficients is significant at the 10% level with all estimated
coefficients relatively small. The estimated impacts here and above together suggest
limited impacts of school access expansion on academic achievement. This finding
is in line with that of Lucas and Mbiti (2012a) who find evidence of, at most, small
impacts of free primary education in Kenya. While I can not fully rule out pos-
itive impacts, the non-negative impacts are in line with those of Blimpo, Gajigo,
and Pugatch (2015) who find that free secondary education for girls in The Gambia
increased test scores.
2.8 Conclusion
In early 2008, the Kenyan government implemented a free secondary education pro-
gram. The program increased educational attainment for primary school completers
by approximately 0.8 years. This paper uses differential exposure to the program,
in an instrumental variables framework, to present new evidence on the impact of
education on a range of demographic and labor market outcomes.
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I find that secondary schooling has broad impacts on fertility behaviors. Sec-
ondary schooling decreases the probability of first intercourse at all ages between
16 and 20 by around 25%, decreases the probability of first marriage at all ages
between 16 and 20 by around 50%, and decreases the probability of teenage child-
bearing by 37%. Despite these impacts, I find no evidence that secondary schooling
decreases desired fertility or increases modern contraceptive use. This suggests that
free education decreases risky behaviors that could potentially preclude continued
schooling. These demographic impacts suggest a potentially large additional benefit
of the program, as delayed fertility behaviors are associated with significant benefits
for both the mother and child (Ferré, 2009; Schultz, 2008).
I also find that post-primary schooling shifts young women across labor market
sectors. Education increases the likelihood of work in skilled labor by 28% and
decreases the likelihood of working in agriculture by almost 80%. These findings
for women complement similar existing findings for men (Ozier, Forthcoming). This
shift towards more productive sectors is suggestive of potential growth consequences
of the program.
Finally, I use new individual examination results data to demonstrate that the
rapid increases in educational attainment associated with the free secondary educa-
tion policy did not lead to a corresponding decrease in the educational achievement
of students. Impact estimates which combine both composition changes and re-
source dilution are small and insignificant. With a decrease in resource quality, this
implies an increase in mean student ability. I present a model showing that an
offsetting increase in mean student ability is consistent with credit constraints pre-
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cluding poor students from attending secondary schooling. The results on student
achievement suggest that concerns over rapid expansions of schooling systems may
be overstated and that countries are able to adjust to additional students without
negative consequences to the quality of education.
The methodology used here could be employed with future survey data, in
which individuals exposed to the program are older, to examine longer term fertility
and labor market outcomes. Further, using future data may also provide evidence
on the impact of education on spousal quality: if assortative matching is taking
place, we may expect the education gains to have intergenerational impacts.
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Actual admissions Trend line for Pre-FSE period
Source: Kenya Economic Surveys (2000-2013).
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Age at time of FSE
Age distribution of primary school completion exam cohort
Implied percent of cohort exposed to FSE
Source: 2014 KCPE registration data.
Notes: The age distribution for the first FSE cohort (2007 primary school completers) is assumed
to have been the same as that observed in the 2014 cohort. The implied cumulative distribution
assumes that age distribution of test takers is stable across time.
based on the age distribution of primary school completers
Percent of each cohort exposed to FSE
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Cohort
High pre-program access Low pre-program access
Pre-program linear trend Pre-program linear trend
Source: 2014 Kenya DHS.
Notes: High/low pre-program access defined as whether county average pri-sec transition rate
between 1989 and 1990 was above/below the average transition rate.  Pri-sec transition rate
defined as share of primary school graduates with at least some secondary schooling. Free
secondary education introduced in early 2008 for the 2007 KCPE cohort. 70% of KCPE students 
in 2014 were 14-16 years old suggesting program first impacted students born between 1991 
and 1993.
and by high/low pre-FSE program transition rates
Primary to secondary transition rates by birth cohort
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Primary to secondary transition rate
Source: 2014 Kenya DHS.
Notes: Transition rate measured as students with any secondary schooling as a fraction of
primary school graduates. Dashed line indicates mean county transition rate.
Pre-FSE county transition rates
Figure 2.5: Pre-program primary to secondary transition rates by county
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Figure 2.6: Kaplan-Meier survival estimates
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Lines depict the probability of still being in a (a) no
intercourse, (b) no birth, or (c) no marriage state by
schooling level. Sample restricted to women. In this
context, survival refers to remaining in the initial state.
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Cohort
in the years of education regression
Interaction between year of birth and treatment intensity
Note: Coefficients are on the interaction between county FSE intensity and birth
cohort. A joint F-test of pre-program values does not reject that all values are
equal to zero.
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16 17 18 19 20
Age
First intercourse First marriage First birth
Each point represents the coefficient on years of education from separate regressions where
the dependent variables are binary indicators for whether individuals participated in each behavior
before age X.  Years of education is instrumented with cohort * county level exposure.  The bars
denote the corresponding 95% confidence intervals, with standard errors clustered by county. The
F-statistics for first intercourse and first marriage are 10.46, 10.46, 10.46, 12.43, and 14.38 for
age 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20, respectively. First birth F-statistics are 18.08, 18.08, 18.08,
22.76, and 13.34.
before selected ages
Estimated impact of secondary education on behaviors
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Table 2.1: DHS sample characteristics
Obs. Mean S.D. Median Min. Max.
A. Primary School Completers
Female 13605 0.71 0.46 1 0 1
Age 13605 23.97 3.90 24 18 31
Years of education 13605 10.49 2.35 10 8 19
Completed primary school 13605 1.00 0.00 1 1 1
Attended some secondary school 13605 0.65 0.48 1 0 1
Completed secondary school 13605 0.42 0.49 0 0 1
Female fertility behaviors:
Age at first intercourse 8298 17.72 2.85 18 5 30
Age at first birth 6432 19.54 3.08 19 11 31
Age at first marriage/cohabitation 6097 19.47 3.23 19 10 31
Male fertility behaviors:
Age at first intercourse 3446 16.45 3.38 16 5 30
Age at first marriage/cohabitation 1454 22.46 3.13 23 13 30
Employment sector:
Not working 8499 0.28 0.45 0 0 1
Agricultural work 8499 0.17 0.38 0 0 1
Unskilled work 8499 0.37 0.48 0 0 1
Skilled work 8499 0.18 0.38 0 0 1
Intensity (1-transition rate) 13605 0.35 0.12 0.34 0.05 0.66
B. Secondary School Completers
Female 5704 0.69 0.46 1 0 1
Age 5704 24.32 3.64 24 18 31
Female fertility behaviors:
Age at first intercourse 3389 18.95 2.81 19 8 29
Age at first birth 2231 21.24 3.10 21 11 31
Age at first marriage/cohabitation 2166 21.21 2.94 21 10 30
Male fertility behaviors:
Age at first intercourse 1575 16.93 3.41 17 5 30
Age at first marriage/cohabitation 603 23.30 2.90 23 13 30
Employment sector:
Not working 3615 0.24 0.43 0 0 1
Agricultural work 3615 0.11 0.32 0 0 1
Unskilled work 3615 0.35 0.48 0 0 1
Skilled work 3615 0.30 0.46 0 0 1
Source: 2014 Kenya DHS
Note: Sample restricted to individuals born between 1983 and 1996 and who are at
least 18 years old at the time of the survey. Employment questions were only included
in the full survey which was asked of approximately half the sample. Unskilled work
comprises unskilled manual work, household work, and services work. Skilled work
comprises skilled manual work or professional work.
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Number of schools: 5141 7445
Public schools: 4346 6213
Private schools: 795 1232
Number of test takers per year: 300355 437049
Public schools: 262995 384756
Private schools: 37360 52294
Number of test takers per school: 88.94 92.32
Public schools: 90.23 94.76
Private schools: 79.89 74.38
Standardized KCSE score: -0.051 -0.066
Public schools: -0.022 -0.050
Private schools: -0.254 -0.205
Note: Counts calculated as annual averages over stated period.
2012 data are not available. A small number of national schools that
draw high performing students from across Kenya are excluded.
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Table 2.3: Difference-in-differences estimates: primary schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Pooled Gender
(1-transition rate)*FSE period 0.055 0.06 0.086∗∗ -0.134 -0.06
(0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.083) (0.083)
Observations 20458 20458 20458 20458 20458
R2 0.208 0.209 0.209 0.211 0.212
B. Female Only
(1-transition rate)*FSE period 0.04 0.043 0.082 -0.129 -0.024
(0.059) (0.057) (0.067) (0.098) (0.102)
Observations 14934 14934 14934 14934 14934
R2 0.228 0.229 0.229 0.232 0.234
C. Male Only
(1-transition rate)*FSE period 0.116 0.124 0.122 -0.143 -0.148
(0.105) (0.107) (0.112) (0.152) (0.165)
Observations 5524 5524 5524 5524 5524
R2 0.153 0.156 0.155 0.164 0.169
Control variables:
Constituency development funds * birth year X X
2009 unemployment rate * birth year X X
County linear trends X X
Note: Dependent variable is a binary variable equal to one if an individual has com-
pleted primary school. All regressions include birth year, county, and ethnicity/religion
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted
using DHS survey weights. Transition rate defined as the percentage of primary school
graduates who attend secondary school. Initial transition rate defined as the average
transition rate in each county for students born in either 1989 or 1990. FSE period
defined as birth cohorts after and including 1991. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 99
percent level; ∗∗ indicates significance at the 95 percent level; and ∗ indicates signifi-
cance at the 90 percent level.
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Table 2.4: Binary treatment intensity difference-in-differences estimates: secondary
education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel 1: years of education
A. Pooled Gender
High Intensity*FSE period 0.348∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗ 0.382∗∗ 0.387∗
(0.133) (0.129) (0.135) (0.168) (0.198)
Observations 13605 13605 13605 13605 13605
R2 0.093 0.095 0.094 0.1 0.102
B. Female Only
High Intensity*FSE period 0.346∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗ 0.479∗∗ 0.564∗∗
(0.132) (0.13) (0.139) (0.199) (0.221)
Observations 9596 9596 9596 9596 9596
R2 0.089 0.091 0.09 0.096 0.099
C. Male Only
High Intensity*FSE period 0.367∗ 0.348∗ 0.328 0.138 0.024
(0.199) (0.192) (0.205) (0.337) (0.39)
Observations 4009 4009 4009 4009 4009
R2 0.124 0.128 0.127 0.139 0.146
Panel 2: completed secondary school
A. Pooled Gender
High Intensity*FSE period 0.001 0.005 -0.004 0.013 0.024
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.039) (0.038)
Observations 13605 13605 13605 13605 13605
R2 0.1 0.101 0.101 0.103 0.105
B. Female Only
High Intensity*FSE period -0.008 -0.002 -0.012 0.033 0.063
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.049) (0.048)
Observations 9596 9596 9596 9596 9596
R2 0.098 0.1 0.099 0.102 0.105
C. Male Only
High Intensity*FSE period 0.014 0.017 0.009 -0.044 -0.062
(0.035) (0.035) (0.04) (0.072) (0.078)
Observations 4009 4009 4009 4009 4009
R2 0.129 0.134 0.135 0.14 0.151
Control variables:
Constituency development funds * birth year X X
2009 unemployment rate * birth year X X
County linear trend X X
Note: Reported coefficients are the estimated interaction coefficient between a dummy
variable for high treatment intensity counties and an FSE indicator variable equal to one for
all individuals born in 1991 or later. Sample restricted to individuals who have completed at
least primary school. All regressions include birth year, county, and ethnicity/religion fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted using
DHS survey weights. Transition rate defined as the percentage of primary school graduates
who attend secondary school. Initial transition rate defined as the average transition rate
in each county for students born in either 1989 or 1990. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 99
percent level; ∗∗ indicates significance at the 95 percent level; and ∗ indicates significance
at the 90 percent level.
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Table 2.5: Difference-in-differences estimates: secondary education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel 1: years of education
A. Pooled Gender
(1-transition rate)*FSE period 2.255∗∗∗ 2.256∗∗∗ 2.060∗∗∗ 2.059∗∗∗ 2.134∗∗∗
(0.31) (0.311) (0.356) (0.718) (0.677)
Observations 13605 13605 13605 13605 13605
R2 0.099 0.101 0.1 0.104 0.106
B. Female Only
(1-transition rate)*FSE period 2.409∗∗∗ 2.449∗∗∗ 2.221∗∗∗ 2.058∗∗ 2.336∗∗∗
(0.277) (0.268) (0.336) (0.897) (0.709)
Observations 9596 9596 9596 9596 9596
R2 0.091 0.093 0.092 0.096 0.099
C. Male Only
(1-transition rate)*FSE period 2.047∗∗∗ 2.035∗∗∗ 1.942∗∗∗ 2.374∗∗ 2.075
(0.673) (0.616) (0.686) (1.090) (1.309)
Observations 4009 4009 4009 4009 4009
R2 0.125 0.129 0.128 0.14 0.147
Panel 2: completed secondary school
A. Pooled Gender
(1-transition rate)*FSE period 0.129∗ 0.145∗∗ 0.116 0.158 0.201
(0.071) (0.066) (0.087) (0.135) (0.126)
Observations 13605 13605 13605 13605 13605
R2 0.104 0.105 0.105 0.107 0.109
B. Female Only
(1-transition rate)*FSE period 0.143∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.146 0.213 0.321∗∗
(0.081) (0.069) (0.091) (0.156) (0.13)
Observations 9596 9596 9596 9596 9596
R2 0.099 0.1 0.099 0.102 0.105
C. Male Only
(1-transition rate)*FSE period 0.085 0.107 0.064 0.046 -0.05
(0.111) (0.108) (0.129) (0.231) (0.267)
Observations 4009 4009 4009 4009 4009
R2 0.129 0.134 0.135 0.14 0.151
Control variables:
Constituency development funds * birth year X X
2009 unemployment rate * birth year X X
County linear trend X X
Note: Sample restricted to individuals who have completed at least primary school. All
regressions include birth year, county, and ethnicity/religion fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted using DHS survey weights.
Transition rate defined as the percentage of primary school graduates who attend secondary
school. Initial transition rate defined as the average transition rate in each county for
students born in either 1989 or 1990. FSE period defined as birth cohorts after and including
1991. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 99 percent level; ∗∗ indicates significance at the 95
percent level; and ∗ indicates significance at the 90 percent level.
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Table 2.6: Falsification test difference-in-differences estimates: secondary education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel 1: years of education
A. Pooled Gender
(1-transition rate)*FSE period 0.713 0.462 0.737 1.418 1.034
(0.45) (0.357) (0.478) (1.028) (1.081)
Observations 7661 7661 7661 7661 7661
R2 0.108 0.11 0.108 0.113 0.114
B. Female Only
(1-transition rate)*FSE period 0.718 0.475 0.731 1.062 1.092
(0.674) (0.548) (0.664) (1.147) (1.323)
Observations 5484 5484 5484 5484 5484
R2 0.099 0.101 0.1 0.105 0.107
C. Male Only
(1-transition rate)*FSE period 0.517 0.289 0.668 2.482∗ 1.193
(0.877) (1.037) (0.92) (1.484) (1.922)
Observations 2177 2177 2177 2177 2177
R2 0.12 0.124 0.122 0.142 0.147
Panel 2: completed secondary school
A. Pooled Gender
(1-transition rate)*FSE period 0.058 0.022 0.07 0.05 0.014
(0.084) (0.078) (0.096) (0.178) (0.214)
Observations 7661 7661 7661 7661 7661
R2 0.09 0.092 0.091 0.094 0.096
B. Female Only
(1-transition rate)*FSE period -0.027 -0.077 -0.003 -0.13 -0.054
(0.118) (0.102) (0.123) (0.191) (0.238)
Observations 5484 5484 5484 5484 5484
R2 0.088 0.09 0.089 0.095 0.097
C. Male Only
(1-transition rate)*FSE period 0.212 0.214 0.224 0.517∗∗ 0.306
(0.176) (0.18) (0.183) (0.251) (0.311)
Observations 2177 2177 2177 2177 2177
R2 0.093 0.096 0.097 0.11 0.116
Control variables:
Constituency development funds * birth year X X
2009 unemployment rate * birth year X X
County specific linear trends X X
Note: All regressions include birth year, county, and ethnicity/religion fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted using DHS survey weights.
Transition rate defined as the percentage of primary school graduates who attend secondary
school. Initial transition rate defined as the average transition rate in each county for students
born in either 1986 or 1985. Pre-FSE treatment period defined as birth cohorts after and
including 1987.
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Table 2.7: Instrumental variables estimates: fertility behaviors
Mean dep. var Est. treatment effect
Pooled Female Pooled Female
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First intercourse before age:
16 0.226 0.186 -0.027∗ -0.050∗
(0.016) (0.028)
17 0.341 0.302 -0.061∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.040)
18 0.460 0.425 -0.078∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.042)
19 0.604 0.573 -0.162∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.062)
20 0.700 0.678 -0.177∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.073)
First marriage before age:
16 0.046 0.063 -0.027∗ -0.042∗∗
(0.015) (0.020)
17 0.080 0.109 -0.057∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.023)
18 0.130 0.176 -0.073∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.029)
19 0.197 0.262 -0.095∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.039)
20 0.281 0.364 -0.143∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.048)











Note: Dependent variable is equal to one if the event (inter-
course/marriage/birth) happened before the individual turned age X.
Reported values are the estimated coefficients on years of education
where years of education is instrumented with post * county level ex-
posure. The F-statistics for the pooled sample are 55.52, 55.52, 55.52,
41.47, and 40.48 for age 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20, respectively. The first
birth F-statistics are 75.78, 75.78, 75.78, 55.04, and 37.47. Standard
errors clustered at the county level are reported in parenthesis. Sample
restricted to individuals who have completed at least primary school.
All regressions include birth year, county, and ethnicity/religion fixed
effects. Regressions are weighted using DHS survey weights. ∗∗∗ indi-
cates significance at the 99 percent level; ∗∗ indicates significance at the
95 percent level; and ∗ indicates significance at the 90 percent level.70
Table 2.8: Instrumental variables estimates: contraceptive use
Uses any Uses modern Uses Can get
contraceptive method condoms condoms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of education -0.017 -0.043 0.022 0.032
(0.052) (0.042) (0.03) (0.049)
Constant 0.675 0.83∗∗ -0.14 0.203
(0.492) (0.399) (0.282) (0.496)
Observations 8298 8298 8298 3868
First stage F-stat: 30.311 30.311 30.311 10.419
Note: Years of education instrumented with post * county level exposure.
Standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in parenthesis.
Sample restricted to individuals who have completed at least primary school
and have had intercourse. All regressions include birth year, county, and
ethnicity/religion fixed effects. Regressions are weighted using DHS survey
weights. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 99 percent level; ∗∗ indicates signif-
icance at the 95 percent level; and ∗ indicates significance at the 90 percent
level.
Table 2.9: Instrumental variables estimates: desired fertility
Pooled Female
(1) (2)





First stage F-stat: 30.622 15.031
Note: Dependent variable is the respondent’s ideal
number of children. Years of education instrumented
with post * county level exposure. Standard errors
clustered at the county level are reported in paren-
thesis. Sample restricted to individuals who have
completed at least primary school. All regressions in-
clude birth year, county, and ethnicity/religion fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county
level. Regressions are weighted using DHS survey
weights. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 99 percent
level; ∗∗ indicates significance at the 95 percent level;
and ∗ indicates significance at the 90 percent level.
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Table 2.10: Instrumental variables estimates: sector of work
Skilled Unskilled Agricultural No
Work Work Work Work
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel 1. Age 18 and over
Years of education 0.069∗∗∗ -0.06 -0.18∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗
(0.022) (0.064) (0.039) (0.079)
Observations 4525 4525 4525 4525
First stage F-stat: 22.909 22.909 22.909 22.909
Panel 2. Age 19 and over
Years of education 0.074∗∗∗ -0.047 -0.169∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗
(0.023) (0.059) (0.037) (0.07)
Observations 4295 4295 4295 4295
First stage F-stat: 24.347 24.347 24.347 24.347
Panel 3. Age 20 and over
Years of education 0.082∗∗∗ -0.037 -0.137∗∗∗ 0.092
(0.025) (0.057) (0.033) (0.067)
Observations 3935 3935 3935 3935
First stage F-stat: 16.226 16.226 16.226 16.226
Note: Dependent variable is a binary variable equal to one if respondent works
in sector X. Years of education instrumented with post * county level exposure.
Unskilled labor aggregates household/domestic work, service jobs, and unskilled
manual labor. Skilled labor aggregates professional/technical/managerial/clerical
and skilled manual labor. Standard errors clustered at the county level are re-
ported in parenthesis. Sample restricted to women who have completed at least
primary school. All regressions include birth year, county, and ethnicity/religion
fixed effects. Regressions are weighted using DHS survey weights. ∗∗∗ indicates
significance at the 99 percent level; ∗∗ indicates significance at the 95 percent
level; and ∗ indicates significance at the 90 percent level.
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Table 2.11: County expansion at secondary school completion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Pooled Gender
(1-transition rate)*FSE period 0.192∗∗ 0.196∗ 0.245∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.104) (0.09) (0.093)
Observations 423 423 423 423
R2 0.969 0.971 0.977 0.977
B. Female Only
(1-transition rate)*FSE period 0.763∗∗ 0.751∗∗ 0.405∗∗ 0.413∗∗
(0.297) (0.295) (0.16) (0.162)
Observations 423 423 423 423
R2 0.942 0.944 0.966 0.966
C. Male Only
(1-transition rate)*FSE period 0.557∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗
(0.126) (0.129) (0.126) (0.128)
Observations 423 423 423 423
R2 0.948 0.953 0.962 0.964
Control variables:
Constituency development funds * birth year X X
2009 unemployment rate * birth year X X
Note: Regressions are run at the county-year level. Dependent variable is the county
cohort KCSE registration divided by the 2010 cohort KCSE registration. Standard
errors clustered at the county level are reported in parenthesis. All columns include
year fixed effects as well as county linear trends. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the
99 percent level; ∗∗ indicates significance at the 95 percent level; and ∗ indicates
significance at the 90 percent level.
73
Table 2.12: Student achievement
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Full sample
(1-transition rate)*FSE period -0.007 0.074 . .
(0.02) (0.047)
(1-transition rate)*FSE period*Female . . -0.019 0.055
(0.02) (0.054)
(1-transition rate)*FSE period*Male . . 0.012 0.112∗
(0.024) (0.06)
Observations 3321504 3321504 3321504 3321504
R2 0.039 0.221 0.049 0.238
B. High performers
(1-transition rate)*FSE period 0.131 0.122∗ . .
(0.197) (0.074)
(1-transition rate)*FSE period*Female . . 0.147 0.01
(0.215) (0.1)
(1-transition rate)*FSE period*Male . . 0.121 0.173∗∗
(0.197) (0.082)
Observations 269436 269436 269436 269436
R2 0.357 0.409 0.361 0.418
Control variables:
Constituency development funds * birth year X X
2009 unemployment rate * birth year X X
Note: Dependent variable is standardized KCSE score. Standard errors clustered
at the county level are reported in parenthesis. All columns include county fixed
effects and county linear trends while Panel B also includes year fixed effects.
Columns 2 and 4 also include dummies for public schools, single gender schools,
and district level schools. Controls are interacted with gender for columns 3 and
4. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 99 percent level; ∗∗ indicates significance at the
95 percent level; and ∗ indicates significance at the 90 percent level.
Table 2.13: Estimates from a changes-in-changes model
Percentile Overall Female Male
0.8 0.037 0.063∗ -0.005
0.9 0.015 0.026 -0.018
0.95 0.022 0.010 -0.021
Note: Estimates are from a changes-in-
changes model. Standard errors clustered
at the county level. County fixed effects
and linear trends are included as described
in the text above. ∗∗∗ indicates significance
at the 99 percent level; ∗∗ indicates signif-
icance at the 95 percent level; and ∗ indi-
cates significance at the 90 percent level.
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2.A Additional Tables and Figures


















10 12 14 16 18 20
Age
2008 cohort 2014 cohort
Source: 2008 and 2014 KCPE data.
Notes: 2008 data are only available for Central, Nyanza, and Western provinces.  The 2014 data
are restricted to the same provinces. Data restricted to first time test takers.
for Central, Nyanza, and Western provinces
Age distribution of 2008 and 2014 exam cohorts
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2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Year
Public schools Private schools
Notes: Mean scores calculated from KCSE data. Each year approximately 12% of test takers
attend private schools.
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4 5 6 7 8 9
Years since primary school completion
Source: 2014 KCSE Registration Data
Note: Fewer than 2% of test takers complete secondary school more than 7 years after primary
school.
Time between primary and secondary school completion
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Cohort
High pre-program access Low pre-program access
Pre-program linear trend Pre-program linear trend
Notes: High/low pre-program access defined as whether county average pri-sec transition rate
between 1985 and 1986 was above/below the average transition rate.  Pri-sec transition rate
defined as share of primary school graduates with at least some secondary schooling.
Source: 2014 Kenya DHS.
and by high/low pre-free secondary education program transition rates
Primary to secondary transition rates by birth cohort
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Primary School Completion Examination Score
Source: KCPE results data and KCSE registration data.
Note: The graph shows, by primary school completion examination score, the proportion of 2010
primary school completers who registered for the secondary school completion examination in
either 2014 or 2015.
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Table 2.A.1: DHS sample characteristics
Obs. Mean S.D. Median Min. Max.
DHS Sample
Female 20458 0.73 0.44 1 0 1
Age 20458 24.24 3.97 24 18 31
Christian 20458 0.84 0.37 1 0 1
Muslim 20458 0.13 0.34 0 0 1
Kalenjin 20458 0.15 0.36 0 0 1
Kikuya 20458 0.15 0.35 0 0 1
Luhya 20458 0.12 0.33 0 0 1
Luo 20458 0.10 0.30 0 0 1
Other ethnicity 20458 0.22 0.41 0 0 1
Urban household 20458 0.41 0.49 0 0 1
Years of education 20458 8.21 4.11 8 0 19
Completed primary school 20458 0.67 0.47 1 0 1
Attended some secondary school 20458 0.43 0.50 0 0 1
Completed secondary school 20458 0.28 0.45 0 0 1
Female fertility behaviors:
Age at first intercourse 13287 17.00 2.95 17 5 30
Age at first birth 11104 18.75 3.10 18 10 31
Age at first marriage/cohabitation 10718 18.37 3.41 18 9 31
Male fertility behaviors:
Age at first intercourse 4734 16.31 3.38 16 5 30
Age at first marriage/cohabitation 2204 21.95 3.25 22 13 30
Intensity (1-transition rate) 20458 0.34 0.12 0.34 0.05 0.66
Source: 2014 Kenya DHS
Note: Sample restricted to individuals born between 1983 and 1996.
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Table 2.A.2: Binary intensity measure difference-in-differences estimates: primary
schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Pooled Gender
High Intensity*FSE period -0.0005 0.00002 0.007 -0.059∗∗∗ -0.044∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.023) (0.023)
Observations 20458 20458 20458 20458 20458
R2 0.201 0.201 0.201 0.204 0.205
B. Female Only
High Intensity*FSE period 0.006 0.005 0.014 -0.054∗ -0.032
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.028) (0.028)
Observations 14934 14934 14934 14934 14934
R2 0.228 0.229 0.229 0.232 0.234
C. Male Only
High Intensity*FSE period -0.011 -0.006 -0.015 -0.057 -0.066
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.038) (0.04)
Observations 5524 5524 5524 5524 5524
R2 0.153 0.155 0.155 0.164 0.17
Control variables:
Constituency development funds * birth year X X
2009 unemployment rate * birth year X X
County linear trends X X
Note: Dependent variable is a binary variable equal to one if an individual has com-
pleted primary school. All regressions include birth year, county, and ethnicity/religion
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted
using DHS survey weights. Transition rate defined as the percentage of primary school
graduates who attend secondary school. Initial transition rate defined as the average
transition rate in each county for students born in either 1989 or 1990. FSE period
defined as birth cohorts after and including 1991. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 99
percent level; ∗∗ indicates significance at the 95 percent level; and ∗ indicates signifi-
cance at the 90 percent level.
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Table 2.A.3: Binary treatment intensity difference-in-differences estimates: sec-
ondary education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Falsification for program introduced in 1986
High Intensity*FSE period 0.198∗ 0.139 0.224∗ 0.229 0.162
(0.119) (0.094) (0.126) (0.2) (0.214)
Observations 10324 10324 10324 10324 10324
R2 0.112 0.115 0.112 0.117 0.12
A. Falsification for program introduced in 1985
High Intensity*FSE period 0.184 0.126 0.222 0.152 0.121
(0.13) (0.114) (0.14) (0.214) (0.204)
Observations 11142 11142 11142 11142 11142
R2 0.111 0.114 0.111 0.117 0.12
B. Falsification for program introduced in 1984
High Intensity*FSE period 0.095 0.044 0.104 -0.047 -0.157
(0.104) (0.086) (0.1) (0.203) (0.21)
Observations 10643 10643 10643 10643 10643
R2 0.111 0.114 0.111 0.116 0.119
C. Falsification for program introduced in 1983
High Intensity*FSE period 0.062 0.002 0.082 -0.03 -0.06
(0.116) (0.12) (0.111) (0.246) (0.231)
Observations 10264 10264 10264 10264 10264
R2 0.113 0.117 0.114 0.118 0.121
D. Falsification for program introduced in 1982
High Intensity*FSE period 0.04 0.07 0.085 0.385∗ 0.504∗∗
(0.133) (0.145) (0.125) (0.207) (0.232)
Observations 9760 9760 9760 9760 9760
R2 0.113 0.115 0.114 0.118 0.121
E. Falsification for program introduced in 1981
High Intensity*FSE period -0.158 -0.075 -0.133 0.19 0.476∗∗
(0.174) (0.176) (0.168) (0.247) (0.233)
Observations 9353 9353 9353 9353 9353
R2 0.111 0.114 0.112 0.117 0.12
Control variables:
Constituency development funds * birth year X X
2009 unemployment rate * birth year X X
County linear trend X X
Note: Reported coefficients are the estimated interaction coefficient between a dummy
variable for high treatment intensity counties and an FSE indicator variable equal to one
for all individuals born after the introduction of the falsified program. Sample restricted to
individuals who have completed at least primary school. All regressions include birth year,
county, and ethnicity/religion fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county
level. Regressions are weighted using DHS survey weights. Transition rate defined as the
percentage of primary school graduates who attend secondary school. Initial transition rate
defined as the average transition rate in each county for students born in either 1989 or
1990. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 99 percent level; ∗∗ indicates significance at the 95
percent level; and ∗ indicates significance at the 90 percent level.
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Table 2.A.4: Binary treatment diff-in-diffs excluding transition cohorts: secondary
education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel 1: years of education
A. Pooled Gender
High Intensity*FSE period 0.346∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗ 0.578∗∗∗ 0.605∗∗∗
(0.146) (0.147) (0.153) (0.192) (0.186)
Observations 11684 11684 11684 11684 11684
R2 0.093 0.101 0.1 0.106 0.109
B. Female Only
High Intensity*FSE period 0.356∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗ 0.852∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.147) (0.155) (0.234) (0.204)
Observations 8246 8246 8246 8246 8246
R2 0.089 0.095 0.095 0.102 0.104
C. Male Only
High Intensity*FSE period 0.322∗ 0.389∗∗ 0.407∗ 0.274 0.151
(0.194) (0.188) (0.208) (0.459) (0.473)
Observations 3438 3438 3438 3438 3438
R2 0.117 0.136 0.135 0.147 0.155
Panel 2: completed secondary school
A. Pooled Gender
High Intensity*FSE period -0.014 0.005 0.002 0.03 0.052
(0.025) (0.024) (0.027) (0.05) (0.048)
Observations 11684 11684 11684 11684 11684
R2 0.09 0.108 0.107 0.11 0.112
B. Female Only
High Intensity*FSE period -0.026 -0.005 -0.015 0.042 0.085
(0.029) (0.025) (0.03) (0.072) (0.065)
Observations 8246 8246 8246 8246 8246
R2 0.091 0.106 0.105 0.109 0.112
C. Male Only
High Intensity*FSE period 0.002 0.029 0.04 -4.09e-06 -0.011
(0.037) (0.033) (0.039) (0.081) (0.09)
Observations 3438 3438 3438 3438 3438
R2 0.106 0.145 0.145 0.151 0.162
Control variables:
Constituency development funds * birth year X X
2009 unemployment rate * birth year X X
County linear trend X X
Note: Reported coefficients are the estimated interaction coefficient between a dummy
variable for high treatment intensity counties and a post period dummy equal to one for
all individuals born in 1991 or later. Sample restricted to individuals who have completed
at least primary school and excludes the partially impacted cohorts born in 1991 and 1992.
All regressions include birth year, county, and ethnicity/religion fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted using DHS survey weights.
Transition rate defined as the percentage of primary school graduates who attend secondary
school. Initial transition rate defined as the average transition rate in each county for
students born in either 1989 or 1990. FSE period defined as birth cohorts after and including
1991. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 99 percent level; ∗∗ indicates significance at the 95
percent level; and ∗ indicates significance at the 90 percent level.83
Table 2.A.5: OLS estimates: fertility behaviors
Mean dep. var Est. treatment effect
Pooled Female Pooled Female
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First intercourse before age:
16 0.226 0.186 -0.033∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
17 0.341 0.302 -0.045∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
18 0.460 0.425 -0.053∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
19 0.604 0.573 -0.052∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
20 0.700 0.678 -0.047∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
First marriage before age:
16 0.046 0.063 -0.013∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002)
17 0.080 0.109 -0.023∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002)
18 0.130 0.176 -0.034∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
19 0.197 0.262 -0.047∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
20 0.281 0.364 -0.055∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)











Note: Dependent variable is equal to one if the event (inter-
course/marriage/birth) happened before the individual turned age X.
Reported values are the estimated coefficients on years of education.
Standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in parenthe-
sis. Sample restricted to individuals who have completed at least primary
school. All regressions include birth year, county, and ethnicity/religion
fixed effects. Regressions are weighted using DHS survey weights. ∗∗∗
indicates significance at the 99 percent level; ∗∗ indicates significance at
the 95 percent level; and ∗ indicates significance at the 90 percent level.
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Table 2.A.6: Instrumental variables estimates: fertility behaviors
Mean dep. var Est. treatment effect
Pooled Female Pooled Female
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First intercourse before age:
16 0.226 0.186 -0.020 -0.046∗
(0.016) (0.024)
17 0.341 0.302 -0.055∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.033)
18 0.460 0.425 -0.071∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.035)
19 0.604 0.573 -0.157∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.052)
20 0.700 0.678 -0.161∗∗∗ -0.205∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.068)
First marriage before age:
16 0.046 0.063 -0.024∗ -0.038∗∗
(0.013) (0.018)
17 0.080 0.109 -0.050∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.019)
18 0.130 0.176 -0.067∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.024)
19 0.197 0.262 -0.090∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.029)
20 0.281 0.364 -0.133∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.044)











Note: Dependent variable is equal to one if the event (inter-
course/marriage/birth) happened before the individual turned age X.
Reported values are the estimated coefficients on years of education
where years of education is instrumented with cohort * county level
exposure. The F-statistics for the pooled sample are 10.46, 10.46, 10.46,
12.43, and 14.38 for age 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20, respectively. The first
birth F-statistics are 18.08, 18.08, 18.08, 22.76, and 13.34. Standard
errors clustered at the county level are reported in parenthesis. Sample
restricted to individuals who have completed at least primary school.
All regressions include birth year, county, and ethnicity/religion fixed
effects. Regressions are weighted using DHS survey weights. ∗∗∗ indi-
cates significance at the 99 percent level; ∗∗ indicates significance at the
95 percent level; and ∗ indicates significance at the 90 percent level.85
Table 2.A.7: Instrumental variables estimates: contraceptive use
Uses any Uses modern Uses Can get
contraceptive method condoms condoms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of education 0.017 -0.005 0.013 0.035
(0.048) (0.034) (0.025) (0.033)
Constant 0.358 0.473 -0.062 0.181
(0.438) (0.312) (0.239) (0.347)
Observations 8298 8298 8298 3868
First stage F-stat: 15.365 15.365 15.365 7.122
Note: Years of education instrumented with cohort * county level exposure.
Standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in parenthesis.
Sample restricted to individuals who have completed at least primary school
and have had intercourse. All regressions include birth year, county, and
ethnicity/religion fixed effects. Regressions are weighted using DHS survey
weights. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 99 percent level; ∗∗ indicates signif-
icance at the 95 percent level; and ∗ indicates significance at the 90 percent
level.
Table 2.A.8: Instrumental variables estimates: desired fertility
Pooled Female
(1) (2)





First stage F-stat: 9.145 8.655
Note: Dependent variable is the respondent’s ideal
number of children. Years of education instrumented
with cohort * county level exposure. Standard errors
clustered at the county level are reported in paren-
thesis. Sample restricted to individuals who have
completed at least primary school. All regressions in-
clude birth year, county, and ethnicity/religion fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county
level. Regressions are weighted using DHS survey
weights. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 99 percent
level; ∗∗ indicates significance at the 95 percent level;
and ∗ indicates significance at the 90 percent level.
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Table 2.A.9: Instrumental variables estimates: sector of work
Skilled Unskilled Agricultural No
Work Work Work Work
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel 1. Age 18 and over
Years of education 0.069∗∗∗ -0.06 -0.18∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗
(0.022) (0.064) (0.039) (0.079)
Observations 4525 4525 4525 4525
First stage F-stat: 22.909 22.909 22.909 22.909
Panel 2. Age 19 and over
Years of education 0.074∗∗∗ -0.047 -0.169∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗
(0.023) (0.059) (0.037) (0.07)
Observations 4295 4295 4295 4295
First stage F-stat: 24.347 24.347 24.347 24.347
Panel 3. Age 20 and over
Years of education 0.082∗∗∗ -0.037 -0.137∗∗∗ 0.092
(0.025) (0.057) (0.033) (0.067)
Observations 3935 3935 3935 3935
First stage F-stat: 16.226 16.226 16.226 16.226
Note: Dependent variable is a binary variable equal to one if respondent works in
sector X. Years of education instrumented with cohort * county level exposure.
Unskilled labor aggregates household/domestic work, service jobs, and unskilled
manual labor. Skilled labor aggregates professional/technical/managerial/clerical
and skilled manual labor. Standard errors clustered at the county level are re-
ported in parenthesis. Sample restricted to women who have completed at least
primary school. All regressions include birth year, county, and ethnicity/religion
fixed effects. Regressions are weighted using DHS survey weights. ∗∗∗ indicates
significance at the 99 percent level; ∗∗ indicates significance at the 95 percent
level; and ∗ indicates significance at the 90 percent level.
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Table 2.A.10: School openings (by type)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1-transition rate)*FSE period 0.136 0.13 0.176∗∗ 0.171∗∗
(0.099) (0.105) (0.081) (0.083)
(1-transition rate)*FSE period*Public . . . .
(1-transition rate)*FSE period*Private . . . .
Observations 423 423 423 423
R2 0.968 0.97 0.975 0.976
Control variables:
Constituency development funds * birth year X X
2009 unemployment rate * birth year X X
Note: Regressions are run at the county-year level. Dependent variable is the change
in number of schools from 2006 levels. Standard errors clustered at the county level
are reported in parenthesis. All columns include year and county fixed effects as well
as county linear trends. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 99 percent level; ∗∗ indicates
significance at the 95 percent level; and ∗ indicates significance at the 90 percent level.
Table 2.A.11: Class size changes expansion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1-transition rate)*FSE period 4.279 4.991 . .
(3.695) (3.901)
(1-transition rate)*FSE period*Public . . 0.418 0.334
(4.235) (3.934)
(1-transition rate)*FSE period*Private . . 10.616 14.892∗
(7.314) (8.009)
Observations 52797 52797 52797 52797
R2 0.283 0.283 0.301 0.301
Control variables:
Constituency development funds * birth year X X
2009 unemployment rate * birth year X X
County linear trend X X
Note: Dependent variable is number of students in school cohort and the regressions
are run at the school-year level. Standard errors clustered at the county level are
reported in parenthesis. All columns include year and county fixed effects. ∗∗∗
indicates significance at the 99 percent level; ∗∗ indicates significance at the 95




The Kenya DHS does not include information on where individuals received their schooling
or their county of birth. As my identification exploits geographic variation in exposure
to FSE, internal migration poses a potential threat. In this section, I repeat the main
educational attainment analysis excluding Kenya’s two largest cities and main migration
destinations: Nairobi and Mombasa. Figure 2.B.1 depicts a similar shape to the inter-
actions coefficient figure suggesting that the intensity measure is unrelated educational
gains prior to the program and correlated with gains following the program. Similarly,
table 2.B.1 presents the difference-in-differences estimates illustrating similar impacts on
education as the full sample.
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Table 2.B.1: Difference-in-differences estimates: education - no cities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel 1: years of schooling
(1-transition rate)*FSE period 2.086∗∗∗ 2.064∗∗∗ 2.024∗∗∗ 2.760∗∗∗ 2.560∗∗
(0.438) (0.442) (0.45) (1.039) (1.028)
Observations 12485 12485 12485 12485 12485
R2 0.092 0.094 0.093 0.098 0.102
Panel 2: completed secondary school
(1-transition rate)*FSE period 0.153 0.15 0.151 0.188 0.163
(0.109) (0.106) (0.112) (0.252) (0.226)
Observations 12485 12485 12485 12485 12485
R2 0.102 0.104 0.104 0.106 0.109
Control variables:
Constituency development funds * birth year X X
2009 unemployment rate * birth year X X
County specific linear trends X X
Note: All regressions include birth year, county, and ethnicity/religion fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted using DHS survey weights.
Transition rate defined as the percentage of primary school graduates who attend secondary
school. Initial transition rate defined as the average transition rate in each county for students
born in either 1989 or 1990. FSE period defined as birth cohorts after and including 1991.
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2.B.2 Drop smallest population counties
As described in Section 2.5.1, I define my primary to secondary transition rates using
individuals in the 1989 and 1990 cohorts. In this section, I repeat the analysis excluding
the smallest population counties for whom the transition rate is calculated based on a
small number of observations and thus may be particularly susceptible to measurement
error: Garissa, Mandera, Marsabit, Samburu, Turkana, and Wajir. Figure 2.B.2 depicts a
similar shape to the interactions coefficient figure suggesting that the intensity measure is
unrelated educational gains prior to the program and correlated with gains following the
program. Similarly, table 2.B.2 presents the difference-in-differences estimates illustrating
similar impacts on education as the full sample
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Table 2.B.2: Difference-in-differences estimates: education - no small counties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel 1: years of schooling
(1-transition rate)*FSE period 2.252∗∗∗ 2.255∗∗∗ 1.970∗∗∗ 2.029∗∗∗ 2.176∗∗∗
(0.316) (0.318) (0.369) (0.731) (0.688)
Observations 12970 12970 12970 12970 12970
R2 0.099 0.101 0.1 0.104 0.106
Panel 2: completed secondary school
(1-transition rate)*FSE period 0.124∗ 0.143∗∗ 0.092 0.157 0.182
(0.073) (0.068) (0.094) (0.139) (0.13)
Observations 12970 12970 12970 12970 12970
R2 0.104 0.105 0.104 0.107 0.109
Control variables:
Constituency development funds * birth year X X
2009 unemployment rate * birth year X X
County specific linear trends X X
Note: All regressions include birth year, county, and ethnicity/religion fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted using DHS survey weights.
Transition rate defined as the percentage of primary school graduates who attend secondary
school. Initial transition rate defined as the average transition rate in each county for students
born in either 1989 or 1990. FSE period defined as birth cohorts after and including 1991.
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2.B.3 Unrestricted DHS sample (1983-1996)
The main analysis restricts attention to a sample of primary school completers for whom
the program could change their decision to attend secondary school. This section relaxes
that focus and examines the impacts in the full DHS sample born between 1983 and 1996.
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Table 2.B.3: Difference-in-differences estimates: secondary education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel 1: years of education
A. Pooled Gender
(1-transition rate)*FSE period 1.750∗∗ 1.727∗∗ 2.328∗∗∗ 1.426 2.073∗∗
(0.79) (0.693) (0.692) (0.87) (0.886)
Observations 20458 20458 20458 20458 20458
R2 0.291 0.292 0.293 0.298 0.299
Panel 2: completed secondary school
A. Pooled Gender
(1-transition rate)*FSE period 0.081 0.092∗ 0.099∗ 0.066 0.129
(0.051) (0.05) (0.057) (0.114) (0.112)
Observations 20458 20458 20458 20458 20458
R2 0.149 0.15 0.149 0.151 0.152
Control variables:
Constituency development funds * birth year X X
2009 unemployment rate * birth year X X
County linear trend X X
Note: All regressions include birth year, county, and ethnicity/religion fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted using DHS survey weights. Transition rate defined
as the percentage of primary school graduates who attend secondary school. Initial transition rate defined
as the average transition rate in each county for students born in either 1989 or 1990. FSE period defined
as birth cohorts after and including 1991. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 99 percent level; ∗∗ indicates
significance at the 95 percent level; and ∗ indicates significance at the 90 percent level.
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2.B.4 Alternative treatment definition
The main student achievement results above assumes that individuals in cohorts prior to
2011 are not impacted by FSE. While students in the pre-2011 cohorts were not induced
by the program to attend secondary school, there may be resource dilution effects where
the quality of the schooling provided to these students is lower due to larger cohorts in the
grades below. In this section, I rerun the analysis with an alternative definition of treat-
ment that accounts for the potential impacts of these larger cohorts on the achievement
of the pre-FSE cohorts.
2.B.4.1 Defining treatment
Consider a student in the cohort that completed secondary school in 2008. This student
completed the first three years of secondary school before FSE was announced and was
only impacted by FSE by having a larger cohort in form 1 while this student was in form 4.
Therefore, for three years, the student was not impacted and in the final year, the student
was impacted only by having a larger cohort in one of the younger grades. Therefore,
of the 16 cohorts that were in school while this student attended secondary school, only
one was admitted under FSE. Similarly, for a student who completed secondary school in
2009, three of the 16 cohorts were FSE cohorts. With this in mind, I define an alternative
intensity measure for county j and cohort k, Îjk as the county intensity measure, Ijk,
multiplied by the fraction of the overlapping cohorts that were admitted under the FSE
regime. Compared to the original treatment intensity multiplier which switches from 0 to
1 in 2011, this alternative measure ramps up as shown in figure 2.B.4.
This alternative approach is not valid for the analysis of education attainment but
may be more representative of the impact of FSE on educational achievement. With that
in mind, I present the results analogous to regression 2.18 and table 2.12.
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Figure 2.B.4: Treatment intensity multiplier











Note: Alternative intensity multiplier calculated as the fraction of 
cohorts that were admitted under FSE during the four years leading 
up to the KCSE examination.  Using the 2010 cohort as an example, 
when they entered secondary school in 2007, none of the cohorts 
were FSE cohorts.  In form 2, one of the four cohorts were FSE 
cohorts.  In form 3, two of the four cohorts were FSE cohorts.  In form 
4, three of the four cohorts were FSE cohorts.  This generates an 
average FSE cohort fraction of (0+1+2+3)/16 = 6/16.
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Table 2.B.4: Student achievement: alternative treatment intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Full sample
Alternative treatment intensity -0.023 0.251 . .
(0.068) (0.175)
Alternative treatment intensity*Female . . -0.059 0.141
(0.069) (0.188)
Alternative treatment intensity*Male . . 0.024 0.372∗∗
(0.076) (0.184)
Observations 3321504 3321504 3321504 3321504
R2 0.039 0.221 0.049 0.238
B. High performers
Alternative treatment intensity 0.151 0.419 . .
(0.259) (0.334)
Alternative treatment intensity*Female . . 0.188 -0.211
(0.287) (0.378)
Alternative treatment intensity*Male . . . 0.751∗∗
(0.328)
Observations 269436 269436 269436 269436
R2 0.357 0.409 0.361 0.418
Control variables:
Constituency development funds * birth year X X
2009 unemployment rate * birth year X X
Note: Dependent variable is standardized KCSE score. Standard errors clustered
at the county level are reported in parenthesis. All columns include county fixed
effects and county linear trends while Panel B also includes year fixed effects.
Columns 2 and 4 also include dummies for public schools, single gender schools,
and district level schools. Controls are interacted with gender for columns 3 and
4. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 99 percent level; ∗∗ indicates significance at the
95 percent level; and ∗ indicates significance at the 90 percent level.
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2.C Simulation
2.C.1 Simulation adding lower quality students
This section details a simulation designed to measure the impact of a hypothetical policy
that only adds lower quality students. In the pre-FSE period, I keep all students and
their grades. For the post-FSE period, I first keep the highest performing students in
each county where the number of students kept is equal to the 2010 county cohort size.
This yields a sample of individuals, in each county and for each year, that is equal in
size to the 2010 cohort. I then add any students observed in the exam but not included
in this sample to the sample with an assigned score of 0. For all post-FSE individuals
I then randomly draw a value from a uniform [0,1] distribution which is added to their
score. I then rescale the post-FSE grades to match the empirical pre-FSE distribution.
As desired, this process yields a sample where any additional students added after the
introduction of FSE are assumed to be lower performing than the existing student body:
the high performing students are of the same size and distribution across counties as the
last pre-FSE cohort and all new students are assigned random grades and across counties
in proportion to actual student body growth. I bootstrap this process 1,000 times.
Table 2.C.1: Simulated impact on student achievement (under no credit constraints)
(1) (2)





Constituency development funds * birth year X
2009 unemployment rate * birth year X
County linear trend X
Note: Dependent variable is adjusted standardized KCSE score.
Scores in post-FSE period simulated assuming all additional students
in a county beyond 2010 county registration are the lowest performing
students in the county. Scores were randomly generated for these stu-
dents and then normalized to match the 2010 score distribution. All
columns include county fixed effects. Estimates obtained from boot-
strapped simulation. R2 from single run. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at
the 99 percent level; ∗∗ indicates significance at the 95 percent level;
and ∗ indicates significance at the 90 percent level.
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Chapter 3: Can Government School Upgrades Up Grades? Evidence
from Kenyan Secondary Schools
3.1 Introduction
Over the past 20 years, countries throughout sub-Saharan Africa have dramatically
increased education access. Between 1999 and 2012, the region’s net primary enroll-
ment rate increased from 59% to 79% (UNESCO, 2015).1 Student learning, how-
ever, remains low as students from developing countries consistently and substan-
tially underperform relative to their counterparts in developed countries (Pritchett,
2013). Given the demonstrated relationship between human capital development
and growth, and the recognition that human capital is better captured by cog-
nitive skills than schooling attainment, low quality schooling may lower economic
growth (Hanushek and Wößmann, 2007). This may be particularly true at the post-
primary level as secondary education has been shown to decrease the probability of
self-employment and increase the probability of skilled work (Ozier, Forthcoming;
Brudevold-Newman, 2016) and labor flows from low-productivity sectors to high-
productivity sectors have been shown to be a key driver of development (McMillan
1UNESCO Institute for Statistics estimates that the region’s net secondary enrollment rate
increased from 20% to 33% over the same period.
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and Rodrik, 2011; McMillan, Rodrik, and Verduzco-Gallo, 2014).
This paper evaluates the impact of a government funded school promotion
program for high-performing public secondary schools. The promotion from a mid-
level tier to the top-level tier afforded the selected schools flexibility to charge higher
fees, granted higher priority in teacher assignment, and came with a USD300,000
grant to improve school facilities. There are three main contributions of this paper.
First, it estimates the impact on academic outcomes of a government implemented
program specifically targeting school quality. While the number of low-cost private
schools is growing, public schools remain the dominant source of education for many,
suggesting that any meaningful improvements in school quality will likely depend
on government programs improving quality at public institutions. Second, I provide
estimates of the impact of a particularly large block grant issued directly to schools,
and use detailed descriptions of how the schools spent their additional funding to
identify correlates of increased academic performance. Finally, I measure the im-
pact of the program on the composition of the student body, illustrating how the
implementation of the national central student assignment mechanism likely caused
a decrease in the quality of students attending the upgraded schools following the
program.
My identification of causal impacts exploits the school eligibility criteria used
in the implementation of the program. I use a difference-in-differences approach
to compare the outcomes of students at schools selected for the program against
students at schools that met the upgrade program eligibility criteria but were not
selected for the program. This methodology relies on two main assumptions. First,
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the selection of the upgraded schools from the pool of eligible schools needs to
be attributable to fixed characteristics, so that any selection bias is absorbed by
school fixed effects. I demonstrate that the highest scoring eligible schools were
often upgraded suggesting that pre-program average examination results were the
primary driver of school selection. The second assumption is common trends across
the treated and comparison schools. I use pre-treatment data to demonstrate that,
despite a difference in performance levels, the trends in test performance of stu-
dents at upgraded schools tracked closely with the performance of students at the
comparison schools.
As the program raised the prestige of upgraded institutions, one threat to
identification is the possibility that students responded to the program by differen-
tially seeking enrollment at treated schools, changing their composition relative to
comparison schools. With this in mind, I use cohorts of students who enrolled in
the sample schools before the program was announced; thus, the sample students
all enrolled in medium-tier schools, some of which were subsequently upgraded to
national-tier schools. I also demonstrate that within these cohorts, upgraded schools
did not experience differential cohort growth.
My difference-in-differences estimates suggest heterogeneous program impact:
while the program had no measurable impact for girls, the program improved overall
examination scores for boys by 0.12 standard deviations with larger gains estimated
for English and Swahili scores. The improved scores for boys appear to be driven
by shifting up the lower tail of the test score distribution. I also demonstrate that
among the upgraded schools, improvements in test scores are correlated with having
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spent program funds on basic furniture for students such as desks and tables.
This paper contributes to several literatures. First, it contributes to the wide
variety of interventions attempting to improve school quality that have been im-
plemented and evaluated, and which have led to an extensive set of systematic
reviews (Glewwe, Hanushek, Humpage, and Ravina, 2011; Kremer, Brannen, and
Glennerster, 2013; Murnane and Ganimian, 2014; McEwan, 2014). These reviews
consistently recommend three classes of interventions: programs that tailor teaching
to student skills (such as streaming or certain ICT interventions), repeated teacher
training, and improving teacher accountability (Evans and Popova, 2015). Two of
the reviews also suggest that interventions which change the students’ daily learning
experiences may also be particularly effective (Glewwe, Hanushek, Humpage, and
Ravina, 2011; Murnane and Ganimian, 2014). The reviews are consistent in finding
no positive impact of increased monetary resources on academic achievement.
Despite discouraging results from the existing literature, the fact that it was
high-performing secondary schools that were impacted by the upgrade program,
combined with the research examining elite-oriented curricula may help account for
the positive impacts found here.2 The majority of the existing evidence on the
efficacy of additional funding on student outcomes stems from studies conducted
at the primary school level. The lack of demonstrated impact at this level may
be attributable to other binding constraints such as a lack of accountability that
2While tracking and repeated teacher training have been shown to improve academic outcomes
there is no evidence to suggest either was implemented as a result of the program. Also, while
larger systems changes such as local contract teachers or enhanced parental involvement in parent-
teacher associations have been successful, these policies are unlikely to be affected by the program
given the national nature of the schools.
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are not eased by additional resources; secondary schools may face a different set of
constraints and may be able to benefit from additional funding. Earlier research has
highlighted that the Kenyan curriculum is set at a level appropriate for students in
elite schools and may be inappropriate for the majority of students attending schools
frequently burdened by barriers such as high teacher absence (Glewwe, Kremer, and
Moulin, 2009; Kremer, 2003). This elite-focused system may explain the lack of
demonstrated impact among earlier interventions if they targeted lower-performing
schools and were not designed to overcome this curriculum-based barrier to learning.
On the other hand, high-performing schools with high quality students, as is the
case in this program, may be better equipped to benefit from additional resources.
My results also complement earlier research examining the marginal impact of
elite-tier secondary schools on student outcomes. Using a regression discontinuity
approach, Lucas and Mbiti (2014) find no evidence of value-added from the Kenyan
national-tier schools suggesting that observed differences in outcomes across school
quality tiers are the result of student selection rather than differential learning. The
authors also reject heterogeneous treatment effects for students of different quality
within the top tier schools which consists of students admitted to county schools.
As they focus on students just above and below the national school cutoffs, their
sample likely aligns with the upper end of my sample. In line with their results, I
find no evidence of an impact on the upper end of the sample student distribution
for either boys or girls. My finding that the upgrade program shifted the lower end
of the distribution to the right for students at the upgraded boys’ schools suggests
that lower ability students may benefit from the additional resources afforded to the
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higher tier schools.
Finally, my results also contribute to the literature focusing on school choice
and student preferences in centralized allocation systems. Recent empirical work has
exploited individual-level preferences to demonstrate the potential for the mecha-
nisms to stratify students by socioeconomic status in both the U.S. and Ghana
(Hastings and Weinstein, 2008; Ajayi, 2013), measure efficiency gains associated
with eliciting more preferences (Ajayi and Sidibe, 2015), explore gender differences
in submitted preferences (Ajayi and Buessing, 2015), and examine patterns in pref-
erence submission errors (Lucas and Mbiti, 2012b). I highlight that a decrease in
admitted student quality is likely attributable to the specific structure of the pref-
erence submission mechanism.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 provides a
background of Kenya’s education system and the school upgrade program, Section
3.3 describes the data, Section 3.4 describes my difference-in-differences and changes-
in-changes identification strategy, Section 3.5 presents the impacts of the upgrade
program on student achievement, Section 3.6 examines the impacts of the program
on the composition of the student body, and I conclude in Section 3.7.
3.2 Kenya’s Education System and the School Upgrade Program
Kenya’s education system consists of 8 years of primary school, 4 years of secondary
school, and 4 years of university. Standardized tests are administered at the conclu-
sion of both primary school and secondary school: the Kenya Certificate of Primary
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Education (KCPE) is used to determine admission into secondary school while the
Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE) determines admission and fund-
ing for higher education and is also used as a credential on the labor market. The
exams are conducted by a national testing organization - the Kenya National Ex-
aminations Council - and are centrally developed and graded. The public secondary
education system is tiered with schools categorized as either national, county, or dis-
trict schools.3 Admission to public secondary schools is obtained through a central
mechanism that allocates students based on KCPE scores and student submitted
preferences over schools. Students submit ranked lists over schools in each of the
three public school tiers, submitting four national school choices, three county school
choices, and a district school choice. The student preferences are submitted at the
time of registration for the KCPE examination, approximately 9 months before the
exam. Students are assigned via a student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm
similar to that of Gale and Shapley (1962). In general, this mechanism assigns the
top performers from each county to schools in the national tier, high performers to
schools in the county tier, and the remaining students to either the district or are
left unassigned due to capacity constraints.4 Because students can only list four
national schools, they will be assigned to either a county or district school if all
of the national schools they listed are full, even if there is capacity remaining at a
3Of the 8,228 secondary schools that administered the secondary school completion examination
in 2014, 94 were national schools, 1,222 were county schools, 5,444 were district schools, while 1,468
were private schools. All national schools are single gender while 75% of county schools and 10%
of district schools are single gender.
4Of the 2014 secondary school graduates, only 11% were assigned to either national or county
tier secondary schools when they joined secondary school in 2010. Ozier (Forthcoming) details
how the KCPE score is used to determine eligibility for secondary school admission.
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national school that they did not list and which they may prefer over their assigned
school.
In addition to receiving preferential assignment of students, national schools
also have better educated staff with more experience and more extensive facilities,
such as computer labs and classroom space (Lucas and Mbiti, 2014).5 The numerous
advantages afforded to the national schools bear out in their performance on the
KCSE: the average grade of a student in a national school in 2010 was 67 (B+/B)
while that for county and district schools was 39 (C/C-) and 28.95 (D+) respec-
tively.6 This paper evaluates a government program to upgrade selected schools
from county-level schools to national-level schools.
Between 2011 and 2014, the Kenyan government upgraded 76 county schools
to national schools with the explicit goal of ensuring that each county had two na-
tional schools: one for boys and one for girls. The upgrade eligibility criteria were
established by the Ministry of Education and based on school KCSE performance
over the prior 5 years, existing physical infrastructure, geographic equity, and com-
munity support (Kenya National Assembly Official Records, 2011).7 To meet the
performance criteria, each school had to have a mean KCSE grade of C+ or higher
5In contrast to Kenyan primary schools, overall attrition at the secondary school level is quite
low with secondary school survival rates of around 92% (Ministry of Education, 2008b). Similarly,
repetition rates at the secondary school level are low: KCSE registration data show that almost 80%
of students proceed through secondary school in 4 years. Both repetition and dropout are likely
to be lower for students attending the national and county schools where students are generally
the children of the elite or middle class and where credit constraints or the price of schooling are
less likely to influence schooling decisions.
6A full description of the KCSE examination is provided in Section 3.3.
7Although not explicitly listed by the Ministry of Education as an eligibility requirement, all
upgraded schools were public. Ministry of Education officials confirmed that two schools were
selected for the upgrade program but declined: Kapropita Girls in Baringo county and Chebisass
Boys in Uasin Gishu county. These schools are excluded from the analysis.
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over the 2006-2010 period. For counties that did not have any schools that met the
grade eligibility criteria, lower KCSE thresholds of C and C- were used for boys’
and girls’ schools, respectively. The infrastructure criteria required that each school
be single gender and have existing boarding facilities. The geographic criteria were
inherent in the program’s design; two eligible schools were upgraded in each county,
one girls’ school and one boys’ school.
Each selected school was allocated KSh25 million (USD300,000) for improve-
ments. While the Ministry of Education was explicit that the funding had to be
spent on school infrastructure, the specific purchases were left to the schools with
ministry audits confirming the expenditures. The first group of 30 upgraded schools
was announced in 2011 and began admitting students as a national school in 2012.
The second group of 30 upgraded schools was announced in 2012 and began admit-
ting students as a national school in 2013. The last group of 16 upgraded schools
was announced in 2013 and began admitting students as a national school in 2014.
3.3 Data
This paper makes use of two administrative datasets: the first comprises the KCSE
examination results of all students who took the exam between 2006 and 2014 with
the exception of the 2012 cohort while the second contains KCPE scores, submitted
secondary school preferences, and assigned secondary schools for students assigned
to either national or county schools between 2010 and 2014.8
8The test data are a combination of publicly available data from 2006-2008 together with data
scraped from the national examination council’s website for 2009-2011 and 2013-2014. The national
examination council web site did not have the 2012 KCSE results publicly available.
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3.1 KCSE and Secondary School Data
The KCSE consists of a minimum of 7 exams across four subject categories: three
compulsory subjects (English, Kiswahili, and math), 2 science subjects, 1 humanities
subject, and 1 practical subject.9 Each subject is graded on a 12(A)-1(E) scale
with a maximum total score of 84 points. Each student is assigned an aggregate
grade between A and E based on their composite score.10 Detailed subject grades
are available from 2009 to 2014, while only the overall letter grades are available
prior to 2009. The data prior to 2009 is used to identify schools that met the
upgrade program eligibility criteria while the primary analysis uses the detailed
results available from 2009 to 2014. Summary statistics for all students for each
exam between 2009 and 2014 are presented in Table 3.1. Column 2 details the
average grades of students from the national schools in 2009 and illustrates the
stronger performance of the national school students who average between a 10
(B+) and 8 (B-) for each subject while the overall average is generally between a 6
(C) and 3 (D).11
9Science options include biology, chemistry, and physics. Humanities options are his-
tory/government and geography. Practical subjects include Christian religious education, Islamic
religious education, Hindu religious education, home science, art and design, agriculture, wood-
work, metalwork, building construction, power mechanics, electricity, drawing and design, aviation
technology, computer studies, French, German, Arabic, Kenyan sign language, music, and business
studies.
10Overall KCSE grades are assigned as follows: a score between 84 and 81 is an A, 80 to 74 is
an A-, 73 to 67 is a B+, 66 to 60 is a B, 59 to 53 is a B-, 52 to 46 is a C+, 45 to 39 is a C, 38 to
32 is a C-, 31 to 25 is a D+, 24 to 18 is a D, 17 to 12 is a D- and below 12 is an E.
11The differences between the summary statistics of the national schools and all schools also
highlights the difficulty inherent in measuring education intervention effect sizes in standard de-
viations. The standard deviation of overall test scores for students in national schools is about
25% less than the overall test taking population. In an intervention designed to improve high-
performing schools, it is not clear which of the standard deviations is a more relevant benchmark.
As such, I report raw grade impacts and reference the standard deviation of the overall student
body in 2009.
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Each student record within the dataset is identified by a 9-digit student number
that is unique within each year. The first six digits of the student number indicate
the school at which the test was administered while the last three denote the student
within the school. Each upgraded school received a new school code at the time it
was promoted. The new national school codes are mapped back to the county school
codes using the school name and county. Additional data on school characteristics
come from the Ministry of Education’s Kenyan Schools Mapping Project conducted
in 2007. I supplement my analysis with information from the Ministry of Education
detailing how each school reported spending their upgrade grant. While the dataset
includes spending type, it does not include the amount spent on each category.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the spending categories selected by upgraded schools.
3.2 KCPE and School Preference Data
The KCPE consists of five subject tests - English, Swahili, math, science, and social
studies/religious education - each of which is graded out of 100 points. An overall
KCPE test score is assigned as the sum of the five subject grades and is out of 500
points. This paper makes use of an administrative dataset of individual-level KCPE
examination results between 2010 and 2014. I combine the examination results
together with individual-level data on the submitted preferences over secondary
schools and their assigned school. The preference and assignment data were available
only for students assigned through the central mechanism and covers approximately




I identify the effect of school upgrading on student achievement by comparing the
KCSE results of students who were admitted to county schools that were then up-
graded (“upgraded schools”) to students admitted to other county schools that met
the government’s eligibility criteria but which were not selected to be upgraded (“el-
igible schools”). For this difference-in-differences approach, the primary regression
is of the form:
yijt = β0 + β1T + β2Xjt + λt + γj + εijt (3.1)
where yijt is the KCSE score of student i in school j in year t. The school upgrade
program is represented by T , which is an indicator variable equal to one for upgraded
schools once they have been upgraded. I include annual fixed effects, λt, to account
for any differences in test difficulty and a vector of school characteristics that change
over time, Xjt, which will include the number of students registered for the exam
at school j in year t. Had the upgrade program been randomly assigned to eligible
schools, a regression of yijt on T for all eligible schools would consistently estimate
the impact of the upgrade program. I also include school fixed effects, γj, to capture
school specific characteristics and ensure that any school specific attributes that led
to upgrading are not relegated to an unobservable correlated with treatment.
As the upgrade program was implemented with the goal of introducing two
national schools in each county, one for boys and one for girls, each upgraded school
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represents a county-gender pair. While some counties had a number of schools that
met the eligibility criteria, other counties had only a single school that met the
criteria so that there are no natural comparison schools.12 In cases where only one
school was eligible and upgraded, the school is excluded from the analysis. The
eligibility criteria identify 104 eligible, but not upgraded, schools that pair with 49
of the 76 upgraded schools.13
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics for the upgraded and eligible schools.
The upgraded schools are slightly higher performing, closer to cities and main roads,
and also have more teachers and acreage although the differences are insignificant
for all variables except acreage. The comparison of upgraded and eligible schools
across genders are similar although upgraded schools are closer to cities and roads
for the boys’ schools and further for the girls’ schools. Figure 3.2 maps the sample
schools which are mainly concentrated in the former Central, Eastern, Rift Valley,
and Western provinces of Kenya.
To avoid student selection issues, I focus only on students attending and ad-
mitted to the sample schools prior to their upgrade to national status. The analysis
makes use of the fact that the students at the upgraded schools, like the students
at the comparison schools, were originally admitted to middle-tier schools. The
12In the regressions, eligible schools are weighted based on the number of eligible schools in
the county so results are not biased by specific counties with a large number of eligible schools.
Appendix Table 3.A.3 presents an alternative analysis that includes only one comparison school
per county. The comparison school is chosen as the school with the closest mean KCSE score over
the prior five years. There are no substantive changes in the results.
13In line with the implementation of the program, I consider public status as an additional
eligibility criteria of the program. The sample approximately splits by gender with female schools
comprising 27 of the 49 upgraded schools and 53 of the 103 comparison schools. Appendix Table
3.A.4 presents an alternative analysis that includes only counties where both the boys’ and girls’
schools have eligible comparison schools.
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students at the upgraded schools differ in that they subsequently received one or
more years of education at a national-tier institution. As the first set of students
admitted to the newly upgraded schools enrolled in 2011, they took the KCSE in
2015; my data includes KCSE results through 2014 which should mitigate the pos-
sibility that individuals selected into treated schools as the sample students were
all initially admitted to schools of the same tier quality. Further, I test for differ-
ential cohort size growth at treatment schools. The main identifying assumption of
this difference-in-differences fixed effects approach is that the two groups of schools
(upgraded and eligible) follow common trends prior to the intervention.
Figure 3.3a uses the 2006-2011 data on aggregate KCSE score to evaluate the
comparability of the upgraded and upgrade-eligible schools prior to the implemen-
tation of the program. The trend lines of the upgraded and eligible schools suggest
that it is unlikely that the program was randomly assigned among all eligible schools
as the upgraded schools outperformed other eligible schools not selected. However,
once we account for the differences in levels, the trends of the two groups follow very
closely supporting the inclusion of fixed effects in the above regression. Figures 3.3b
and 3.3c present equivalent figures for the split sample of boys’ schools and girls’
schools. Evident in Figures 2 and 3 - and Figure 1 to a lesser extent - are small
deviations from common trends in 2007 and 2008.14 Given these deviations and the
greater detail test score results, I restrict attention in the analysis to the post 2008
period where the figures suggest that the common trends hold.
14These small deviations could be the result of the Kenyan election and subsequent post-election
violence in late 2007 into 2008.
112
I examine the validity of the common trends assumption more formally by
looking at whether the grades of students in upgraded schools changed differentially
between 2006 and 2010 relative to the grades of students in the eligible schools.15
This is equivalent to running a regression of the form:
yijt = δ0 + δ1τ + δ2T ∗ τ + γj + εijt (3.2)
where yijt are individual test scores of student i at school j in time t, τ is a time
trend, T is a dummy variable equal to one for the eventually upgraded schools, and
γj are school fixed effects.
Another threat to identification in the above model could be that students
respond to the new national schools by transferring to the upgraded schools which
would result in potential composition effects. I can test for differential cohort growth
across the new national schools by running regressions of the form:
njt = α0 + α1T + λt + γj + εijt (3.3)
where njt is the KCSE cohort size of school j in time t. α1 captures the impact
that the national school upgrade has on the number of students taking the KCSE.
A significant coefficient for α1 could indicate that students are transferring to the
school or that there is a compositional effect whereby the school is registering a
15As subject specific data are available only from 2009 onwards, I examine the common trends
between 2009 and 2010. I restrict attention prior to 2011 to avoid any contamination from schools
that may have received some benefit from the upgrade program between when it was announced
in 2011 and when it admitted students as a national school in 2012.
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greater or fewer number of students to take the KCSE exam in the year. Results
from this regression are presented in table 3.4. Upgraded schools did not see a
significant change in the number of students registering for the exam following their
promotion to the national tier.
Another possible identification strategy would exploit the phased-in nature
of the upgrade program and compare the outcomes of schools that were upgraded
early to those that were phased in later. Without the 2012 cohort, this amounts
to comparing the outcomes of students at schools upgraded in 2012/2013 to those
upgraded in 2014. Figures 3.4a and 3.4b again use the 2006-2011 data on aggregate
KCSE score to evaluate the comparability of the schools phased in first to those
upgraded later. The very different trends in test scores suggest that the two groups
are not comparable and that this alternative identification strategy is not valid.
I examine the impact on the composition of the incoming student body using
regressions of the form represented by equation 3.1. In this analysis, I use the KCPE
scores of incoming students to test whether the composition of the incoming cohorts
are different than those entering before the upgrade program.
3.2 Changes-in-changes
The upgrade program could also alter the distribution of KCSE results if the benefits
of the program accrued to students at a certain point in the test score distribution. I
employ the changes-in-changes (CiC) model of Athey and Imbens (2006) to examine
the impact on the entire distribution of test scores. The CiC model is a generaliza-
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tion of the difference-in-differences estimator that estimates the entire counterfactual
distribution of a treated group which is identified under the assumption that the
changes in the distribution of the treated and comparison groups would, absent
treatment, be the same. The standard estimator considers the impact of a binary
treatment across two time periods. I consider the pre- and post-upgrade periods
and compare the upgraded schools to the eligible but not upgraded schools. The
treatment effect at quantile q is calculated as:
τCiCq = F
−1
Y 1,11 (q)− F
−1
Y N ,11









where FY 1,gt is the cumulative distribution function of group g in time t. The








N = h (Ui, Ti) (3.5)
where Ui is an underlying unobserved ability and Ti is the time period in which the
test was taken. Second, CiC imposes a strict monotonicity framework that the test
score production function h (Ui, Ti) be strictly increasing in u. Third, the underlying
ability distribution within a group can not vary over time:
Ui⊥Ti|Gi (3.6)
16These are laid out in Athey and Imbens (2006) Assumption 3.1-3.3. An additional common
support assumption (Athey and Imbens (2006) assumption 3.4) requires that outcomes of the
treated group in any period be a subset of the untreated outcomes.
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I consider students who were all admitted to the schools prior to the upgrade pro-
gram, when the upgraded schools were all known as high performing county schools.
As such, it seems likely that the students are of consistently high ability.17 I control
for the school cohort size following the parametric approach suggested by Athey and
Imbens (2006) and which is both employed and described in a similar context by
Lucas and Mbiti (2012a).
3.5 Student Achievement Results
Table 3.5 presents the difference-in-differences estimates represented by equation 3.1
for the core KCSE subjects, where each coefficient represents the impact of attending
an upgraded school. Column 1 shows that there is a positive but insignificant
effect of upgrading across all schools. Overall, the program is estimated to have
marginally significantly increased only English scores. Columns 2 and 3 split the
sample to examine the impact of the upgrade program separately for the sample
of boys’ schools and girls’ schools. Column 2 shows that the program is estimated
to have significantly increased examination scores at upgraded boys’ schools by
0.35 points (0.16 standard deviations) where a one point increase represents a one
letter point increase (e.g C to C+) in each subject.18 Conversely, column 3 shows
17Lucas and Mbiti (2012a) employ the CiC framework to examine the impact of free primary
education in Kenya. To satisfy the requirement that the underlying ability distribution within a
group not vary over time, they restrict their focus to the top half of the distribution where free
primary education was less likely to have impacted their schooling decisions but would have still
impacted their schooling inputs. The current context avoids the composition changes by focusing
on students already enrolled in the sample schools prior to the announcement of the upgrade
program.
18The impact reported in standard deviations is relative to the overall examination standard
deviation. The sample standard deviation is much smaller so that the 0.36 point increase represents
a 0.40 standard deviation increase.
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that the program is estimated to have had a negative but insignificant effect on
the academic achievement of students at upgraded girls’ schools. The second row
examines the impact on the percentage of students who qualify for preferential
university admission and funding, which requires scoring above a threshold score.19
Male students at upgraded schools were 8% more likely to qualify for the preferential
admission and funding. Across the two columns, the coefficients show that the
overall significant coefficient for English is entirely driven by the large (0.16 standard
deviations) and highly significant impact on boys English scores as the coefficient
for girls is negative and insignificant. The program is also estimated to have had a
positive and significant impact on boys Swahili scores of 0.29 standard deviations
and a weakly negative impact on girls Swahili scores. Treatment appears to have
had no impact on any test scores for students at the upgraded girls’ schools.20
Table 3.6 presents the changes-in-changes estimates across the score distribu-
tions for the boys’ schools and girls’ schools.21 For the boys’ schools, the estimated
impact is significant across the lower end of the distribution, a trend also evident
in the Swahili and math results. Importantly, these gains did not appear to come
at the expense of students at the upper end of the distribution where there is no
evidence of negative impacts. The results also indicate that the upgrade program
improved English scores across the whole distribution, including at the upper end.
19The threshold score for males was 63 in 2009-2011 and 60 in 2013-2014. The requisite score
for females was 2 points lower (61 and 58).
20Appendix Table 3.A.1 shows that the difference between the estimated coefficients for boys
and girls in pooled gender regressions is at least weakly significant across all subjects.
21Appendix Table 3.A.5 similarly explores whether the upgrade program had heterogeneous
effects at different achievement levels within the schools by showing school-level regressions exam-
ining the impact of the upgrade program on the 25th, 50th, 75th percentile scores.
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In contrast, the upgrade program is not estimated to impacted test scores for stu-
dents attending the upgraded girls’ schools at any point in the distribution and on
any of the exams.
Table 3.7 examines whether the upgrade program impacted the standard de-
viation of the scores of the treatment schools. As suggested by Table 3.6 where
the gains are larger for the lower end of the distribution, the estimated impact of
treatment on the standard deviation is negative. This is true for the overall score,
Swahili score, and math score for all schools, as well as the Swahili and overall KCSE
scores for the boys’ schools.
Taken together, Tables 3.6 and 3.7 suggest an upward shift and compression
of the test score distribution for the test scores of boys’ schools and no change
for the distribution of test scores of girls’ schools. While the upward shift of the
boys’ scores are observed in the overall KCSE scores, the compression of the test
score distribution arises from greater gains for lower performing students relative to
higher performing students and is confirmed by smaller school test score standard
deviations. This suggests that the upgrade program conveyed the greatest benefits
to students at the lower end of the test score distribution.
Table 3.8 examines the impact of receiving a larger relative grant by exploiting
the fact that upgraded schools were of different sizes so that the grants, which were
of constant dollar amount, were of different value in terms of dollars per student.
I split the sample in half based on their 2011 cohort size to create two different
dummy variables. The first dummy variable equals one in post-upgrade periods
for the smaller upgraded schools (more dollars per student) and the second dummy
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variable equals one in post-upgrade periods for the larger schools (fewer dollars
per student).22 Using 2011 cohort numbers, the high dollars per student category
received about 40% more per student than the low dollar per student category. In
spite of the greater relative funds, I am unable to reject equal impact on overall test
scores.23
One mechanism that could lead the upgraded schools to improve grades with-
out improving human capital would be to encourage students to take easier elective
subjects. Table 3.1 shows that students taking government/history score between
0.5-1 point higher than students taking geography, a subject that meets the same
curriculum requirement. Similarly, of the sciences, both biology and physics con-
sistently award higher grades than chemistry. Table 3.9 presents regression results
looking at whether the upgrade program changed the subjects students choose. The
table shows coefficients from a series of linear probability model regressions for
each of the optional subjects from the science and humanities categories.24 The
table suggests that there was shifting of students towards geography and away from
government/history which would be expected to lower overall performance. The
coefficients in the last line of the table indicate an insignificant increase at both the
boys and girls schools in the number exams taken by each student.
Table 3.10 examines the correlates of improved test performance by running
regressions with the estimated impact on school test scores as the dependent variable
22As the upgraded girls’ schools are larger on average, the sample is split by gender before
splitting again by school size so that the indicator variables are balanced by gender.
23Appendix Table 3.A.2 presents the results separately for the core subjects with similar findings.
24English, Swahili, and math are compulsory for all students and so are not affected by the
upgrade program.
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and binary variables for grant spending as the independent variables. Unfortunately,
the small sample provides little insight into positive spending: overall only spending
on student furniture which included student desks, tables, and beds, is associated
with improved outcomes. This finding is consistent with earlier literature reviews
which found that interventions that provide additional resources which change the
daily learning environment have the most impact.
3.6 Student Composition and Preference Changes
As described in Section 3.2, students are centrally allocated to secondary school
based on their primary school completion examination score and listed preferences.
In this section, I use incoming student preference and assignment data to demon-
strate that the composition of the new national-tier schools’ student body changed
following the introduction of the national school designation.
Figure 3.5 shows the proportion of the total national-tier preference slots as-
signed to each national-school type from 2010 to 2014.25 As expected, in 2010 and
2011 almost all of the students list the original national schools in their four national
school slots.26 The 2012 introduction of 30 new national school options appears to
have been known and have opened up desirable schools as slightly less than half of
the preferences submitted in 2012 were for the new schools. This contrasts with the
46 schools upgraded in 2013 and 2014 which account for less than 20% of the listed
25Recall that while the number of national schools increased between 2010 and 2014, students
remained constrained to providing a ranked list of only four national schools.
26Lucas and Mbiti (2012b) detail the causes and consequences of errors made in the listing of




The limited interest in some of the new national schools together with the
higher number of national schools relative to national school preference slots suggests
an ambiguous impact on incoming student quality. If a district is allocated a slot
in a national school, the allocation mechanism will run through all students in that
district in descending score order until it finds a student who listed that school
among his/her preferences. With an additional 76 schools to list and the number of
slots held constant at four, the probability that a lower performing student is the
first to list a certain national school increases, which could serve to decrease the
quality of students entering the new national schools.
Table 3.11 presents the results of regressions represented by equation 3.1 where
the dependent variable is the primary school completion examination (KCPE) scores
of incoming students. Overall, the quality of the admitted students in the upgraded
schools decreased following their promotion to national school status. This result
could be attributable to the larger number of national schools and the fact that
the allocation mechanism needed to go further down the student list before finding
a student from each district who listed each national school as one of the four
national school preferences.27 This decrease in incoming student quality suggests
that a simple before-and-after analysis of student performance at upgraded schools
that made use of students admitted after the upgrade program was implemented
27In 2016, the National Examinations Council and the Ministry of Education changed the pref-
erence submission structure. Instead of listing any of the national schools in each of the national
school slots, students were required to select schools only from a list for each of the slots. By
placing the traditional national schools in a single category, students were unable to consistently
list the same schools making it less likely that low-ability students would be the first to list a
certain national school.
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would be inappropriate. Also, if peer effects across grades are particularly strong,
it is possible that the relatively lower quality of incoming students in the girls’
schools could bias downwards the impact of the upgrade program on students already
enrolled.
3.7 Conclusion
Between 2011 and 2013, the Kenyan government upgraded selected high-performing
secondary schools. I identify the impact of the program by comparing students
already in the selected schools to students in other schools that were eligible but
not selected for the program. The program had a heterogeneous impact on aca-
demic achievement of students at the impacted schools. The program improved
examination scores for students at upgraded boys’ schools but had no impact on
upgraded girls’ schools. Boys’ mean overall grades at upgraded schools increased by
0.16 standard deviations. Boys’ English and Swahili examination scores increased
by 0.16 and 0.23 standard deviations respectively. In addition to the increase in ex-
amination scores, the program led to a rightward shift and compression of the test
score distribution resulting from benefits that accrued to lower-performing students
at the upgraded schools. While the overall test score gains are small relative to
the resources allocated to the program, it does represent a government implemented
school improvement program that successfully increased academic outcomes.
There are a number of possible explanations for the fact that the program
improved achievement at boys’ schools but not girls’ schools. First, average per-
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formance was higher at the upgraded boys’ schools; it is possible that the school
inputs affected by the program are not the binding constraint facing the slightly
lower achievement girls’ schools.
In addition to demonstrating impact on student achievement, I also demon-
strate that the program decreased the composition of students admitted to the
upgraded schools. I attribute this counterintuitive result to the structure of the
central student assignment mechanism and detail why common preference for the
original national schools could lead to a decrease in the average ability of incoming
students. A new policy, attempting to address low-ability students being admit-
ted to national-tier schools, was introduced in 2016 and changed the way students
are required to list their preferences. The ad-hoc nature of these policies provides
interesting experiments that could, in future research, provide insights into the un-
derlying preferences of students over schools. The new policy in particular imposes
restrictions on the listing of schools and presents interesting opportunities to exam-
ine the welfare changes.
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Figure 3.1: Reported Grant Spending Categories
Dormitories Classrooms
Toilet facilities Administration/staff buildings
Science/language labs Student furniture
Dining hall Library
Security
Note: Schools could spend on multiple categories. 125 categories reported across 49 upgraded schools.
School grant spending was audited.
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Figure 3.2: Sample Schools
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Table 3.1: KCSE Summary Statistics
2009 2010 2011 2013 2014
All Nat All All All All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Students 337387 15472 357447 413510 449214 486430
Overall Score 4.94 9.60 5.15 5.25 5.12 5.38
(2.32) (1.74) (2.42) (2.47) (2.49) (2.47)
Core Subjects
English 5.36 9.94 5.52 5.38 4.90 5.59
(2.48) (1.35) (2.55) (2.51) (2.43) (2.42)
Swahili 5.05 9.42 5.43 5.72 5.40 5.65
(2.43) (1.88) (2.50) (2.61) (2.70) (2.65)
Math 3.40 9.01 3.54 3.67 3.92 3.64
(2.92) (2.99) (3.05) (3.22) (3.38) (3.19)
Humanities
Gov’t/History 5.93 10.15 6.05 5.79 5.87 6.15
(2.60) (1.69) (2.77) (2.66) (2.70) (2.69)
Geography 4.98 9.24 4.91 5.51 5.56 5.53
(2.62) (2.08) (2.59) (2.85) (2.87) (2.93)
Sciences
Biology 4.70 9.70 4.86 5.09 4.93 4.99
(2.68) (1.99) (2.80) (2.79) (2.84) (2.87)
Physics 4.82 9.04 5.19 5.33 5.51 5.40
(2.89) (2.65) (3.04) (3.12) (3.16) (3.10)
Chemistry 3.68 8.39 3.97 3.91 3.96 4.41
(2.31) (2.76) (2.60) (2.71) (2.70) (2.73)
Note: Standard deviation reported in parenthesis. Overall score is the
mean score across the three core subjects, 1 subject from the humanities,
2 subjects from the sciences, as well as one additional practical subject
from the list presented in footnote 8.
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Table 3.2: School Summary Statistics
Sample Schools Upgraded Schools Eligible Schools
All Boys’ Girls’ All Boys’ Girls’ All Boys’ Girls’
Schools 153 75 78 49 22 27 104 53 51
Overall Score 8.11 8.28 7.95 8.46 8.76 8.21 7.95 8.08 7.81
(0.90) (0.80) (0.96) (0.95) (0.88) (0.96) (0.83) (0.69) (0.95)
Cohort Size (2010) 198.05 204.60 191.74 222.08 238.50 208.70 186.72 190.53 182.76
(69.72) (68.21) (71.01) (68.90) (82.54) (53.36) (67.51) (56.41) (77.76)
TSC Teachers 26.07 26.43 25.73 27.94 28.50 27.48 25.19 25.57 24.80
(13.00) (14.83) (11.05) (14.72) (18.20) (11.49) (12.08) (13.29) (10.81)
Total Teaching Staff 30.49 31.75 29.28 32.61 34.41 31.15 29.49 30.64 28.29
(13.67) (15.65) (11.43) (15.31) (18.36) (12.46) (12.79) (14.42) (10.84)
Distance to City 17.46 18.86 16.12 15.22 11.78 18.01 18.52 21.80 15.11
(12.66) (13.55) (11.68) (12.02) (11.62) (11.81) (12.88) (13.29) (11.61)
Distance to Road 9.76 11.17 8.41 8.05 9.34 6.99 10.57 11.93 9.16
(10.99) (12.62) (9.04) (11.49) (14.96) (7.77) (10.71) (11.58) (9.64)
Religious Sponsor 0.63 0.60 0.65 0.61 0.50 0.70 0.63 0.64 0.63
(0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.49) (0.51) (0.47) (0.48) (0.48) (0.49)
Government Sponsor 0.35 0.37 0.33 0.39 0.50 0.30 0.34 0.32 0.35
(0.48) (0.49) (0.47) (0.49) (0.51) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.48)
Acreage 29.30 36.56 22.24 37.88 52.77 25.85 25.39 30.14 20.36
(32.16) (41.67) (16.17) (46.71) (65.05) (17.12) (21.85) (25.73) (15.50)
Note: Standard deviation reported in parenthesis. Sample schools include all upgraded and
eligible schools. Upgraded schools were selected for upgrade to the national tier in either
2011, 2012, or 2013. Eligible schools met the upgrade criteria but were not selected to be
upgraded. Overall score reflects the school mean overall KCSE performance. TSC teachers
refers to the number of government certified teachers.
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Table 3.3: Common Trends Regressions
Full Sample Boys Sample Girls Sample
A. Common trends from 2006-2010
N 115651 59594 56057
Overall Score -0.015 -0.048 0.011
(0.034) (0.053) (0.043)
B. Common trends from 2009-2010
N 50656 26215 24441
Overall Score -0.015 -0.042 0.042
(0.076) (0.096) (0.110)
English Score -0.196∗ -0.087 -0.255∗
(0.103) (0.126) (0.151)
Swahili Score 0.074 0.082 0.115
(0.120) (0.181) (0.154)
Math Score -0.150 -0.361∗ 0.090
(0.140) (0.207) (0.170)
Notes: Each coefficient in the table is the result from a separate
regression and is the coefficient on an interaction between a
time trend and a binary treatment variable. Exam scores are
normalized by year. Subject specific scores are not available
prior to 2009. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 99 percent level;
∗∗ indicates significance at the 95 percent level; and ∗ indicates
significance at the 90 percent level.
130
Table 3.4: Impact of Treatment on School Cohort Size
All Schools Boys’ Schools Girls’ Schools
(1) (2) (3)
Upgraded Schools 5.720 6.646 5.048
(9.072) (13.156) (12.505)
Constant 265.684∗∗∗ 265.342∗∗∗ 174.157∗∗∗
(3.395) (5.888) (4.671)
Observations 763 375 388
R2 0.834 0.849 0.814
Note: Dependent variable is school cohort size and the regression is
run at the school-year level. Five school-year pairs are excluded be-
cause the exam results were nullified. All regressions include year and
school fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
Upgraded School is a binary variable equal to one once the school has
received its national school designation. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at
the 99 percent level; ∗∗ indicates significance at the 95 percent level;
and ∗ indicates significance at the 90 percent level.
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Table 3.5: Estimated Treatment Coefficients
Full Boys Girls
(1) (2) (3)
N 134966 69398 65568
Examination Outcomes
Overall Score 0.055 0.359∗∗ -0.208
(0.122) (0.174) (0.160)
Higher Ed. Funding Cutoff 0.016 0.085∗∗ -0.044
(0.029) (0.041) (0.038)
Core Subject Scores
English Score 0.192∗ 0.397∗∗ -0.021
(0.099) (0.155) (0.116)
Swahili Score 0.067 0.560∗∗ -0.368∗
(0.153) (0.212) (0.194)
Math Score -0.016 0.314 -0.284
(0.157) (0.212) (0.202)
Note: Each coefficient in the table is a result from a sepa-
rate regression. All regressions include school and year fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
Treatment is a binary variable equal to one once the school
received its national school designation. ∗∗∗ indicates sig-
nificance at the 99 percent level; ∗∗ indicates significance at
the 95 percent level; and ∗ indicates significance at the 90
percent level.
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Table 3.6: Upgrade Treatment Effect by Percentile
Boys Girls
Percentile Overall English Swahili Math Overall English Swahili Math
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.10 0.371 0.677∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗ 0.651∗∗ -0.064 -0.013 -0.369 -0.169
0.240 0.209 0.332 0.296 0.187 0.223 0.280 0.233
0.20 0.539∗∗ 0.442∗∗ 0.775∗∗ 0.599∗ -0.050 -0.072 -0.208 -0.093
0.268 0.186 0.303 0.329 0.182 0.140 0.304 0.281
0.25 0.417∗ 0.564∗∗ 0.861∗∗∗ 0.841∗∗∗ -0.041 -0.130 -0.283 -0.205
0.243 0.220 0.291 0.262 0.188 0.215 0.230 0.231
0.30 0.474∗∗ 0.221 0.865∗∗∗ 0.273 -0.069 -0.125 -0.228 -0.368
0.237 0.263 0.330 0.326 0.256 0.150 0.239 0.335
0.40 0.481∗∗ 0.340∗ 0.647∗∗ 0.447 -0.050 -0.032 -0.424 -0.334
0.230 0.205 0.276 0.304 0.170 0.171 0.260 0.351
0.50 0.347 0.488∗∗ 0.549∗ 0.411 -0.088 -0.049 -0.252 -0.334
0.217 0.207 0.285 0.299 0.196 0.102 0.202 0.332
0.60 0.333 0.211 0.526∗ 0.390∗ -0.285 0.000 -0.103 -0.245
0.220 0.203 0.306 0.221 0.237 0.164 0.235 0.289
0.70 0.202 0.177 0.347 0.070 -0.049 -0.141 -0.087 -0.237
0.189 0.161 0.270 0.127 0.156 0.177 0.192 0.284
0.75 0.254 0.363∗ 0.227 0.042 0.000 -0.050 -0.146 -0.284
0.196 0.190 0.221 0.127 0.166 0.107 0.193 0.256
0.80 0.210 0.516∗∗ 0.154 0.081 -0.017 0.043 -0.023 -0.225
0.221 0.218 0.257 0.230 0.197 0.094 0.171 0.231
0.90 0.070 0.263 0.045 0.223 0.041 0.019 -0.201 -0.085
0.149 0.173 0.208 0.195 0.101 0.152 0.152 0.156
0.95 0.112 0.558∗∗ 0.000 0.000 -0.017 0.075 -0.217 -0.346
0.221 0.231 0.152 0.173 0.181 0.111 0.153 0.291
Note: Standard errors clustered at the school level. Estimates are from a changes-in-changes
model. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 99 percent level; ∗∗ indicates significance at the 95
percent level; and ∗ indicates significance at the 90 percent level.
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Table 3.7: Estimated Impact on Standard Deviation
Overall Male Female
(1) (2) (3)
N 755 358 397
Examination Outcomes
Overall Score -0.082∗ -0.123∗ -0.042
(0.042) (0.067) (0.043)
Core Subjects
English Score -0.029 -0.079 0.013
(0.033) (0.048) (0.044)
Swahili Score -0.128∗∗ -0.221∗∗ -0.050
(0.054) (0.088) (0.062)
Math Score -0.105∗ -0.110 -0.092
(0.062) (0.097) (0.072)
Note: Dependent variable is the standard deviation of
scores in each school in each year. The regression is run
at the school-year level where five school-year pairs are ex-
cluded because the exam results were nullified. Each coef-
ficient in the table is a result from a separate regression.
All regressions include school and year fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the school level. Treatment is a
binary variable equal to one once the school received its na-
tional school designation. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the
99 percent level; ∗∗ indicates significance at the 95 percent
level; and ∗ indicates significance at the 90 percent level.
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Table 3.8: Estimated Treatment Coefficients by Relative Grant Size
Overall Male Female
High dollar per student 0.024 0.352 -0.284
(0.163) (0.261) (0.187)
Low dollar per student 0.077 0.364∗ -0.152
(0.153) (0.208) (0.22)
Constant 9.674∗∗∗ 9.891∗∗∗ 7.868∗∗∗
(0.314) (0.259) (0.256)
Observations 134966 69398 65568
R2 0.28 0.257 0.286
F-test: high=low (p-value) 0.791 0.968 0.621
Note: All regressions include cohort size as an additional in-
dependent variable as well as year and school fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the school level. High (low)
dollar per student is a binary variable equal to one for schools
with a student body less (more) than the median student body
once the school received its national school designation. The
sample includes the set of students at schools that were up-
graded as well as students at schools that were eligible but not
upgraded. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 99 percent level; ∗∗
indicates significance at the 95 percent level; and ∗ indicates
significance at the 90 percent level.
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Table 3.9: Impact of Treatment on Subject Selection
Overall Male Female
(1) (2) (3)
A: Linear Probability Model
Gov’t/History Score -0.020 -0.070∗ 0.023
(0.024) (0.037) (0.032)
Geography Score 0.044∗ 0.047 0.040
(0.024) (0.043) (0.025)
Biology 0.013 0.016 0.010∗
(0.009) (0.018) (0.006)
Physics 0.009 0.015 0.006
(0.022) (0.037) (0.026)
Chemistry 0.002 0.003 0.000
(0.002) (0.005) (0.001)
B: OLS
Number of Subjects 0.061∗∗ 0.072 0.048
(0.028) (0.047) (0.033)
Note: All regressions include year and school fixed
effects as well as cohort size. Standard errors are
clustered at the school level. Treatment is a binary
variable equal to one once the school received its na-
tional school designation. ∗∗∗ indicates significance
at the 99 percent level; ∗∗ indicates significance at
the 95 percent level; and ∗ indicates significance at
the 90 percent level.
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Table 3.10: Grant Spending Correlates of Treatment Effects
Overall Male Female
(1) (2) (3)
Dormitories 0.166 0.476 0.111
(0.22) (0.342) (0.307)
Classrooms -0.387∗ -0.404 -0.318
(0.226) (0.78) (0.296)
Science/language labs 0.436 0.484 0.432
(0.281) (0.683) (0.361)
Library 0.241 -0.05 0.191
(0.235) (0.688) (0.303)
Toilet facilities 0.345 0.216 0.603∗∗
(0.278) (0.845) (0.282)
Administration/staff buildings -0.221 0.568 -0.596
(0.244) (0.482) (0.426)
Dining hall 0.175 0.979 0.211
(0.269) (0.734) (0.408)
Security 0.351 1.041 -0.126
(0.402) (0.668) (0.314)
Student furniture 0.707∗∗ 0.768 0.929∗
(0.289) (0.527) (0.553)
Constant -0.237 -0.524∗ -0.327
(0.219) (0.302) (0.309)
Observations 49 22 27
R2 0.342 0.411 0.459
Note: All spending is categorized and represented by a dummy
variable equal to one if the school spent funds on the category. ∗∗∗
indicates significance at the 99 percent level; ∗∗ indicates signifi-
cance at the 95 percent level; and ∗ indicates significance at the
90 percent level.
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Table 3.11: Impact of Treatment on Test Scores of Incoming Students
Incoming Student KCPE Scores
Overall Male Female
(1) (2) (3)
Upgraded Schools -9.107∗∗∗ -7.696∗∗∗ -10.226∗∗∗
(1.787) (2.637) (2.431)
Constant 353.244∗∗∗ 356.067∗∗∗ 350.614∗∗∗
(0.883) (1.248) (1.242)
Observations 140585 72680 67905
R2 0.279 0.29 0.262
Note: All regressions include year and school fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the school level. Upgraded
School is a binary variable equal to one once the school
has received its national school designation. ∗∗∗ indicates
significance at the 99 percent level; ∗∗ indicates significance




3.A Additional Tables and Figures
Table 3.A.1: Pooled Regressions
Mean KCSE Grade English Swahili Math
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Upgraded Male Schools 0.35∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗ 0.559∗∗∗ 0.302
(0.17) (0.158) (0.209) (0.209)
Upgraded Female Schools -0.211 -0.013 -0.369∗ -0.288
(0.162) (0.116) (0.194) (0.205)
Constant 8.251∗∗∗ 9.265∗∗∗ 8.363∗∗∗ 7.105∗∗∗
(0.303) (0.159) (0.317) (0.549)
Observations 134966 134866 134898 134966
R2 0.282 0.306 0.271 0.201
p-value (male = female): 0.017 0.028 0.001 0.042
Note: All regressions include year and school fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the school level. Upgraded Male School and Upgraded Female School are binary
variables equal to one once the school has received its national school designation.
Table 3.A.2: Estimated Treatment Coefficients by Relative Grant Size
English Swahili Math
Overall Male Female Overall Male Female Overall Male Female
High dollar per student 0.191 0.458∗ -0.013 -0.079 0.371 -0.47∗∗ -0.1 0.34 -0.515∗∗
(0.144) (0.24) (0.147) (0.202) (0.317) (0.236) (0.193) (0.276) (0.261)
Low dollar per student 0.193∗ 0.354∗∗ -0.027 0.17 0.695∗∗∗ -0.294 0.043 0.296 -0.115
(0.117) (0.167) (0.157) (0.188) (0.249) (0.261) (0.195) (0.275) (0.253)
Constant 10.126∗∗∗ 9.602∗∗∗ 9.351∗∗∗ 9.569∗∗∗ 9.652∗∗∗ 7.919∗∗∗ 9.178∗∗∗ 9.658∗∗∗ 6.052∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.283) (0.093) (0.354) (0.316) (0.314) (0.626) (0.321) (0.506)
Observations 134866 69350 65516 134898 69361 65537 134966 69397 65569
R2 0.304 0.293 0.314 0.267 0.274 0.268 0.2 0.146 0.219
F-test: high=low (p-value) 0.989 0.692 0.946 0.310 0.389 0.588 0.539 0.903 0.226
Note: All regressions include cohort size as an additional independent variable as well as year and school fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the school level. High (low) dollar per student is a binary variable equal to one for schools with a student body less (more) than
the median student body once the school received its national school designation. The sample includes the set of students at schools that were
upgraded as well as students at schools that were eligible but not upgraded. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 99 percent level; ∗∗ indicates
significance at the 95 percent level; and ∗ indicates significance at the 90 percent level.
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Table 3.A.3: Estimated Treatment Coefficients - Closest School
Full Boys Girls
(1) (2) (3)
N 87687 41657 46030
Overall Score 0.012 0.439∗∗ -0.311∗
(0.140) (0.217) (0.168)
Higher Ed. Funding Cutoff 0.003 0.098∗ -0.069∗
(0.033) (0.052) (0.040)
Core Subjects
English Score 0.162 0.368∗ -0.034
(0.113) (0.198) (0.124)
Swahili Score 0.055 0.774∗∗∗ -0.482∗∗
(0.178) (0.246) (0.200)
Math Score -0.056 0.389 -0.341
(0.185) (0.266) (0.226)
Note: Each coefficient in the table is a result from a sepa-
rate regression. All regressions include school and year fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
Treatment is a binary variable equal to one once the school
received its national school designation.
Table 3.A.4: Complete Counties Estimated Treatment Coefficients
Full Boys Girls
(1) (2) (3)
N 105021 58651 46370
Overall Score 0.105 0.303 -0.087
(0.142) (0.191) (0.206)
Higher Ed. Funding Cutoff 0.029 0.080∗ -0.023
(0.033) (0.046) (0.047)
Core Subjects
English Score 0.177 0.392∗∗ -0.030
(0.121) (0.174) (0.156)
Swahili Score 0.071 0.532∗∗ -0.374
(0.171) (0.216) (0.238)
Math Score 0.011 0.137 -0.056
(0.164) (0.222) (0.224)
Note: Each coefficient in the table is a result from a sepa-
rate regression. All regressions include school and year fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
Treatment is a binary variable equal to one once the school
received its national school designation.
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Table 3.A.5: Estimated Treatment Coefficients: School Level
A: Overall B: Male C: Female
25th 50th 75th 25th 50th 75th 25th 50th 75th
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Overall Score 0.183 0.054 -0.015 0.421 0.242 0.336∗ -0.020 -0.106 -0.298
(0.170) (0.150) (0.135) (0.253) (0.213) (0.191) (0.224) (0.210) (0.179)
Core Subjects
English Score 0.170 0.126 0.106 0.382 0.403∗∗ 0.244 -0.008 -0.108 -0.008
(0.148) (0.130) (0.112) (0.238) (0.197) (0.177) (0.187) (0.160) (0.143)
Swahili Score 0.207 0.008 -0.070 0.739∗∗ 0.521∗∗ 0.330 -0.218 -0.397 -0.386∗
(0.207) (0.188) (0.157) (0.330) (0.258) (0.208) (0.239) (0.253) (0.215)
Math Score 0.256 -0.036 -0.182 0.558∗ 0.268 0.035 0.000 -0.283 -0.341
(0.221) (0.246) (0.226) (0.315) (0.336) (0.300) (0.312) (0.347) (0.307)
Note: Each coefficient in the table is a result from a separate regression. All regressions include
school and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. Treatment is a
binary variable equal to one once the school received its national school designation.
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Chapter 4: A Firm of One’s Own: Experimental Evidence on Credit
Constraints and Occupational Choice
Joint with Maddalena Honorati, Pamela Jakiela, and Owen Ozier
4.1 Introduction
Youth underemployment is a major challenge facing developing nations, particularly
in Africa Filmer and Fox (2014). Young people are more likely to be unemployed
than older adults (Kluve et al. 2016). In low-income countries, unemployment figures
also typically underestimate the proportion of youths who cannot find productive
jobs Fares, Montenegro, and Orazem (2006). After leaving school, it often takes
young adults in low-income countries several years to find gainful employment or
launch a viable household enterprise; during that transition from school to the labor
market, many youth are forced to rely on family members for support between stints
of work in irregular, informal positions World Bank (2006). Demographics make the
problem of youth underemployment particularly acute in Sub-Saharan Africa, where
more than half the population is under 25. Filmer and Fox (2014) estimate that,
over the next ten years, only a quarter of the African youth entering the labor
market will be able to find paid employment.
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Since formal sector jobs are scarce in low-income settings, many policymakers
have advocated entrepreneurship promotion programs intended to help unemployed
youth generate an income through self-employment United Nations Development
Programme (2013); Franz (2014). The simplest entrepreneurship promotion pro-
grams are credit market interventions such as loans or one-off grants of money or
physical capital. Economic theory suggests that such interventions can help po-
tential entrepreneurs who have limited opportunities to save or borrow to start or
expand profitable businesses, and one recent study suggests that cash grants can
help unemployed youth launch businesses and increase their incomes Blattman, Fi-
ala, and Martinez (2014). However, a growing body of evidence on the the returns
to capital among entrepreneurs suggests that credit constraints may not be the main
obstacle limiting the growth of female-owned microenterprises: evaluations to date
have found that, in most cases, cash grants to female entrepreneurs do not lead to
sustained increases in business profits or income (De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff
2008, De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff 2009, Fafchamps, McKenzie, Quinn, and
Woodruff 2011, Fiala 2014, Karlan, Knight, and Udry 2015, Blattman et al. 2016).1
Taken together, these results suggest that many women who operate small busi-
nesses are “subsistence entrepreneurs” Schoar (2010) who lack either the ability or
the inclination to expand their enterprises; if this is true, access to capital (alone)
is unlikely to have major impacts.
1Recent evaluations also suggest that microfinance loans, the canonical credit market interven-
tion intended to help subsistence entrepreneurs, do not lead to significant increases in income or,
in most cases, microenterprise profits (Angelucci, Karlan, and Zinman 2015, Attanasio et al. 2015,
Augsburg, De Haas, Harmgart, and Meghir 2015, Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, and Kinnan 2015,
Crépon, Devoto, Duflo, and Parient 2015, Tarozzi, Desai, and Johnson 2015).
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In fact, though capital drop interventions are becoming increasingly common,
many youth entrepreneurship programs offer more than just capital, for example,
start-up capital together with skills training or ongoing business mentoring (Kluve
et al. 2016). The theory of change underlying such multifaceted approaches is that
young entrepreneurs face many different obstacles and constraints that need to be
addressed simultaneously in order to launch a successful microenterprise. For exam-
ple, they may lack the vocational skills needed to attract customers in competitive
markets, they may not have access to the start-up capital needed to launch a busi-
ness, and they may not know how to manage an enterprise successfully after it is
launched. Several recent studies suggest that multifaceted programs that combine
vocational education and start-up capital with life skills training may improve the
income prospects of young women, in particular (cf. Adoho et al. 2014, Bandiera et
al. 2014).2
We evaluate one such multifaceted entrepreneurship intervention: a “microfran-
chising” program that offered young women in some of Nairobi’s poorest neighbor-
hoods a combination of vocational and life skills training together with start-up
capital and ongoing business mentoring. Like many entrepreneurship programs, the
microfranchising model is premised on the idea that many youth do not have the
skills and experience necessary to be competitive in the labor market, and also lack
the financial and human capital needed to start a successful enterprise (for example,
2There is also evidence that multifaceted programs which combine skills training and asset
transfers can improve the income-generating capacity of vulnerable adults (not just youth and
not just women). Banerjee et al. (2015) demonstrate that one such multipronged approach, the
ultrapoor Graduation Program implemented by the NGO BRAC, led to large increases in income,
food security, and rates of savings. A recent meta-analysis also highlights the relative effectiveness
of multifaceted entrepreneurship promotion programs Cho and Honorati (2014).
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the ability to conduct market research and develop a business plan). The franchise
treatment that we study attempts to overcome these barriers by providing moti-
vated young women with an established business model and the specific capital and
supply chain linkages needed to operate the business. The franchise treatment was
designed and implemented by the International Rescue Committee (the IRC) in
cooperation with local community-based organizations.3
We estimate the impacts of this franchise treatment on applicants via a ran-
domized trial. We not only measure the program’s impacts in relation to a control
group, but also compare those impacts to the effects of a simpler cash grant inter-
vention that relaxed the credit constraint without providing any additional training
or support. We interpret our findings through the lens of a simple model of invest-
ment decisions when individuals differ in terms of their labor productivity. High
productivity types who have limited opportunities to save or borrow may be unable
to launch profitable businesses because they cannot accumulate the required capital.
In such cases, credit market imperfections may create a poverty trap, and one-off
transfers of money or capital, such as those in our study, can lead to permanent in-
creases in income. One of the key insights from the model is that credit constraints
are only an obstacle to productive entrepreneurship for a subset of individual types;
less productive types are unable to sustain a business in any steady state. Nonethe-
less, savings constraints can also affect the investment decisions and occupational
choices of lower productivity types who receive one-off infusions of funding or cap-
3See International Rescue Committee (2016b) for an overview of the IRC’s economic develop-
ment programs.
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ital; though these individuals cannot sustain businesses, they may invest in capital
and launch unproductive firms because enterprise capital is a technology for saving,
albeit at a negative interest rate. Thus, short-term impacts of one-off transfers on
entrepreneurship should not be taken as evidence that a program relieved a credit
constraint or addressed a poverty trap; the critical issue is whether impacts on
income persist over the longer-term.
We find that both the franchise treatment and the grant treatment led to
substantial increases in income in the year after the interventions. Point estimates
suggest impacts that are both economically and statistically significant: the fran-
chise treatment increased weekly income by 30 percent, up 1.6 US dollars from a
mean of 5.5 dollars in the control group (p-value 0.035); the grant treatment in-
creased weekly income by 3.2 dollars (p-value 0.008) or 56 percent. As expected,
these impacts appear to be driven by a shift from paid work to self-employment;
women assigned to either the franchise or the grant treatment are approximately 10
percentage points more likely to be self-employed than those in the control group.
Women assigned to the grant treatment also increased their labor supply (hours
worked) substantially.
Though both interventions increased income in the relatively short-run, data
from endline surveys conducted between 14 and 22 months after treatment indicate
that the observed impacts on income disappeared in the second year after the pro-
gram(s). At endline, women assigned to either the franchise treatment or the grant
treatment are more likely to be self-employed than women in the control group,
but the treatments are not associated with increases in income or labor supply.
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In addition, we find no impacts of treatment on food security, expenditures, liv-
ing conditions, or empowerment at endline. Seen through the lens of our model,
these findings are consistent with the existence of savings constraints; large impacts
on income and occupational choice that disappear relatively quickly make sense if
enterprise capital is one of the few viable savings technologies available to young
women in a poor urban area. However, our findings do not suggest that credit con-
straints had been preventing productive entrepreneurs from launching profitable,
sustainable businesses.
This paper makes several contributions. First, we measure the impact of
an active labor market program on young women in an urban area in a developing
country. Here, we contribute to an active literature on active labor market programs
and youth unemployment.4 Our work is most closely related to Bandiera et al. (2014)
and Adoho et al. (2014), who also evaluate multifaceted labor market interventions
for young women in Sub-Saharan Africa.
We compare the impacts of a multifaceted entrepreneurship promotion inter-
vention to those of a one-off cash grant; this provides a natural cost-effectiveness
benchmark without any of the contextual caveats that would accompany a more
traditional cost-benefit analysis. Though evaluations of cash grants are becoming
more common Haushofer and Shapiro (2016)cf., the use of cash as a benchmark
within program evaluation is still relatively uncommon. Our results, like those of
Karlan, Knight, and Udry (2015), suggest that unrestricted cash grant treatments
can provide an extremely useful alternative to the traditional control group (that
4See Kluve et al. (2016) for a recent survey.
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receives no treatment).5
We measure both interventions’ impacts over time, expanding our understand-
ing of the dynamics of the estimated impacts. In addition, we present a model,
building on previous work (cf. Fafchamps et al. 2011, Blattman, Fiala, and Mar-
tinez 2014, Blattman et al. 2016), that yields a straightforward interpretation of the
estimated program impacts in relation to credit and savings constraints. Our model
suggests that the patterns of impacts that we observe are more likely to be explained
by savings constraints than by credit-constraint-based poverty traps. This conclu-
sion resonates with other recent evidence that the poor, particularly poor women,
have a very limited menu of savings technologies Dupas and Robinson (2013a,b).
Finally, we capitalize on the program evaluation setting to test whether par-
ticipants hold accurate beliefs about program impacts; in so doing, we provide a
framework for comparing methods of belief elicitation. Our work builds directly on
the contributions of Smith, Whalley, and Wilcox (2011) and Smith, Whalley, and
Wilcox (2012). Like McKenzie (2016a), we find the program participants do a poor
job of estimating their own counterfactual (probabilistic) outcomes. However, we
extend the existing set of best practices by demonstrating that participants are quite
good at estimating average treatment impacts on the population once behavioral
biases are taken into account.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 outlines our
theoretical model. Section 4.3 describes our research design and the specific fran-
5Supporting this argument, Özler (2016) has also remarked that “the interesting comparison is
not against ‘no support’ ... it’s against cost-equivalent alternative efforts.”
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chise and grant treatments that we evaluate. Section 4.4 presents our main results.
Section 4.5 characterizes participants’ beliefs about the impacts of the program.
Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Conceptual Framework
To understand the impacts of capital infusions and other credit market interventions,
we require a framework for interpreting individual responses to these interventions.
We propose a simple model of labor supply decisions in the presence of credit mar-
ket imperfections, when individuals may face credit constraints and may also be
unable to save. We show that high productivity individuals who are are unable to
save or borrow may find themselves in a poverty trap in which they never launch a
business, even though their enterprises would be profitable once launched. In this
constrained environment, a large capital transfer enables these individuals to start
lasting businesses. In contrast, low productivity individuals are unable to sustain an
enterprise in any steady state; because these individuals cannot sustain a profitable
enterprise, the fact that they are not accessing loans does not indicate a market
failure. However, in a savings-constrained environment, low productivity types may
open businesses after receiving a large capital transfer, using enterprise capital as
a savings vehicle when other savings technologies are unavailable. These businesses
are temporary (because low productivity individuals cannot sustain businesses in
the steady state), and are eventually closed after the initial capital investment de-
preciates.
149
We begin by considering a simple model in which production in each period de-
pends on labor and capital. Labor is allocated between two activities: own-enterprise
production, characterized by production function f e(K,Le), and wage labor, char-
acterized by production function fw(Lw). Individuals allocate their labor across
sectors subject to the constraint: Le + Lw ≤ 1. Importantly, we follow other re-
cent work Blattman, Fiala, and Martinez (2014)cf. in assuming that own-enterprise
production requires a capital investment that exceeds some minimum scale; thus,
potential entrepreneurs who are credit-constrained and unable to save cannot launch
arbitrarily small businesses that could then grow over time. This minimum scale
requirement creates the potential for a poverty trap. Both production functions are
characterized by diminishing returns with respect to individual inputs; we assume
that the enterprise production function, f e(K,Le), is homogeneous of degree one
above the minimum scale.
We make the following specific assumptions about the own-enterprise produc-
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tion function, f e(K,Le):
f e(K,Le) ≡ 0 ∀K ≤ Kmin (minimum scale) (A1)
δ2
δK2
f e(K,Le) < 0 <
δ
δK
f e(K,Le) ∀K ≥ Kmin (diminishing returns) (A2)
δ2
δL2
f e(K,Le) < 0 <
δ
δL
f e(K,Le) ∀K ≥ Kmin (diminishing returns) (A3)
δ2
δLδK















f e(K,Le) = 0 (Inada) (A7)
With respect to the wage labor production function, fw(Lw), we assume that stan-
dard Inada conditions hold.6 In other words, we assume
fw(0) = 0 (A8)
δ
δL
fw(Lw) > 0 (A9)
δ2
δL2





fw(Lw) = +∞ (A11)
In each period t, the agent has capital Kt and one unit of labor to divide
between activities such that Le + Lw ≤ 1. The agent produces using whatever
allocation of labor she chooses, yielding F(Kt, L
w) = fw(Lw) + f e(Kt, 1−Lw). The
6In the Online Appendix, we show that the same argument can be extended for a constant wage
rate.
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maximum level of production in a given period results from the optimal allocation






Proposition 1 characterizes the properties of F∗(Kt). Because of the minimum level
of capital required to produce output in the own-enterprise sector, the function
F
∗(Kt) has a characteristic shape, which is shown in Figure 4.1. The characteristic
shape of F∗(Kt) drives the predictions of our model.
Proposition 1. F∗(Kt), the total production function conditional on the optimal
allocation of labor across the wage labor and own enterprise sectors, has the following
properties:
1. For all Kt ≤ Kmin, F∗(Kt) = fw(1); hence, the first and second derivatives of
F
∗(Kt) are equal to 0 for all Kt ≤ Kmin.
2. For all Kt > Kmin, F
∗(Kt) has a positive first derivative.
3. For all Kt > Kmin, F
∗(Kt) has a negative second derivative.
Proof: see Online Appendix.
Intuitively, F∗(Kt) is flat for Kt ≤ Kmin. Levels of capital below the minimum
level required to operate a business, Kmin, do not contribute to total output and
simply depreciate; hence, for individuals who have access to a range of savings
technologies, there is no reason to invest K < Kmin in the own-enterprise sector. At
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levels of capital exceeding Kmin, F
∗(Kt) inherits the properties of the production
function in the own enterprise sector; it is always optimal to allocate one’s capital
and some of one’s labor to the own enterprise sector and operate a business at some
scale because the marginal product of capital approaches infinity as Kt → K+min.







After production, the previous period’s capital depreciates, so that it becomes
Kt(1− δ). The agent also chooses a level of consumption, ct, in period t. Capital in
the next period is thus given by:
Kt+1 = F
∗(Kt)− ct +Kt(1− δ) (2)
A steady state is characterized by a level of capital, Kss, and a level of consumption,
css, that satisfy the following condition:
Kss = F
∗(Kss)− css +Kss(1− δ) (3)
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Rearranging, and because consumption cannot be negative, this becomes:
css = F
∗(Kss)− δKss ≥ 0 (4)
For any individual, the steady state level of capital cannot exceed the highest value
of Kt such that F
∗(Kt) = δKt.
Because δKt is a ray from the origin, it may cross the production function,
F
∗(Kt), at most three times: it may cross the flat region of F
∗(Kt) (where 0 < Kt <
Kmin) at most once, and it may cross F
∗(Kt) in the curved region (where Kt ≥ Kmin)
at most twice. Examples of production functions (and their intersections with δKt)
are shown in Figure 4.2.













Individuals differ in terms of their productivity, which is characterized by the
shape of the production function F∗i (Kt). We define high productivity individuals
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as those that can sustain a self-employment activity in any steady state.
Definition 1. Individual i is a high productivity type if she is able to sustain
a business in any steady state, i.e. if there exists Kt such that F
∗
i (Kt) > δKt and
Kt > Kmin. A latent entrepreneur is a high productivity type with at least one
steady state that satisfies the condition F∗i (Kss) > f
w(1).
Being a high productivity type is a necessary condition for successful entrepreneur-
ship: individuals who are not high productivity types are unable to sustain an
enterprise in any steady state.7 If high productivity individuals are sufficiently pa-
tient and they are able to save at a sufficiently non-negative interest rate, then those
who prefer operating their own businesses to working (exclusively) in the wage sec-
tor will do so — they will save up the funds needed to make the initial profitable
capital investment of Kss > Kmin and launch their own businesses. Alternatively,
high productivity types who face sufficiently low borrowing costs can borrow the
funds needed to launch their businesses. However, when opportunities for saving
and borrowing are limited, high productivity types who wish to launch their own
enterprises may not be able to do so — creating a poverty trap.
Savings constraints also shape individual responses to cash grant interventions.
When individuals are able to save, investing a transfer in enterprise capital (or in
any other illiquid asset) is only attractive if the return on the investment exceeds the
return on saving. However, when saving is impossible, investing in business capital
7Whether a high productivity type prefers entrepreneurship to wage labor will depend on their
preferences. For many preferences specifications, opening a business is attractive when fw(1) ≤
maxKssF
∗
i (Kss). However, the predictions of the model do not depend on specific assumptions
about the utility function.
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and launching a small-scale enterprise may be one of the only ways to smooth
positive income shocks across periods. We assume that capital stock is carried
forward (minus depreciation) as long as an individual allocates at least ε > 0 units
of labor to the own-enterprise sector; we allow ε to be arbitrarily small.
The first key prediction of the model is that a one-off transfer to a latent
entrepreneur can lead to a permanent increase in income. Individuals who have
access to a zero-interest savings technology will invest enough in their businesses to
transition to their preferred steady-state level of capital. In this case, income will
immediately rise from fw(1) to F∗i (Kss), and will remain there indefinitely. Con-
sumption may also be directly impacted if individuals save and consume transferred
funds without investing them in microenterprises (though these direct impacts on
consumption should not be associated with changes in occupational choice).
When latent entrepreneurs are unable to save, they will invest any transfers
received in their businesses.8 If the amount of the transfer exceeds the lowest possible
steady state capital stock, income rises from fw(1) to F∗i (Ktransfer) and then settles
toward the individual’s optimal steady state value of F∗i (Kss) > f
w(1) over time.
Thus, the short-term impacts of capital infusions on income may be larger than the
long-term impacts, but the long-term impacts on income are positive.
In contrast, for lower productivity individuals — those for whom δKt only
crosses F∗i (Kt) once, in the flat region where Kt < Kmin — a capital transfer does
not have permanent impacts. These individuals cannot operate their own enterprises
8Transfer recipients may choose to consume of the transferred funds upon receipt; this does not
impact the predictions of our model. Ktransfer should then be interpreted as the amount that is
not immediately consumed.
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in a steady state. Even when they are able to save at a non-negative interest rate,
saving money to invest in the own-enterprise sector is not an attractive proposition.
Even when they are able to borrow at low interest rates, borrowing the funds to
launch a business is unattractive (if one is required to eventually repay the loan).
However, when individuals who cannot sustain a profitable enterprise receive
a large transfer, they may choose to invest the money in a business if they are






− δ. For large infusions of capital, launching a business,
consuming the business income, and allowing the business to shrink over time as the
capital depreciates will sometimes be preferable to immediately consuming all of the
capital received. Operating that business, even if depreciation exceeds production,
is still better than letting the capital depreciate without production. Thus, savings-
constrained individuals who are not productive enough to sustain enterprises may
operate temporary businesses if given a cash infusion. The key distinction between
latent entrepreneurs and lower productivity types is that one-off infusions of capital
can permanently increase the incomes of latent entrepreneurs, while such infusions
of capital have impacts on lower productivity types that disappear over time.
4.3 Research Design and Procedures
We conducted a randomized evaluation of two labor market interventions targeted
to young women aged 18 to 19 in three of Nairobi’s poorest neighborhoods, Baba
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Dogo, Dandora, and Lunga Lunga.9 Applicants to the program were stratified
by neighborhood and application date and then randomly assigned to one of three
treatment arms: a franchise treatment, a cash grant treatment, and a control group.
This design allows us to estimate the impact of the franchise and grant treatments
on those invited to the program, and to compare the impacts of the cash grant
treatment — which relaxes the credit constraint but provides no other training or
support — to a multifaceted program designed to address many of the obstacles to
youth entrepreneurship simultaneously.
4.1 Two Labor Market Interventions
4.1.1 The Franchise Treatment
Credit constraints may prevent potential entrepreneurs from launching profitable
businesses. However, credit constraints may not be the only obstacle to entrepreneurial
success; potential entrepreneurs — particularly young people — may also lack the
market intelligence and business training needed to launch a successful enterprise
Berge, Bjorvatn, and Tungodden (2014). We evaluate a multifaceted “microfranchis-
ing” program that provided eligible applicants with an established business model
and the specific training, capital, and business linkages (for example, with whole-
sale suppliers) needed to make the business operational. Microfranchisees supply
9Applications were solicited from women between the ages of 16 and 19; in practice, relatively
few of the applicants (only 14.6 percent) were below 18 years of age when they applied. Only
those women who had attained the age of legal majority were eligible to receive cash grants, so
our analysis focuses on those who were in the two oldest age cohorts (randomization to treatment
was stratified by age). The cash grant treatment was not announced in advance; women applied
for a business training program and were then randomized into one of the three treatment arms.
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their labor, and are free to expand their microenterprises as they see fit. Thus,
a microfranchise has features in common with both a formal sector job and self-
employment: while microfranchisees do not need to devise business models, they
work with very little managerial supervision and considerable latitude for creativ-
ity — managing their own time and entrepreneurial effort. Thus, microfranchising
strikes a middle ground between entrepreneurship and wage employment.
We evaluate a microfranchising intervention geared toward young women in
Nairobi’s poorest neighborhoods. The program helped young women launch branded
franchise businesses, either salons or mobile food carts. The intervention combined
a number of distinct elements: business skills training, franchise-specific vocational
training, start-up capital (in the form of the specific physical capital required to
start the franchise), and ongoing business mentoring. Several of the intervention’s
components are common to many entrepreneurship promotion and job skills pro-
grams; what distinguishes microfranchise programs from other interventions is the
focus on a small number of specific franchise business models that are tailored to
the skills and constraints of program participants (i.e. poor young women in urban
Nairobi) and to local market conditions. In this case, the implementing organization
(the IRC) partnered with two Kenyan businesses looking to expand their presence
in slum neighborhoods — a maker of hair extensions and a poultry producer known
for its fast food restaurants. The franchise partners are both relatively well-known
firms (within Kenya), and their reputations added value to the franchise package
that program participants received.
The first component of the franchise program was a two-week training course.
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In addition to a standard curriculum of business and life skills training topics, the
training included modules about the two specific franchise business models. At the
end of the course, participants indicated their ranking of the two franchise partners
and were then matched with one of them (almost always their first choice).
After the business skills course, program participants received training from
the franchise business partner with whom they had been matched. Women assigned
to the salon franchise received six weeks of classroom training and then completed
a two-week internship with a local salon. At the end of the internship, participants
organized themselves into small groups and received their business start-up kits
(which included branded aprons, a hair washing sink, a hair dryer, and a variety of
hair cutting and styling products).
For women assigned to the food cart franchise, the franchise-specific training
was a one-day session where franchisees were introduced to the brand, available
products, and appropriate preparation methods. Following the franchise training,
program participants organized themselves into small groups and received business
start-up kits that included a mobile cart, an apron or t-shirt displaying the company
logo, and an initial stock of smoked chicken sausages.
Each franchise business launched through the program was assigned a mentor
who visited the business every few weeks. Mentors helped the young women in
the program get their businesses off the ground — for example, by coordinating
additional training with the franchise partners, helping the businesses set up bank
accounts, or assisting with financial management and record keeping.
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4.1.2 The Grant Treatment
Applicants assigned to the cash grant treatment were offered an unrestricted transfer
of 20,000 Kenyan shillings (or 239 US dollars at the prevailing exchange rate of 83.8
shillings to the dollar).10 Individuals assigned to the grant arm were contacted by
phone and invited to meet privately with a member of the disbursement team to
discuss the grant. During the meeting, individuals were told that there were no
restrictions on how the grant could be used and that the grant did not need to be
paid back. Disbursements to the grant recipients were timed to coincide with the
launch of the microfranchise businesses.
4.2 Data Collection
Our analysis draws on three main sources of data. First, we administered a brief
baseline survey to all eligible applicants prior to randomization. We also conducted
a midline survey 7 to 10 months after the end of the intervention.11 The midline
surveys were conducted via phone. The midline included detailed questions about
income-generating activities, but did not ask about a broader range of outcomes
(this was not feasible in a short phone survey). We conducted a more comprehensive
endline survey 14–22 months after the end of the intervention.
10Though the US dollar value of the shilling has since declined, the exchange range was fairly
constant during the grant disbursement period (from November 1, 2013 to January 13, 2014). The
value of the grant was selected to make it roughly comparable to the value of the microfranchising
package of training and capital; the 20,000 shilling amount is also identical to the grant size in
another study of cash grants for Kenyan youth Hicks, Kremer, Mbiti, and Miguel (2016).
11We also conducted an extremely brief phone survey 2 to 5 months after the intervention, but
we did not ask about income-generating activities at that time. The goal of that survey was to
collect better contact information than had been gathered at baseline.
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Attrition rates are extremely low in both the midline and the endline surveys:
we successfully surveyed 94.0 percent of the baseline sample at midline and 92.5
percent of the baseline sample at endline. Regressions testing for differential attri-
tion across treatment arms are reported in the Online Appendix. Attrition is not
associated with either treatment.
4.3 Sample Characteristics
Table 4.1 describes the baseline characteristics of the young women in our sample.
As expected, there is little variation in age: 94.6 percent of the young women in the
sample were 18, 19, or 20 years of age at baseline. 11.6 percent of women in our
sample did not have a living parent at the time of the baseline survey. 16.5 percent
were married or cohabitating, and 40.9 percent had given birth. The median number
of years of schooling in the sample is 10; 92.4 percent of baseline respondents finished
primary school, while only 41.1 percent finished secondary school.12 34.5 percent
had done some form of vocational training prior to the program.
Only 14.6 percent of the sample was engaged in an income-generating activity
(IGA) at the time of the baseline survey, but 54.6 percent had been involved in an
IGA at some point in the past. 23.2 percent had been self-employed at some point
in the past. The young women in the sample spent a considerable amount of time
doing unpaid work at home: the median number of hours of unpaid housework (in
12The average level of education among women aged 18-20 in Nairobi is 10.6 years; 28 percent
are currently married or living with a partner, and 26 percent have had a child (Kenya DHS 2014).
Thus, relative to the general population of comparably-age women in Nairobi, our sample is slightly
less educated, less likely to be married or cohabitating, and more likely to have had a child. These
differences likely reflect the program’s focus on Nairobi’s poorest neighborhoods.
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the week prior to the baseline) was 21. Only 8.8 percent of women in the sample had
a bank account at baseline, and only a third had any savings in money or jewelry.
Among those with savings, the median amount of savings was (equivalent to) 8.91
US dollars.
Balance checks (i.e. tests of the hypothesis that observable characteristics
are balanced across treatments) are reported in the Online Appendix. Observable
characteristics were relatively balanced prior to the program. Out of 75 hypothesis
tests, we find 3 differences across treatments that are significant at greater than 95
percent statistical confidence.13
4.4 Compliance with Treatment
As is typical in training programs (McKenzie and Woodruff, 2014), not all the
women assigned to the program participated in it, and not all those who started
the business training completed the program. Table 4.2 reports the proportion of
women in the treatment and control groups who completed each stage of the pro-
gram.14 61 percent of those assigned to the franchise treatment attended the initial
two-week business training course at least once; 39 percent of those assigned to the
franchise treatment completed the franchise-specific business training and launched
a microfranchise. Though these modest take-up rates are not out of line with those
13Women assigned to the control group come from slightly larger households, and are somewhat
more likely to have given birth prior to the program. Women assigned to the cash grant treatment
had, on average, about half a year less schooling than those assigned to the franchise treatment
and the control group. Controls for those variables that are not balanced across treatments are
included in our main specifications (though results are nearly identical when controls are omitted).
14The table is based on administrative data from the implementing NGO and the franchise
partners, though self-reports line up with administrative records.
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observed in comparable training programs McKenzie and Woodruff (2014), they
have important ramifications for the interpretation of intent-to-treat estimates of
program impacts (a point we return to below). Unsurprisingly, the take-up rate is
extremely high in the cash grant treatment: 95 percent of those assigned to the
grant treatment accepted and received the grant. We also find very little evidence
of imperfect compliance with the evaluation design on the part of the implement-
ing organization: no women assigned to the control group attended the business
training, and only 1 percent were involved in starting a microfranchise.
4.4 Analysis
Our theoretical model predicts that infusions of funding will increase self-employment
and income over the relatively short-term if individuals are unable to save through
channels other than enterprise capital. For relatively unproductive individuals, these
increases in income are temporary; they disappear as capital depreciates. Thus, im-
pacts on entrepreneurship and income over the short-term do not indicate that cap-
ital infusions relieved a credit constraint or helped potential entrepreneurs to escape
a poverty trap. In the presence of savings constraints, the key distinction between
latent entrepreneurs and less productive individuals is that latent entrepreneurs can
transform one-off infusions of capital into permanent increases in income. A compar-
ison of shorter-term versus longer-term impacts indicates whether capital transfers
are likely to have alleviated a poverty trap.
The cash grant intervention is exactly the type of unrestricted financial trans-
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fer described by our model. If the cash grant impacts occupational choice and
income in the relatively short-term, analysis of longer-term impacts allows us to
assess the extent to which the capital infusion relieved a poverty trap. Of course,
if low productivity individuals are not savings constrained, there is little reason for
them to knowingly launch an unproductive enterprise. In that case, an infusion of
capital could increase consumption, savings, or assets (though possibly only over
the relatively short-term), but would not impact occupational choice.
We model the impact of an infusion of capital, but our analysis compares two
distinct interventions. An important question is whether an equivalently-valued
intervention that offers enterprise capital in a more restricted form (including some
in the form of human capital) has comparable impacts. Women assigned to the
franchise treatment who did not wish to start a business and were not savings-
constrained had the option of selling the physical capital that they received through
the program, though we would expect the market value of, for example, a mobile
food cart to be well below the cost of providing the entire microfranchise package
of training and mentoring plus capital. Thus, if low productivity individuals who
are not savings constrained participated in the program, we would not expect them
to launch businesses, and the impacts on (e.g.) consumption might be relatively
small. Alternatively, if credit and savings constraints are the main obstacles to
successful entrepreneurship (and business training and mentoring add little value),
we might expect the impacts of the franchise treatment to be smaller than the
impacts of the grant treatment (because much of the program spending paid for
training that, by assumption, would not be the relevant barrier to entrepreneurship
165
for these individuals). On the other hand, the training and mentoring provided
through the franchise program might impact participants’ productivity, increasing
the fraction of high productivity types. If this were the case, we would expect the
impacts of the franchise treatment to be more persistent than those of the grant
treatment — though they might initially be smaller in magnitude, depending on
the initial mix of types in the population and the value of the capital transferred to
franchise program participants.
We test these predictions using data from two rounds of surveys: midline
surveys that were conducted between 7 and 10 months after the interventions and
endline surveys that were conducted 14 to 22 months after the interventions. Both
the midline and endline surveys contain detailed data on involvement in income-
generating activities. The endline survey also includes a range of measures of con-
sumption, expenditure, and well-being — which might be impacted by treatment
if participants saved or consumed the value of the capital they received without
launching a small business.
4.1 Estimation Strategy
In our main analysis, we report intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates of the impacts of
the franchise treatment and the cash grant treatment on women assigned to each
treatment group. Treatment assignment was random within strata, so the impacts
of the interventions on any outcome Yi can be estimated via the OLS regression
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specification:
Yi = α+β ·Franchisei +γ ·Granti + δstratum +φenumerator + ζmonth + η ·Xi + εi (5)
where Franchisei and Granti are indicators for, respectively, random assignment to
the franchise treatment or the grant treatment, δstratum is a randomization stratum
fixed effect, φenumerator is a survey enumerator fixed effect, ζmonth is a fixed effect for
the month the survey was administered, Xi is a vector of individual controls, and
εi is a conditionally-mean-zero error term.
15,16
We also report treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) estimates that instrument for
take-up (specifically, indicators for starting the business training portion of the
franchise program and receiving the cash grant). Since take-up is almost universal
among those assigned to the grant treatment, ITT and TOT estimates are nearly
identical. However, the TOT estimates give us a better sense of how the franchise
program impacted those who chose to participate (subject, of course, to additional
assumptions).
15In our main specifications, we include controls for baseline household size, education level, and
indicators for having given birth, having received any vocational training, or having any paid work
experience prior to the baseline survey. Results are similar in magnitude and significance when
these controls are omitted.
16We do not correct for the false discovery rate in our analysis of medium-term labor market
outcomes: we consider a relatively small set of outcomes (because the midline survey did not collect
data on a broader range of outcomes), none of which can be treated as statistically independent.
As will become apparent in the subsequent discussion, most of these outcomes are impacted by the
treatments over the medium-term; so the overall pattern of findings is unlikely to be explained by
multiple testing. In our analysis of longer-term impacts, we look at a broad range of outcomes; as
almost none are impacted by either treatment, there is little need to correct for the false discovery
rate. However, we implement the multiple test correction procedure proposed by Benjamini and
Hochberg (1995), following the procedures suggested by Anderson (2008). Results are discussed
below.
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4.2 Labor Market Outcomes 7–10 Months after Treatment
We summarize the (relatively) short-term impacts of the franchise and grant in-
terventions on labor market outcomes in Table 4.3. Both the franchise treatment
and the grant treatment had a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of
self-employment, though they did not increase the likelihood of involvement in any
income-generating activity. Women assigned to both treatments used the capital
that they received to launch businesses. Point estimates suggest an extremely large
effect: 24.5 percent of women assigned to the control group were self-employed at
midline; the franchise and grant treatments both increased the likelihood of self-
employment by approximately 10 percentage points. Coefficient estimates suggest
that both interventions also reduced the likelihood of paid work for others, though
the coefficients are not statistically significant at conventional levels.17 As expected,
the franchise treatment increased the likelihood of operating a microfranchise, while
the grant treatment did not (Table 4.3, Panel B).
Though the grant and franchise treatments had similar impacts on the like-
lihood of self-employment and paid work, they had distinctly different impacts on
labor supply (as shown in Table 4.3, Panel C). The grant treatment had a large
positive impact on hours worked (over the week prior to the survey). The coefficient
estimate indicates that women assigned to the grant treatment worked 6.8 more
hours (p-value 0.019), which represents a 38 percent increase in hours worked. In
17The coefficient estimate on the franchise treatment suggests a marginally significant impact
on the likelihood of paid work (p-value 0.061). The coefficient on the grant treatment is not even
marginally significant (p-value 0.116).
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contrast, the franchise treatment did not have a significant impact on the total num-
ber of hours worked (p-value 0.607), and we can reject the hypothesis that the two
treatments had comparable impacts on hours worked (p-value 0.046). As expected,
both treatments increased self-employment hours substantially; these increases are
partially offset by modest (and insignificant) declines in the number of hours of paid
work for others. The increases in self-employment hours are both large in magnitude
and statistically significant. Assignment to the franchise treatment is associated
with 4.1 additional self-employment hours per week (p-value 0.002), which repre-
sents an 87 percent increase in self-employment hours. Assignment to the grant
treatment is associated with 7.6 additional hours of work in self-employment per
week (p-value < 0.001), or a 162 percent increase in self-employment hours. Thus,
both treatments are associated with substantial increases in both the likelihood of
self-employment and the number of hours devoted to entrepreneurial activities.
Panel D of Table 4.3 summarizes the impacts of the treatment on income
(excluding transfers). Neither treatment impacts the overall likelihood of reporting
an income, but both the franchise treatment and the grant treatment had positive
and significant impacts on income. The franchise treatment increased weekly income
by 1.6 dollars (p-value 0.035); this represents about a 30 percent increase over the
mean income in the control group of 5.5 dollars per week. The grant treatment
increased income by 3.2 dollars a week (p-value 0.008), or 56 percent relative to
the control group mean. Though the coefficient on the grant treatment is larger
in magnitude than the coefficient on the franchise treatment, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the two treatments had statistically indistinguishable impacts on
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income (p-value 0.208). Results are similar if we focus on log transformations of
income. As expected, the impacts on income are driven by extremely large (and
statistically significant) increases in self-employment income that are not offset by
any statistically significant changes in income from paid work. Thus, our results
provide clear evidence that both the franchise treatment and the grant treatment
encouraged young women to become self-employed; this shift into self employment
was associated with large increases in income over the year after the interventions.
In the Online Appendix, we report instrumental variables estimates of the
impact of the franchise and grant treatments on compliers (i.e. treatment-on-the-
treated estimates). As expected, ITT and TOT estimates are nearly identical for the
grant treatment, since 95 percent of those assigned to treatment received the grant.
We can never reject the hypothesis that the TOT impacts of the franchise and grant
treatments are identical. Thus, the evidence does not support the hypothesis that
the franchise treatment had larger impacts on compliers than the grant treatment.
The one important difference between our ITT and our TOT results is that we
can no longer reject the hypothesis that the two treatments had different impacts
on hours worked (p-value 0.140), though the point estimate suggests a much larger
TOT effect for the grant treatment (7.1 additional hours versus 1.9 additional hours).
Both the ITT and TOT effects of the treatments on income and occupational choice
are statistically indistinguishable.
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4.3 Labor Market Outcomes 14–22 Months after Treatment
In Table 4.4, we examine labor market outcomes 14 to 22 months after treatment.
Looking across the range of outcomes related to occupational choice (Panels A and
B), hours worked (Panel C), and income (Panel D), a clear pattern emerges: the
impacts on hours and income that we observed at midline disappeared completely
by the time of the endline survey. Looking at income, we see that neither treatment
is associated with a significant increase in income at endline, and the point estimates
for both treatments are negative. Moreover, the lack of significance is not simply the
result of noise. The 95 percent confidence interval for the impact of grant treatment
is [−2.4, 2.3]; this range does not include the point estimate (of 3.153) for the impact
of the grant treatment after 7 to 10 months.18 There is also no evidence that either
treatment had a significant impact on hours worked (in the last week) 14 to 22
months after treatment. The coefficients on both the franchise treatment and the
grant treatment are small and not statistically significant. Moreover, once again we
find that the point estimate for the impact of the grant treatment on hours worked
at midline is outside the 95 percent confidence interval for the impact at endline:
the 95 percent confidence interval for the impact of the grant treatment on hours
worked at endline is [−3.7, 6.1]; the point estimate for the impact on hours worked
at midline was 6.8.19
18Similarly, the point estimate for the impact of the franchise treatment at midline, 1.6, is near
the extreme end of the 95 percent confidence interval for the impact of the franchise treatment on
incomes at endline. The 95 percent confidence interval is is [−2.2, 1.7].
19The franchise treatment did not have a significant impact on hours worked at midline — so, of
course, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the non-effects at midline and endline are identical.
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Looking across the range of labor market outcomes, the clear pattern that
emerges is that, by the time of the endline survey, impacts on hours and income had
disappeared; however, impacts on occupational choice persisted. Both the franchise
and the grant treatments increased the likelihood of self-employment at endline.
The franchise treatment caused an 11.8 percentage point increase in the likelihood
of self-employment (p-value 0.001) while the grant treatment led to a 12.9 percentage
point increase in the likelihood of self-employment (p-value 0.003). Both effects are
large in magnitude relative to the rate of self-employment in the comparison group,
which is 24.3 percent. Both the franchise treatment and the grant treatment are
also associated with large increases in self-employment hours and, to some extent,
increases in income from self-employment (we observe significant impacts on log
self-employment income, but not on the level of self-employment income).
Thus, the overall picture at endline is that the impacts of both the franchise
treatment and the grant treatment are confined to the domain of occupational choice.
Both treatments shift young women into self-employment, but have no overall im-
pact on income or labor supply. One somewhat anomalous finding is that assignment
to the franchise treatment is associated with a significant increase in the likelihood
of reporting any income-generating activity. Though the increase is relatively large
in magnitude (the coefficient estimate suggests a 7.6 percentage point increase in the
likelihood of involvement in any IGA), it is difficult to interpret since the franchise
treatment does not lead to increases in the total number of hours worked or the
likelihood of reporting any income over the seven days prior to the survey.
In the Online Appendix, we show that the franchise treatment increased the
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likelihood of working in the salon or beauty sector at endline; otherwise, neither the
franchise treatment nor the grant treatment had a significant impact on occupational
sector at endline.20 We also find no evidence of impacts on labor market churning:
women assigned to treatment are not more likely to have either started or closed a
business between midline and endline, nor are they more likely to have left a job or
started a new job.
4.4 Impacts of Treatment on Firm Structure
In Table 4.5, we examine the impacts of the two labor market interventions on the
characteristics of microenterprises. As always, we estimate Equation 5 in the full
sample of women who completed the endline survey, but we also report the results of
analogous specifications in a restricted sample of self-employed women. These latter
specifications help to test the hypothesis that the interventions led to the creation
of enterprises that differed in structure from those started by women in the control
group.21 As one would expect, we see that the franchise treatment increased the
likelihood that a woman operates an enterprise that is directly linked to vocational
training that she has received.22,23 The grant treatment leads to significant increases
20The impact of the franchise treatment on the probability of working in the salon or beauty
sector is robust to the multiple hypothesis testing procedure proposed by Benjamini and Hochberg
(1995) (corrected q-value 0.010).
21In other words, the restricted sample helps us to distinguish between impacts that occur
because the interventions increased the likelihood of self-employment, but without changing the
character of self-employment, and impacts that are not the direct result of the overall increase in
the self-employment rate among women assigned to treatment.
22This variable is equal to one if a woman who has received salon skills training operates a salon
or beauty business, if a woman who has received tailoring training works as a self-employed tailor,
or if a woman who has received culinary training operates a prepared food business.
23In the Online Appendix, we show that the franchise and grant treatments had significant
impacts on the industrial sector in which women worked (in either self-employment or paid work
for others) at midline, but that these effects had largely disappeared by the time of the endline
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in the amount invested to start a business and the likelihood that a business was
started with NGO funding; moreover, the businesses launched by women assigned to
the grant treatment are significantly larger (in terms of the amount invested in them
when they were launched) than the business operated by women assigned to either
the control group or the franchise treatment. More interestingly, businesses launched
by women in the grant treatment are also significantly more likely to employ others.
The point estimate suggests that women assigned to the grant treatment are 5.8
percentage points more likely to run a business that employs anyone than women
assigned to the control group (p-value 0.007), while businesses operated by women
assigned to the grant treatment are 13.3 percentage points more likely to have
employees than businesses operated by women in the control group (p-value 0.029).
Thus, though the treatment effects on participant incomes disappear in the second
year after treatment, positive spillovers on employees may persist.
4.5 Impacts on Other Outcomes
Though the impacts of the labor market interventions we evaluate dissipated over
time, an important question is whether the treatments might have had longer-term
impacts on other outcomes. As discussed above, women who are not savings con-
strained and are not productive entrepreneurs might save the funds that they re-
ceived through the cash grant intervention; thus, the grants might increase con-
survey. At midline, both treatments were associated with a decrease in the likelihood of doing
janitorial or trash collection work and an increase in the likelihood of working in the retail sector.
The franchise treatment was also associated with an increase in the probability of working in the
salon sector, while the grant treatment was associated with a decline in the probability of working
in the salon sector. Only the impact of the franchise treatment on the likelihood of work in the
salon sector persisted at endline.
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sumption or expenditure without impacting income (except at the moment that the
grant is disbursed) or occupational status. Alternatively, women might use grant
money or resulting temporary increases in income to purchase durable assets that
would improve their living conditions or quality of life over the relatively long-term.
A third possibility is that the experience of receiving training and/or launching a
business impacted self-confidence or empowerment. In any of these cases, we might
expect the labor market interventions to have persistent impacts on overall welfare,
even if labor market impacts are temporary.
In the Online Appendix, we estimate the impacts of the franchise and grant
treatments on a range of outcomes: household assets, food security, expenditures,
living arrangements and conditions, savings, time use, self-esteem, and empower-
ment. We find almost no evidence that the treatments had long-run impacts on any
of these outcomes.24 There is no evidence that the treatments improved women’s
living conditions or food security or increased their expenditures, nor is their any
evidence of improvements in self-esteem or empowerment.25 Thus, the evidence does
not provide any meaningful support for the hypothesis that the interventions had
temporary impacts on income but impacted overall welfare in a more permanent
manner.
24In the Online Appendix, we report the estimated impacts of the franchise and grant treatments
on 81 different outcomes. The estimated impacts of the franchise treatment on the likelihood of
working in the salon sector or having done any vocational training are significant at the 99 percent
level after implementing the multiple hypothesis testing correction proposed by Benjamini and
Hochberg (1995). Those assigned to the grant treatment are also more likely to have paid school
fees for someone else’s child in the year after receiving the grant (Benjamini-Hochberg q-value 0.01).
No other outcomes are significantly related to either treatment with adjusted q-values below 0.05.
25We use a range of measures including the Rosenberg self-esteem, the Ladder of Life, and Grit
scales, plus the entire range of empowerment measures used by Bandiera et al. (2014) and Adoho
et al. (2014).
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4.6 Comparing Implementation Costs
The two treatment arms of our study allow for natural cost comparisons, comple-
menting our overall estimates of each program’s impacts. Costs in the cash grant
arm are relatively straightforward. The cash grant itself was worth 239 US dollars.
Because compliance was slightly below 100 percent, the average disbursement per
respondent in the cash grant arm was 228 dollars. Besides simply transferring the
money, administrative tasks supporting this arm included having field team mem-
bers meet participants twice (once to explain the no-strings-attached grant, once
for the actual transfer); confirming, via fingerprint reader, that the individuals our
team met with were indeed the intended recipients; and data, accounting, and other
indirect costs. These administrative tasks cost a total of roughly 82 dollars per in-
tended recipient. Thus, the total cost of the cash grant arm, per intended recipient,
was roughly 310 dollars.
Costs in the microfranchising intervention are more complicated. We begin
with all costs that the IRC incurred implementing the program over three fiscal
years. This study evaluates only the final calendar year of the program, but other
participants were involved in the prior calendar year, and setup costs were required
beforehand to make the program possible. Once we arrive at a total cost figure (the
numerator), we divide by the total number of participants across all program years
(the denominator). We face a number of decisions in both arriving at a total cost
figure and in arriving at the number of participants, so we report upper and lower
176
bounds on our cost estimates.26
One of the smallest cost items in the IRC budget is international staff support
costs. We exclude this for simplicity. A larger cost is internationally hired staff in
Kenya, including portions of the country director’s time. Our upper bound includes
these costs; our lower bound excludes them on the basis that they are needed most
intensely for the startup phase of a project. The rest of the costs (national staff
time, business support, trainings, office expenses, etc.) are concentrated in the two
fiscal years in which the program trained most participants, but there are some
costs from the first fiscal year in which the program began and in which the first
participants started training. Our upper bound includes these costs; our lower
bound includes only half of the first fiscal year’s costs, on the basis that continued
program operation or operation at larger scale would involve lower startup costs.
The upper bound figure for the total cost of the program is roughly 763,000 dollars;
the lower bound is 637,000 dollars. Either way, half of the costs come from providing
trainings, including the (substantial) costs of providing refreshments for hundreds
of participants each day.
These total cost estimates translate into a cost of between 616 dollars and 809
dollars per participant in the microfranchising arm.27 However, this figure is the
26In order to determine cost per activity, each project expense was allocated, completely or par-
tially, to either entrepreneurship activities, cash dispersements, or other non-treatment activities,
and summed to determine total cost per activity. Total values were then divided by number of
clients served to get an average cost per client. See International Rescue Committee (2016a) for a
detailed discussion of the costing methodology.
27The number of participants in the microfranchising program was carefully recorded by the local
partner organizations that helped run the training sessions. Over the duration of the program,
there were 898 participants in these sessions: 297 in the first program year, and 601 in the second.
Women launching businesses were encouraged to involve others in their enterprises, but in the first
year, records only indicated 45 additional participants of this type. This leads to the lower bound
figure of 898 + 45 = 943 participants. We were unable to obtain detailed records of any others
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cost associated with the treatment on the treated — not the cost for the intention
to treat. This distinction matters because while 95 percent of those assigned to
the grant treatment received a grant, only 61 percent of those assigned to the mi-
crofranchising treatment actually started the training. The intervention costs per
individual assigned to the relevant treatment are thus roughly 286 dollars for the
grant arm, and between 376 dollars and 494 dollars for the microfranchising arm.
The point estimates in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 for impacts of the cash grant are
generally larger than (though not statistically distinguishable from) the point esti-
mates for the microfranchising intervention; this suggests that they are comparable
in effectiveness, though the point estimates suggest that the cash grant is slightly
more effective. The somewhat higher costs of the microfranchising treatment do
not substantially change this picture, though they tilt it further in favor of the cash
grant: point estimates for the cash grant suggest it is more cost-effective than mi-
crofranchising across a range of outcomes and follow-up durations. The difference
is statistically significant at the 10 percent level for 7–10 month effects on income,
but otherwise is generally not statistically significant.
A full cost-benefit analysis involves measuring the extent of the benefits that
accrued to participants over time. We only measure the benefits at two points in
time: 7–10 months after treatment, and 14–22 months after treatment. The effects
we find are statistically significant at the first of these follow-ups, but not at the
second. We arrive at a lower bound on the benefits by multiplying the shorter-term
involved in new enterprises in the second year, but we can extrapolate that it is proportional to
the number of participants, so roughly twice the number in the second year as in the first. This
leads us to an upper bound estimate of 898 + 45 + 91 = 1034 participants overall.
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impacts on income by the period between the start of the program and the survey,
assuming that the impacts disappeared immediately after the 7–10 month follow-
up; this is, in essence, the area of a rectangle 7–10 months wide and as tall as the
impact estimate. A reasonable upper bound extends these impacts (the width of the
rectangle) until just before the 14–22 month follow-up.28 Using these approaches,
and the coefficients on income in Table 4.3, the microfranchising intervention had
total income benefits of between 60 dollars and 116 dollars; the cash grant had total
income benefits of between 128 dollars and 247 dollars.
Neither intervention shows signs of the benefits exceeding the costs. However,
the amount of the grant (239 dollars) falls between the upper and lower bounds of
the estimated impacts on income over the year after the intervention. This sug-
gests that grant recipients do a relatively efficient job of smoothing their income
by investing grants in enterprise capital. If such one-off grants could be distributed
with minimal overhead costs (as in larger programs like GiveDirectly), or the distri-
butional benefits of making transfers to vulnerable populations justified a modest
level of transaction costs, cash transfers could be socially desirable. The franchise
treatment that we study achieves lower (temporary) income gains at higher cost; it
is therefore reasonable to conclude that cash grants are a more efficient approach to
achieving the same level of redistribution.
28A nearly-equivalent approach to the upper bound calculation assumes a downward ramp shape:
large impacts at first, tapering linearly to zero at the 14–22 month follow-up, and with a height
that is only measured at the 7–10 month follow-up. The area of the resulting triangle is just
slightly larger than that of the upper bound rectangle, since the follow-up when the “height” is
measured is just under halfway along the “base” of the triangle. This approach generates similar
estimates of the total program impacts on income.
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4.5 Participant Evaluations
Given the tremendous lengths one must go to in order to produce credible estimates
of a program’s impacts, an important question is whether participants themselves
understand the effects of the programs in which they participate. It is not un-
common for labor market programs to survey participants ex post ; however, Smith,
Whalley, and Wilcox (2012) find that such ex post assessments of a program’s impact
are not highly correlated with objective measures of program effects. Understand-
ing participants’ beliefs about program impacts is important for two reasons. Most
obviously, if — through their participation — participants obtain reasonable esti-
mates of program impacts, this information may be a feasible, low-cost alternative
to formal impact evaluation. On the other hand, if program participants do not
understand a program’s impacts, even after they have participated in the program,
it is hard to imagine that they are making optimal decisions about whether or not
to participate.
4.1 Empirical Approach and Practical Considerations
As Smith, Whalley, and Wilcox (2012) point out, one reason participant evalua-
tions of programs may differ from rigorous estimates of program impacts is that
participant evaluation questions are often quite open-ended. For example, partici-
pants in the National Job Training Partnership Act program were asked “Do you
think that the training or other assistance that you got from the program helped
you get a job or perform better on the job?” (Smith, Whalley, and Wilcox, 2011,
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p. 9). This question is obviously problematic because it is not at all clear whether
better on-the-job performance should be linked to any measurable outcome (e.g. in-
come); moreover, the link between the fraction of participants who believe that the
program had a positive impact and the estimated treatment effect of the program
is unclear, making it difficult to test whether participants’ subjective evaluations
are accurate. Smith, Whalley, and Wilcox (2012) suggest replacing such subjective
evaluation questions with alternatives that (i) clearly specify the outcomes and time
periods of interest, (ii) ask for continuous (as opposed to binary) responses that can
be directly compared to ITT estimates, and (iii) make the counterfactual nature of
the question transparent.
We follow the recommendations of Smith, Whalley, and Wilcox (2012) and
ask participants in the franchise and grant treatments to estimate the counterfac-
tual probabilities of self-employment and paid work for a reference group of women
similar to themselves. Specifically, we ask women in each of the two treatment arms
the question: “I would like you to imagine 100 women from [your neighborhood]
who applied to the [name of treatment arm] program but who were not admitted
into it. In other words, please think about 100 women similar to yourself who were
not selected to the [name of treatment arm] program. Out of 100 women, how many
do you think are currently running or operating their own business?” We also ask
an analogous question about involvement in paid work for others. Smith, Whalley,
and Wilcox (2012) suggest using this question to construct a perceived counter-
factual, which can then be compared with the average outcome in the treatment
group. We take a different approach, asking each participant to estimate how many
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of 100 women similar to themselves who “applied for and were admitted into” the
program were (at the time of the survey) operating their own business (and, in a
subsequent question, we ask how many were doing paid work for others). We cal-
culate each participant’s belief about the treatment effect of the program (on, for
example, self-employment) by taking the difference between the perceived frequency
of self-employment among women invited to participate in the program and the per-
ceived frequency of self-employment among similar women who were not invited to
participate.
We also test a second method proposed by Smith, Whalley, and Wilcox (2012):
asking participants about the probability that they would be self-employed (or doing
paid work for others) in the absence of the program. These individual-level beliefs
about one’s own counterfactual can then be combined with data on actual outcomes
to construct estimates of perceived treatment effects. However, as Smith, Whalley,
and Wilcox (2012) emphasize, there are several drawbacks to this approach. First,
program participants may find it inherently difficult to imagine what their lives
would have been like in the absence of the program. For example, psychological
studies of “hindsight bias” suggest that people have a difficult time remembering the
beliefs they held in the past and tend to assume that realized outcomes were always
foreseeable Fischhoff (1975); Madarász (2012). In our context, we might expect that
those who have received vocational training and gained self-employment experience
might have a difficult time remembering that they had not always known how to
operate a business; thus, hindsight bias might inflate participants’ estimates of their
own counterfactual, particularly among successful microentrepreneurs. Estimates of
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one’s own counterfactual may also be biased by the tendency to attribute one’s own
success to individual agency as opposed to external factors Miller and Ross (1975).
This would lead those who have benefited from business or vocational training to
overstate the likelihood that they would have started a successful business in the
absence of the program.
In the context of our evaluation, a third problem with questions designed
to elicit beliefs about one’s own counterfactual probability of self-employment (or
paid work) is that they are unlikely to work well when respondents have low levels of
numeracy. Though almost 92 percent of the women in our sample completed primary
school, a relatively large number are not familiar with the concept of percentages.
Roughly one in four cannot (correctly) answer the question: “If there is a 75 percent
chance of rain and a 25 percent chance of sun, which type of weather is more likely?”
While it is possible to elicit probabilistic expectations from subjects with no prior
knowledge of probability, it is costly and time-consuming to do so. Instead, we
asked every subject categorical questions about their counterfactual probabilities of
self-employment and paid work, and collected more specific data on counterfactual
probabilities from those who successfully answered the screening question described
above.29
29We worded the categorical question to make responses directly comparable to probability
estimates. Respondents chose one of the following options: (1) In the absence of the program,
I would definitely be self-employed, (2) In the absence of the program, I would probably be self-
employed but it is not certain, (3) In the absence of the program, the chances of me being self-
employed or not self-employed are equal, (4) In the absence of the program, I would probably not
be self-employed but it is not certain, or (5) In the absence of the program, I would definitely not
be self-employed.
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4.2 Framework for Interpreting Empirics
To facilitate comparisons between different approaches to belief elicitation, we intro-
duce a simple conceptual framework that formalizes the measurement issues high-
lighted above. First, consider an outcome, y, and a program whose causal effect on
that outcome is to increase its expected value by β > 0. Let γ denote the expected
value of y in the absence of the program: E[yj|Tj = 0] = γ.
We wish to know whether program participants hold accurate beliefs about β.
Let
β̃i = β̃ + φi (6)
denote participant i’s belief about the impact of the program, and let
Ẽ[yj|Tj = 0] = γ̃ + νi (7)
be participant i’s belief about the expected value of the outcome of interest for
an untreated individual j who is outwardly similar to her. β̃ is the average belief
about the impact of the program, and γ̃ is the average belief about the outcome
of interest in the eligible population in the absence of the program. φi is the id-
iosyncratic component of beliefs about the impact of the program; without loss of
generality, we assume that the distribution of φi is mean zero, and we let σφ denote
its variance. νi can be decomposed into a mean-zero error term and a term which
reflects the perceived difference between the population average of y and one’s own
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counterfactual:
νi = α̃i · 1(j = i) + εi. (8)
As discussed above, asking participants about their own counterfactuals may be
problematic (for example, because of hindsight bias), and the population mean of
these α̃i values, α̃ = E[α̃i] may not be equal to 0.
30 Combining and generalizing
these expressions, respondents report:
Ẽ[yj|Tj] = β̃ · Tj + γ̃ + α̃i · 1(j = i) + φi · Tj + εi (9)
Specifically, when asked to report the rate of self-employment among 100 poten-
tial program participants who were not invited to participate in the program, a
respondent in our study reports:
Ẽ[yj|Tj = 0] = γ̃ + εi. (10)
When asked to report the rate of self-employment among 100 potential program
participants who were invited to participate in the program, she reports:
Ẽ[yj|Tj = 1] = β̃ + γ̃ + φi + εi. (11)
Finally, when asked to report her own counterfactual probability of self-employment,
30This may be thought of as a “Lake Wobegon” effect.
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a participant reports:
Ẽ[yi|Ti = 0] = γ̃ + α̃i + εi. (12)
The framework presented above helps to clarify the distinctions between the
different approaches to estimating participant beliefs. First, consider an estimate of
participant beliefs constructed by taking the average belief about one’s own coun-
terfactual (in our context, the counterfactual probability of self-employment) and
subtracting this from the observed outcome in the treatment group. The expected
value of this estimator is:
E[yj|Tj = 1]− E[Ẽ[yi|Ti = 0]] = β + γ − (γ̃ + α̃ + E[εi])
= β + (γ − γ̃)− α̃
(13)
since E[εi] = 0. Thus, this estimator will be biased if participants hold inaccurate
beliefs about the counterfactual probability of self-employment, and it will be biased
when psychological factors such as hindsight bias lead participants to overstate their
own counterfactual probability of self-employment. The second estimator proposed
by Smith, Whalley, and Wilcox (2012) is constructed by subtracting the mean rate
of self-employment in a reference group of untreated women from the observed rate
of self-employment in the treatment group. The expected value of this estimator is
given by:
E[yj|Tj = 1]− E[Ẽ[yj|Tj = 0]] = β + γ − (γ̃ + E[εi])
= β + (γ − γ̃)
(14)
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This estimator overcomes the behavioral issues inherent in estimating one’s own
counterfactual. However, when estimates of participant beliefs constructed in this
manner diverge from actual program impacts, it is impossible to determine whether
participants hold inaccurate beliefs about the impact of the program or inaccurate
beliefs about the counterfactual.
The outcomes of interest in impact evaluations are often difficult to mea-
sure, and considerable effort goes into the design and pre-testing of questionnaires.
Nonetheless, there is no guarantee that outcome measures derived from survey ques-
tions (for example, about labor market participation) and participant responses to
belief-elicitation questions will line up, particularly in low-income settings where
formal, full-time employment is relatively uncommon (and there is continuous vari-
ation in the number of hours worked, and labor supply varies substantially from
week to week).31 Impact evaluation questions designed to measure beliefs about the
counterfactual may reveal systematic deviations between participants’ beliefs about
outcome levels and actual outcome levels; however, such measurement error is only
problematic if it cannot be separated from the quantity of interest. To address
this issue, we propose an estimate of participant beliefs that is calculated by taking
the difference between beliefs about the mean outcome of interest in a reference
31Smith, Whalley, and Wilcox (2012) are aware of this issue and recommend asking extremely
specific questions: for example, what fraction of participants meet a well-specified criterion for
employment — for example, working more than 35 hours per week — which can then be used to
construct the empirical estimate of the programs impact. However, such precisely worded questions
are not always feasible. In our context, we worried that any question of the form “Out of 100
women, how many spend at least X hours operating their own business?” would be substantially
more difficult to answer than a less specific question because few people work full-time and there
is no obvious break in the distribution of hours worked at any point.
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population of treatment versus control individuals:
E[Ẽ[yj|Tj = 0]]− E[Ẽ[yj|Tj = 0]]
= β̃ + γ̃ + E[φi] + E[εi]− (γ̃ + E[εi])
= β̃
(15)
Such an estimator allows for a direct test of the hypothesis that participants hold
accurate beliefs about program impacts; moreover, collection of the relevant data
necessarily also allows researchers to assess the related issue of whether partici-
pants can estimate the counterfactual — allowing for a comparison of the different
approaches of belief estimation.
4.3 Results
Our results, which are summarized in Figure 4.1, suggest that participants hold
remarkably accurate beliefs about program impacts. The figure compares ITT es-
timates of program impacts to estimates of participant beliefs about program im-
pacts calculated by taking the difference in reference group probabilities for the
treatment and control groups.32 For example, the ITT estimates suggest that the
franchise treatment increased the likelihood of self-employment by 11.9 percentage
points; those assigned to the program believe that it increased the likelihood of self-
employment by 12.3 percentage points. Similarly, those assigned to the cash grant
32In other words, beliefs were estimated by asking women assigned to each treatment group to
estimate reference group probabilities (frequencies) for both the treatment and comparison groups.
Women assigned to the control group were not asked to estimate a reference group probability
for those assigned to the treatment groups since they were not familiar with the details of each
treatment.
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treatment believe that it increased the likelihood of self-employment by 10.6 per-
centage points; the ITT estimates suggest a 12.9 percentage point increase. Those
assigned to the franchise treatment also have remarkably accurate beliefs about the
program’s impact on the likelihood of paid employment. Those assigned to the
cash grant treatment have less accurate beliefs about the program’s impact on paid
employment, though they are appropriately signed and well within the confidence
interval of the estimated treatment effect. Thus, our results suggest that partici-
pants’ do a reasonably good job of estimating the impact of programs that they have
participated in. For the outcome most directly impacted by the treatments (self-
employment), participants do a remarkably good job of estimating the program’s
impacts.
Figure 4.2 compares beliefs about the probability of self-employment and paid
work to levels observed in the treatment and control groups, and compares beliefs
about one’s own counterfactual to beliefs about a reference population of untreated
women. Several patterns are apparent. First, women in the franchise treatment
group underestimate the probability of paid work in both the treatment and the
control group. Consequently, an estimate of the impact of the franchise program on
the probability of paid work that compared counterfactual beliefs to observed levels
in the treatment group would perform very poorly. Women in both the franchise
and grant treatments hold more accurate beliefs about the level of self-employment
(in both the treatment and control groups); however, women in both treatment
arms seem to overestimate the frequency of self-employment and underestimate
the frequency of paid work in both the treatment and the control groups. Thus,
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differences between observed outcome levels and participant beliefs appear to be
systematic, suggesting that it will typically be better to estimate program beliefs
by comparing beliefs about the control group to beliefs about the treatment group
(rather than the observed outcome levels in the treatment group).
The figure also demonstrates that concerns that estimates of one’s own coun-
terfactual might be biased appear well-founded: the average of own counterfactual
estimates is consistently higher than the estimated outcome for a reference popula-
tion of untreated women. This pattern is particularly pronounced for the franchise
treatment, most dramatically when participants are asked to report their own coun-
terfactual probability of self-employment. Though participants hold accurate beliefs
about the level of self-employment in both the treatment and control groups, own
counterfactual estimates are so inflated that they suggest a negative impact of the
program on self-employment. Thus, our evidence clearly supports the view that
own counterfactual estimates are of little use in estimating treatment effects. This
finding is consistent with recent work by McKenzie (2016a); he finds that program
participants (business owners) do a very poor job of estimating the counterfactual.
Our results support his conclusion, but suggest that an alternative approach to
eliciting participants’ beliefs performs substantially better.
4.6 Conclusion
We report the results of an impact evaluation comparing two labor market interven-
tions that were offered to young, unemployed women in some of Nairobi’s poorest
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neighborhoods. The multifaceted franchise program we evaluate provided partic-
ipants with business and life skills training, vocational training, business-specific
capital and supply chain linkages, and ongoing mentoring. This program was meant
to simultaneously address both credit constraints and other obstacles to youth en-
trepreneurship. The cash grant program was a simple intervention that provided
participants with an unrestricted grant of 20,000 Kenyan shillings (equivalent to 239
US dollars in 2013). Both treatments were randomly assigned (offered) to eligible
applicants to the franchise program; our randomized design allows us to compare
the two programs, and to compare both programs to a control group.
We find that both programs increased the likelihood of self-employment among
eligible participants. In addition, both the franchise treatment and the grant treat-
ment had large and statistically significant impacts on income in the year after the
program. However, the impacts on income did not persist. By the second year after
treatment, women assigned to both the franchise and grant treatments looked simi-
lar to the control group in terms of income, labor supply, food security, expenditures,
living conditions, and empowerment.
Seen through the lens of a simple theoretical model, our findings suggest that
individuals in our sample are savings-constrained; they launch unsustainable busi-
nesses to stretch out the capital infusions provided by the interventions. Our findings
suggest that the training component of the franchise intervention did not increase
individual productivity sufficiently to create enduring, profitable entrepreneurship.
Our findings are also not consistent with the existence of a credit-constraint-based
poverty trap. Of course, our results should not be taken as evidence that credit
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constraints never generate poverty traps. Recent studies by Blattman, Fiala, and
Martinez (2014) and Blattman et al. (2016) suggest that credit constraints may
well be preventing latent entrepreneurs from launching successful businesses in re-
cently conflict-affected regions of northern Uganda. However, our findings resonate
with a number of recent studies of cash grants and other credit market interven-
tions. Studies of the return to capital among microenterprises operated by women
in developing countries have consistently failed to find positive impacts on business
profits, though cash grants do help men expand their businesses in some contexts
(cf. De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff 2008, De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff 2009,
Fafchamps, McKenzie, Quinn, and Woodruff 2011, Fiala 2014, Karlan, Knight, and
Udry 2015). Recent randomized evaluations of microfinance also suggest that access
to credit has, at best, a limited impact on enterprise profits (cf. Angelucci, Karlan,
and Zinman 2015, Attanasio et al. 2015, Augsburg, De Haas, Harmgart, and Meghir
2015, Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, and Kinnan 2015, Crépon, Devoto, Duflo, and
Parienté 2015, Tarozzi, Desai, and Johnson 2015). Our findings also coincide with
the estimated (short-term) impact of the cash grant program offered by the NGO
GiveDirectly: Haushofer and Shapiro (2016) find that grants led to increased rev-
enues from farm and non-farm enterprises, but not increased profits (see Haushofer
and Shapiro 2016, Online Appendix Table 77). Taken together, these studies suggest
that credit constraints are not the main obstacle preventing the poor — particularly
poor women — from launching and expanding profitable, sustainable businesses.
Yet, even when they don’t lead to permanent increases in income, cash grants
may have important impacts. Haushofer and Shapiro (2016) find that cash transfers
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improved psychological wellbeing. Our results show that grants lead to economi-
cally large and statistically significant impacts on income for almost a year after
treatment; it is reasonable to conclude that these increases in income were also as-
sociated with improved wellbeing within that time frame. Moreover, as in other
studies of cash transfers, we see no sign of excessive spending on temptation goods
Evans and Popova (2016). Also as in other studies of cash transfers, we see that if
anything, cash grants temporarily induced an increase in labor force participation,
with no evidence of a decrease in either the short or long term Banerjee, Hanna,
Kreindler, and Olken (2015). Thus, our results are consistent with the view that
one-off cash transfers are a simple, direct way of improving the wellbeing of the poor
and vulnerable. Because grants were used to launch small-scale businesses, impacts
persisted for some time, though they were not permanent.
Point estimates suggest that the cash grant was more cost effective than the
franchise treatment. Other populations or subgroups could, of course, experience
different benefits. Within our sample, the impacts of the franchise treatment were
probably greatest among the 39 percent who actually launched businesses, relative to
the 22 percent who only did some of the training but never launched businesses or the
remainder of those assigned to the franchise treatment, who chose not to participate
in the program. Better targeting could potentially improve impacts.33 However, our
protocol did include a reasonably high degree of screening based on non-monetary
33Several recent studies find positive impacts of cash grants on potential entrepreneurs who
were required to submit detailed business plans Blattman, Fiala, and Martinez (2014); McKenzie
(2016b)cf.. However, the interventions we study were intended to assist poor young women with
very limited work experience, many of whom might not have been able to produce detailed business
plans prior to the program.
193
effort costs Dupas, Hoffmann, Kremer, and Zwane (2016): everyone in our sample
first filled out an application form and then visited the implementing organization’s
office to complete a baseline survey. Moreover, a lengthier application process would
also come with its own implementation costs. Thus, given the observed pattern of
impacts, the cash grant intervention appears both simpler and more cost-effective.
Our results emphasize the importance of examining relatively long-run out-
comes and collecting multiple rounds of post-treatment data whenever possible.
We show that while participants in our study may face credit constraints, these
constraints are not acting as a poverty trap; savings constraints provide a better
explanation for the patterns of outcomes that we observe. Though transforming
unemployed young women into profitable entrepreneurs is a laudable policy goal,
our results suggest that it may be difficult to achieve in urban contexts, where mar-
kets are active and potentially quite competitive. However, one-off cash transfers
can work as a relatively cost-effective means of income support for vulnerable young
women; helping these vulnerable individuals may be a sufficient policy goal in and
of itself.
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Table 4.1: Sample Characteristics at Baseline
Obs. Mean S.D. Median Min. Max.
Panel A. Demographics and Household Composition
Age 905 18.780 0.787 19 17 20
At least one parent alive 903 0.884 0.321 1 0 1
Household size 905 4.882 2.168 5 1 13
Married or cohabitating 905 0.165 0.371 0 0 1
Has given birth 905 0.409 0.492 0 0 1
Panel B. Educational Background
Father’s education, if known 554 9.773 2.990 11 0 16
Mother’s education, if known 714 9.036 2.868 8 0 16
Years of education 905 9.894 2.055 10 0 12
Any vocational training 905 0.345 0.476 0 0 1
Panel C. Involvement in Income-Generating Activities
Any (paid) work experience 905 0.546 0.498 1 0 1
Engaged in any income-generating activities 905 0.146 0.353 0 0 1
Any self-employment activity 905 0.052 0.232 0 0 2
Any paid work for someone else 905 0.099 0.303 0 0 2
Hours of housework in last week 884 26.072 15.295 21 4 84
Panel D. Assets, Saving, and Living Conditions
Food insecurity index 904 0.259 0.175 0.250 0 0.929
Has a personal bank account 901 0.088 0.283 0 0 1
Has any savings (including jewelry) 904 0.330 0.470 0 0 1
Value of savings (in USD) 905 4.938 14.774 0 0 104.886
Value of savings, if any (in USD) 248 18.022 23.709 8.911 0.593 104.886
Owns a personal mobile phone 905 0.734 0.442 1 0 1
Household has electricty 905 0.750 0.433 1 0 1
Household has piped water 905 0.490 0.500 0 0 1
Household owns a television 905 0.568 0.496 1 0 1
Household owns a radio 905 0.685 0.465 1 0 1
Household asset index 905 -0.000 1.000 -0.080 -1.670 3.933
The food insecurity access scale is an adaptation of the measure proposed by the Food and Nutrition Technical
Assistance (FANTA) Project; the measure used at baseline is based on 7 questions, and is rescaled to range from
0 (no food insecurity) to 1 (the maximum level of food insecurity). Savings balances are first deflated using
CPI data from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics to reflect prevailing prices in July 2013, when the first
baseline surveys were conducted; balances are then converted to US dollars using the average exchange rate from
July 2013 (84.04 Kenyan shillings to the dollar). The top 1 percent of values of the Value of savings variable
are trimmed. The household asset index is calculated by taking the first principal component of the indicators
for whether a respondent’s household or dwelling has power, piped water, a radio, a television, a gas or electric
stove, a refrigerator, a motorcycle, a bicycle, a DVD player, and a computer; the first principal component is
then normalized to be mean-zero and have a standard deviation of one.
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Completed baseline survey 1.00 1.00 1.00
Attended business training 0.00 0.61 0.01
Helped to start a microfranchise 0.01 0.39 0.01
Received a cash grant 0.00 0.00 0.95
Observations 363 360 182
Compliance rates for the franchise treatment are calculated using administrative
records (attendance sign-in sheets) from the implementing organization and its
local partners. Compliance rates for the cash grant treatment are calculated from
the disbursement records of the research organization. Estimates of compliance
based on self-reports of program participation (recorded during the first Midline
Survey) yield nearly identical compliance rates.
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Table 4.3: Intent to Treat Estimates: Labor Market Outcomes after 7–10 Months
Treatment Effects
Control Franchise Grant p-value:
Obs. Mean Treatment Treatment F = G
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Involvement in Income-Generating Activities (Previous Month)
Engaged in any income-generating activities 851 0.586 0.019 0.024 0.918
(0.038) (0.046)
Any self-employment activity 851 0.245 0.098∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.940
(0.035) (0.043)
Paid work for someone else 851 0.382 -0.069∗ -0.070 0.973
(0.037) (0.045)
Panel B. Likelihood of Operating a Microfranchise (Previous Month)
Operates a microfranchise 851 0.000 0.085∗∗∗ -0.001 0.000
(0.015) (0.004)
Operates a salon microfranchise 851 0.000 0.050∗∗∗ -0.003 0.000
(0.012) (0.003)
Operates a food cart microfranchise 851 0.000 0.036∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001
(0.010) (0.003)
Panel C. Labor Supply (Previous 7 Days)
Hours worked in last week 851 17.945 1.097 6.831∗∗ 0.046
(2.131) (2.903)
Self-employment hours 851 4.723 4.127∗∗∗ 7.634∗∗∗ 0.104
(1.353) (2.012)
Hours of paid work for someone else 851 13.017 -2.880 -0.871 0.365
(1.787) (2.342)
Panel D. Income Excluding Transfers (Previous 7 Days)
Reports any labor income 851 0.466 0.056 0.060 0.939
(0.038) (0.047)
Income excluding transfers (in USD) 851 5.476 1.637∗∗ 3.153∗∗∗ 0.208
(0.775) (1.179)
Log income (in USD) 851 -1.436 0.508∗∗ 0.560∗ 0.870
(0.253) (0.317)
Self-employment income (in USD) 851 2.617 1.305∗∗ 2.306∗∗ 0.314
(0.615) (1.001)
Log of self-employment income (in USD) 851 -3.158 0.633∗∗∗ 0.705∗∗ 0.802
(0.215) (0.277)
Income from paid work for someone else (in USD) 851 2.901 0.092 0.489 0.557
(0.480) (0.650)
Log of income from paid work (in USD) 851 -2.595 -0.087 -0.063 0.931
(0.222) (0.273)
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 90, 95, and 99
percent confidence levels, respectively. OLS regressions reported. All specifications include controls
for baseline household size, education level, and indicators for having given birth, having received any
vocational training, or having any paid work experience prior to the baseline survey, in addition to
survey enumerator and survey month fixed effects. Incomes are deflated to July 2013 levels using CPI
data from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, then converted to US dollars using the average
exchange rate from July 2013 (84.04 Kenyan shillings to the dollar). The top 1 percent of values of all
hours and income variables are trimmed.
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Table 4.4: Intent to Treat Estimates: Labor Market Outcomes after 14–22 Months
Treatment Effects
Control Franchise Grant p-value:
Obs. Mean Treatment Treatment F = G
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Involvement in Income-Generating Activities (Previous Month)
Engaged in any income-generating activities 837 0.657 0.076∗∗ 0.057 0.655
(0.035) (0.043)
Any self-employment activity 837 0.243 0.118∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.798
(0.035) (0.043)
Works for someone else 837 0.497 -0.040 -0.063 0.635
(0.040) (0.048)
Panel B. Likelihood of Operating a Microfranchise
Operates a microfranchise 837 0.000 0.038∗∗∗ -0.002 0.001
(0.011) (0.003)
Operates a salon microfranchise 837 0.000 0.028∗∗∗ -0.002 0.003
(0.009) (0.003)
Operates a food cart microfranchise 837 0.000 0.009∗ -0.000 0.087
(0.005) (0.002)
Panel C. Labor Supply (Previous 7 Days)
Hours worked in last week 837 19.130 1.490 1.223 0.919
(2.103) (2.520)
Self-employment hours 837 3.509 3.094∗∗∗ 4.406∗∗∗ 0.427
(1.141) (1.441)
Hours of paid work for someone else 837 15.559 -1.758 -3.180 0.538
(1.961) (2.267)
Hours of unpaid work in the last week 837 23.364 -0.952 -0.995 0.975
(1.278) (1.459)
Panel D. Income Excluding Transfers (Previous 7 Days)
Reports any labor income 837 0.556 0.036 0.062 0.584
(0.039) (0.047)
Income excluding transfers (in USD) 837 9.106 -0.239 -0.038 0.858
(1.013) (1.198)
Log income (in USD) 837 -0.655 0.252 0.435 0.577
(0.270) (0.326)
Income from self-employment (in USD) 837 2.849 1.022 1.373 0.679
(0.715) (0.863)
Log of income from self-employment (in USD) 837 -3.276 0.575∗∗∗ 0.988∗∗∗ 0.184
(0.221) (0.292)
Income from paid work for someone else (in USD) 837 6.060 -1.107 -0.958 0.862
(0.765) (0.883)
Log of income from paid work (in USD) 837 -1.331 -0.304 -0.514 0.552
(0.302) (0.351)
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent
confidence levels, respectively. OLS regressions reported. All specifications include controls for baseline
household size, education level, and indicators for having given birth, having received any vocational
training, or having any paid work experience prior to the baseline survey, in addition to survey enumer-
ator and survey month fixed effects. Incomes are deflated to July 2013 levels using CPI data from the
Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, then converted to US dollars using the average exchange rate from













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.1: Participants’ Beliefs about Impacts of Treatments






Self-Employment Paid Work for Others
 
Estimated ITT impact of franchise treatment on self-employment
Participants' belief about impact of franchise treatment on self-employment
Estimated ITT impact of franchise treatment on paid work for others
Participants' belief about impact of franchise treatment on paid work for others






Self-Employment Paid Work for Others
 
Estimated ITT impact of grant treatment on self-employment
Participants' belief about impact of grant treatment on self-employment
Estimated ITT impact of grant treatment on paid work for others
Participants' belief about impact of grant treatment on paid work for others
ITT estimates of treatment are estimated via OLS, controlling for stratum fixed effects (we omit
other controls included in our main specifications to make ITT estimates as comparable to
self-reported beliefs as possible, though these controls have minimal impacts on estimated
coefficients). Beliefs are estimated using estimates of the frequency of outcomes in a reference
class of young women similar to oneself. For example, the estimate of the impact of the franchise
treatment on the probability of self-employment is constructed using average responses to two
questions: (1) “I would like you to imagine 100 women from [your neighborhood] who applied to
the [name of treatment arm] program and were admitted into it, just as you were. In other
words, please think about 100 women similar to yourself. Out of 100 women, how many do you
think are currently running or operating their own business?” and (2) “Now I would like you to
imagine 100 women from [your neighborhood] who applied to the [name of treatment arm]
program and but who were not admitted into it. In other words, please think about 100 women
similar to yourself who were not selected to the [name of treatment arm] program. Out of 100
women, how many do you think are currently running or operating their own business?” The
difference in responses to these two questions (divided by 100) is the individual-level estimate of





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.A Proof and extension of Proposition 1
4.1 Proof of Part (1)
To show Part (1) of Proposition 1, that for all K ≤ Kmin, F∗(Kt) = fw(1), it is
straightforward to proceed by contradiction. If any labor is allocated to the enterprise
sector, the resulting production in the enterprise sector is zero, following Assumption A1.
Thus, for any choice of the quantity of wage labor, Lw, the total output, F(Kt, L
w),
is equal to fw(Lw). Because this is an increasing function of Lw by Assumption A9,
F(Kt, L
w) < F (Kt, 1) ∀Lw < 1. Therefore, for all K ≤ Kmin, Lw cannot be less than 1.
Thus, for all K ≤ Kmin, no labor is allocated to the enterprise sector, all labor is allocated
to the wage sector, and F∗(Kt) = f
w(1). In other words, F∗(Kt) is flat for K ≤ Kmin.

4.2 Proof of Part (2)
To show Part (2) of Proposition 1, that for Kt ≥ Kmin, the function F∗(Kt) has a positive
first derivative, we reason as follows. Consider Kt ≥ Kmin, and K ′t ≥ Kt. Recall that
F
∗(Kt) maximizes, over L
w, the value of F(Kt, L
w) = fw(Lw) + fe(Kt, 1− Lw). Because
Kt ≥ Kmin, and K ′t ≥ Kt, we apply Assumption A2 (fek > 0) implies that fe(K ′t, 1−Lw) >
fe(Kt, 1− Lw). Thus, F(K ′t, Lw) > F(Kt, Lw). Because F∗(Kt) maximizes, over Lw, the
value of F(Kt, L




(which is achieved without adjusting the allocation of labor between activities). Thus,
F(K ′t, L
w) > F(Kt, L
w), so F∗(Kt) has a positive first derivative.
34 
4.3 Proof of Part (3)
To show Part (3) of Proposition 1, that the function, F∗(Kt) has a negative second deriva-
tive for Kt ≥ Kmin, it is useful to provide first a lemma, then a diagram.
Lemma 1. The derivative of F∗(Kt) is equal to the partial derivative of f
e(Kt, L
e) with
respect to capital at the optimum value of Le.
34Because of Assumption A5, the optimal allocation of labor across sectors is an interior solution
in Le for all Kt > Kmin. This remains true for arbitrarily large Kt because of Assumption A11.
Intuitively, the interior nature of the solution follows immediately from the fact that the marginal
product of labor approaches infinity as labor goes to zero in either sector. If the marginal product
of labor in the wage labor sector were constant, the optimal allocation of labor across sectors could
involve no wage labor at some values of Kt > Kmin.
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Proof. Though this can be shown as a direct applicaton of the envelope theorem, it can
also be argued succinctly as follows:
F
∗(Kt) = f






















dLe (marginal products are equated) at the optimum, and because
dLw
dKt
= − dLedKt at the constraint (since L
e+Lw = 1, so any movement in one is accompanied
























Next, we provide a diagram for reference. The graph below shows (on the vertical
axis) the marginal products of labor in the two sectors, as labor (LW , on the horizontal




MPLW MPLE MPLE2 constMPL
The two curves showing the marginal product of labor in each sector, MPLw and MPLe,
are given their shapes by Assumptions A3 and A10. Where the marginal products are
equated, the curves cross at the optimal allocation of labor, L1.
With reference to this diagram, Part (3) of Proposition 1 concerns changes in K.
If K increases, the change in the allocation of labor depends on the shape of fw. By
Assumption A4, that inputs are complements, an increase in K increases the entire MPLe
curve so that it becomes MPLe2, shown in dashes. As a benchmark, we now consider if,
instead of a diminishing returns fw, we instead had a constant returns fw = bL for some
constant b. The graph shows how it too could intersect MPLe at the point L1. If the
wage sector were constant returns, then when the MPLe curve shifts to become MPLe2,
the new optimal allocation would be at LC, and the optimal marginal product of labor
would remain unchanged. But with the actual fw, the new optimum is at L2, which is a
smaller shift in labor allocation: it must be the case that LC < L2 < L1. But because
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fe is homogeneous of degree one above the minimum scale, we know that the marginal
products of capital and labor in the enterprise sector are functions only of the capital-
labor ratio. Thus, if the marginal product of labor is higher at the new equilibrium, it is
because labor did not adjust enough to preserve the capital-labor ratio. The new marginal
product of capital in the enterprise sector is thus lower at L2 than at L1: the value of δf
e
δKt





is also declining in Kt, so F
∗(Kt) has a negative second derivative. 
4.4 Extension of Proposition 1: constant wage
If, instead of Assumption A10 (that δ
2
δL2
fw(Lw) < 0), the wage labor sector is characterized
by a constant wage δ
2
δL2
fw(Lw) = 0, then Part 3 of Proposition 1 changes to: “For all
Kt > Kmin, F
∗(Kt) has a weakly negative second derivative. Specifically, there exists K̄
such that for all Kt above Kmin but below K̄, F
∗(Kt) has a second derivative equal to
zero; and for all Kt above k̄, F
∗(Kt) has a negative second derivative.”
The proof is straightforward. By Assumtion A5, above Kmin, the marginal product
of labor in the enterprise sector crosses the fixed wage in the enterprise sector at some point
(L1 in the diagram above) where a nonzero fraction of labor is allocate to the enterprise
sector (LW > 0). Any increase in capital shifts the MPLe curve upward, moving the
optimum allocation to LC in the diagram above. Because the marginal product of labor
did not change, and because fe is homogeneous of degree one above the minimum scale,
the capital-labor ratio did not change. Thus, as long as the MPLe curve intersects the
fixed wage line, for every increase in capital, there is an exactly proportionate shift in
labor from the wage to the enterprise sector. Because fe is homogeneous of degree one,
this produces a proportionate shift in output. The change in output at the optimum
is thus linear in capital, as long as the MPLe curve intersects the fixed wage line. At
some level of capital, K̄, the MPLe curve rises entirely above the fixed wage line in the
diagram above. After this point, the optimum allocation of labor is a corner solution
setting LW = 0. At this point, the shape of F∗(Kt) is necessarily the shape of f
e, which
by diminishing returns (Assumption A2) means it has a negative second derivative. This
slight variation on the characteristic shape of F∗(Kt) yields the same possible numbers of
crossings as before, so the definitions of latent entrepreneurial types that are used in the
paper still hold. 
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4.B Additional Tables and Figures
Table 4.B.1: Baseline Covariates, by Treatment Status
Franchise Grant
Control Treatment Treatment Differences
(1) (2) (3) F – C G – C G – F
Panel A. Demographics and Household Composition
Age 18.758 18.803 18.780 0.044 0.023 −0.021
[0.802] [0.748] [0.832] (0.055) (0.069) (0.068)
At least one parent alive 0.890 0.878 0.884 −0.013 −0.005 0.007
[0.314] [0.328] [0.321] (0.024) (0.029) (0.029)
Household size 5.127 4.700 4.753 −0.421∗∗∗ −0.375∗ 0.047
[2.258] [1.986] [2.291] (0.154) (0.203) (0.197)
Married or cohabitating 0.149 0.189 0.148 0.039 0.000 −0.039
[0.356] [0.392] [0.356] (0.027) (0.031) (0.032)
Has given birth 0.364 0.439 0.440 0.076∗∗ 0.077∗ 0.002
[0.482] [0.497] [0.498] (0.036) (0.044) (0.044)
Panel B. Educational Background
Father’s education, if known 9.596 9.761 10.142 0.158 0.519 0.361
[3.245] [2.820] [2.767] (0.290) (0.341) (0.321)
Mother’s education, if known 8.955 9.137 9.007 0.162 0.047 −0.115
[2.949] [2.798] [2.847] (0.239) (0.285) (0.285)
Years of education 10.033 9.914 9.577 −0.122 −0.459∗∗ −0.337
[1.998] [2.015] [2.213] (0.147) (0.191) (0.191)
Any vocational training 0.369 0.319 0.346 −0.050 −0.023 0.027
[0.483] [0.467] [0.477] (0.035) (0.042) (0.042)
Panel C. Involvement in Income-Generating Activities (IGAs)
Any (paid) work experience 0.537 0.544 0.566 0.007 0.029 0.022
[0.499] [0.499] [0.497] (0.037) (0.045) (0.045)
Engaged in any IGAs 0.124 0.167 0.148 0.042 0.024 −0.018
[0.330] [0.373] [0.356] (0.026) (0.031) (0.033)
Any self-employment activity 0.041 0.064 0.049 0.022 0.008 −0.014
[0.213] [0.256] [0.217] (0.018) (0.020) (0.021)
Any paid work for someone else 0.085 0.111 0.104 0.025 0.019 −0.007
[0.280] [0.315] [0.324] (0.022) (0.028) (0.029)
Hours of housework in last week 25.881 26.192 26.215 0.305 0.329 0.025
[15.716] [15.545] [13.961] (1.184) (1.337) (1.330)
Panel D. Assets, Savings, and Living Conditions
Food insecurity index 0.257 0.265 0.254 0.009 −0.003 −0.012
[0.185] [0.173] [0.162] (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
Has a personal bank account 0.088 0.092 0.078 0.003 −0.010 −0.013
[0.284] [0.289] [0.269] (0.021) (0.025) (0.025)
Has any savings 0.339 0.336 0.298 −0.002 −0.039 −0.037
[0.474] [0.473] [0.459] (0.035) (0.042) (0.042)
Value of savings (in USD) 4.688 5.225 4.872 0.543 0.153 −0.390
[14.250] [15.334] [14.744] (1.103) (1.321) (1.358)
Value of savings, if any (in USD) 17.364 17.913 19.706 0.395 2.875 2.481
[23.138] [24.129] [24.400] (3.571) (4.227) (4.336)
Owns a personal mobile phone 0.741 0.731 0.725 −0.013 −0.015 −0.002
[0.439] [0.444] [0.448] (0.031) (0.038) (0.038)
Household has electricty 0.749 0.758 0.736 0.009 −0.013 −0.021
[0.434] [0.429] [0.442] (0.032) (0.040) (0.039)
Household has piped water 0.490 0.494 0.478 0.003 −0.013 −0.017
[0.501] [0.501] [0.501] (0.033) (0.041) (0.041)
Household owns a television 0.567 0.575 0.555 0.007 −0.014 −0.021
Continued on next page
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Table 4.B.1 – Continued from previous page
Franchise Grant
Control Treatment Treatment Differences
(1) (2) (3) F – C G – C G – F
[0.496] [0.495] [0.498] (0.036) (0.044) (0.045)
Household owns a radio 0.716 0.664 0.665 −0.053 −0.054 −0.001
[0.451] [0.473] [0.473] (0.034) (0.042) (0.043)
Household asset index -0.003 0.013 -0.020 0.012 −0.021 −0.034
[0.971] [1.024] [1.013] (0.073) (0.089) (0.091)
Observations 363 360 182
Standard deviation in brackets, robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns 4 through 6
report differences in means across treatments, with significance levels estimated controlling for
strata fixed effects (as in our main specifications). ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 90,
95, and 99 percent confidence levels, respectively. Asset PCA is the first principal component of
the set of indicators for: whether the household has electricity, whether the household has piped
water, and whether anyone in the household owns or has a television, a refrigerator, a stove, a
computer, a DVD player, a motorcycle, a bicycle, or a lamp.
Table 4.B.2: Attrition from the Sample
OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3)
Franchise treatment 0.009 0.017 -0.379
(0.02) (0.028) (0.73)
Grant treatment 0.014 0.018 -0.662
(0.024) (0.034) (0.857)
Age . 0.019 0.003
(0.016) (0.026)
At least one parent alive . 0.057 0.076
(0.046) (0.086)
Household size . -0.01 -0.004
(0.006) (0.01)
Married or cohabitating . -0.019 -0.004
(0.043) (0.07)
Has given birth . -0.003 0.023
(0.033) (0.058)
Father’s education, if known . -0.009∗ -0.0007
(0.005) (0.008)
Mother’s education, if known . 0.011∗∗ 0.008
(0.005) (0.009)
Years of education . -0.003 -0.005
(0.008) (0.014)
Any vocational training . 0.033 0.04
(0.028) (0.043)
Any (paid) work experience . -0.015 0.008
(0.028) (0.044)
Engaged in any IGAs . -0.065 0.026
(0.042) (0.073)
Hours of housework in last week . 0.00007 0.00003
(0.0008) (0.001)
Food insecurity index . -0.017 -0.142
(0.081) (0.125)
Has a personal bank account . 0.01 0.032
(0.046) (0.074)
Has any savings . 0.023 0.044
(0.028) (0.045)
Household asset index . -0.013 -0.029
(0.015) (0.024)
Age x franchise treatment . . 0.027
Continued on next page
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At least one parent alive x franchise treatment . . 0.003
(0.113)
Household size x franchise treatment . . -0.0006
(0.015)
Married or cohabitating x franchise treatment . . -0.037
(0.098)
Has given birth x franchise treatment . . -0.041
(0.079)
Father’s education, if known x franchise treatment . . -0.024∗∗
(0.011)
Mother’s education, if known x franchise treatment . . 0.002
(0.013)
Years of education x franchise treatment . . 0.011
(0.019)
Any vocational training x franchise treatment . . 0.034
(0.064)
Any (paid) work experience x franchise treatment . . -0.052
(0.064)
Engaged in any IGAs x franchise treatment . . -0.129
(0.099)
Hours of housework in last week x franchise treatment . . -0.001
(0.002)
Food insecurity index x franchise treatment . . 0.381∗∗
(0.186)
Has a personal bank account x franchise treatment . . 0.007
(0.104)
Has any savings x franchise treatment . . -0.056
(0.063)
Household asset index x franchise treatment . . 0.044
(0.035)
Age x grant treatment . . 0.046
(0.044)
At least one parent alive x grant treatment . . -0.058
(0.128)
Household size x grant treatment . . -0.025
(0.017)
Married or cohabitating x grant treatment . . 0.038
(0.122)
Has given birth x grant treatment . . -0.032
(0.093)
Father’s education, if known x grant treatment . . 0.012
(0.015)
Mother’s education, if known x grant treatment . . -0.008
(0.016)
Years of education x grant treatment . . -0.009
(0.022)
Any vocational training x grant treatment . . -0.086
(0.079)
Any (paid) work experience x grant treatment . . 0.008
(0.077)
Engaged in any IGAs x grant treatment . . -0.119
(0.124)
Hours of housework in last week x grant treatment . . 0.003
(0.002)
Food insecurity index x grant treatment . . -0.0003
(0.231)
Has a personal bank account x grant treatment . . -0.113
(0.134)
Has any savings x grant treatment . . 0.011
(0.078)
Household asset index x grant treatment . . 0.032
(0.041)
Constant 0.069∗∗∗ -0.271 -0.05
Continued on next page
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Observations 905 499 499
R2 0.0004 0.036 0.097
F-Test: observables (p-value) 0.371 0.959
F-Test: treatment-observables interactions (p-value) 0.545
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 90,
95, and 99 percent confidence levels, respectively. OLS regressions reported. The
dependent variable in all specifications is an indicator for attrition from the sample
(between baseline and endline). The last two rows of the table report p-values
from associated F-tests of whether the observable characteristics and observable
characteristics interacted with treatment are jointly significant in the attrition
regressions in columns 2 and 3.
Table 4.B.5: Intent to Treat Estimates: Occupational Sector and Other Outcomes after 14–22 Months
Treatment Effects
Control Franchise Grant p-value:
Obs. Mean Treatment Treatment F = G
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Occupational Sectors
Domestic services 837 0.198 -0.021 0.014 0.374
(0.031) (0.039)
Salon and beauty 837 0.166 0.114∗∗∗ -0.002 0.002
(0.031) (0.035)
Retail and hawking 837 0.121 0.009 0.048 0.274
(0.026) (0.034)
Food service and catering 837 0.056 0.022 -0.013 0.116
(0.020) (0.021)
Sells prepared food or cooked snacks 837 0.053 0.013 -0.000 0.560
(0.019) (0.022)
White collar or professional 837 0.047 -0.022 -0.005 0.272
(0.014) (0.019)
Janitorial work and trash collection 837 0.041 -0.008 -0.003 0.741
(0.015) (0.018)
Sells uncooked fruits and vegetables 837 0.027 0.013 0.016 0.894
(0.014) (0.018)
Works in light industry (factory work) 837 0.024 0.002 0.010 0.690
(0.013) (0.017)
Wholesale and distribution 837 0.024 -0.003 -0.005 0.853
(0.011) (0.014)
Tailoring, sewing, and arts and crafts 837 0.021 0.001 0.026 0.177
(0.011) (0.018)
Entertainment or professional sport 837 0.012 -0.003 -0.013∗ 0.120
(0.009) (0.007)
Construction, security, and manual labor 837 0.009 -0.003 0.001 0.548
(0.005) (0.007)
Farming or agricultural labor 837 0.000 0.012∗ 0.018∗ 0.624
(0.006) (0.010)
Sex worker 837 0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.329
(0.002) (0.001)
Panel B. Labor Market Churning
Closed a business between midline and endline 812 0.183 0.010 0.024 0.715
Continued on next page
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Table 4.B.5 – Continued from previous page
Treatment Effects
Control Franchise Grant p-value:
Obs. Mean Treatment Treatment F = G
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0.032) (0.040)
Left a paid job between midline and endline 812 0.241 -0.051 -0.056 0.894
(0.033) (0.040)
Started a business between midline and endline 812 0.177 0.039 0.047 0.850
(0.031) (0.037)
Started a new paid job between midline and endline 812 0.387 -0.055 -0.058 0.941
(0.039) (0.047)
Panel C. Occupational Sector
Years of education 837 10.198 -0.032 -0.083 0.605
(0.092) (0.092)
Curently enrolled in school 837 0.101 -0.014 -0.016 0.934
(0.022) (0.026)
Has done any vocational training 837 0.568 0.292∗∗∗ 0.035 0.000
(0.033) (0.045)
Has done business skills training 837 0.098 0.149∗∗∗ 0.001 0.000
(0.028) (0.029)
Business skills score (scaled 0 to 5) 837 1.036 0.129 -0.103 0.037
(0.095) (0.109)
Has done salon skills training 837 0.213 0.289∗∗∗ 0.003 0.000
(0.034) (0.039)
Salon skills score (scaled 0 to 9) 837 4.580 0.136 -0.485∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.128) (0.159)
Has done tailoring training 837 0.062 0.003 0.018 0.564
(0.019) (0.026)
Tailoring skills score (scaled 0 to 8) 837 1.325 -0.021 0.035 0.610
(0.092) (0.112)
Has done computer training 837 0.237 -0.069∗∗ 0.003 0.032
(0.027) (0.034)
Seconds required to complete typing test 835 100.935 5.298 13.055∗∗ 0.145
(4.385) (5.285)
Panel D. Household Composition and Living Arrangements
Household size 837 4.716 -0.082 0.133 0.289
(0.169) (0.205)
Married or cohabitating 837 0.269 0.012 -0.040 0.208
(0.034) (0.041)
Had an additional child (after program) 837 0.145 0.061∗∗ 0.045 0.663
(0.030) (0.037)
Lives with own child 837 0.453 0.071∗∗ 0.091∗∗ 0.624
(0.032) (0.040)
Lives in Nairobi 837 0.891 -0.023 -0.049 0.416
(0.024) (0.031)
Panel E. Household Assets and Living Conditions
Household has electricity 837 0.849 -0.023 -0.041 0.645
(0.028) (0.037)
Household has piped water 837 0.470 0.039 0.068 0.488
(0.035) (0.043)
Household has flush toilet 837 0.388 0.056 0.076∗ 0.618
(0.034) (0.041)
Household owns a TV 837 0.598 -0.042 -0.020 0.631
(0.039) (0.046)
Household owns computer 837 0.080 -0.051∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗ 0.486
(0.017) (0.019)
Owns a personal mobile phone 837 0.891 -0.011 -0.062∗ 0.134
(0.025) (0.034)
Continued on next page
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Table 4.B.5 – Continued from previous page
Treatment Effects
Control Franchise Grant p-value:
Obs. Mean Treatment Treatment F = G
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Owns a personal SIM card 837 0.950 -0.011 -0.010 0.984
(0.019) (0.023)
Panel F. Consumption, Expenditures, and Savings
Food Insecurity Access Scale (out of 27) 837 9.571 -0.224 0.903 0.072
(0.512) (0.621)
Women’s Dietary Diversity Score (scaled 0 to 9) 805 4.745 0.156 0.049 0.484
(0.122) (0.145)
Expenditures on self and children (in USD) 837 7.837 0.050 -0.528 0.477
(0.735) (0.845)
Log of expenditures on self and children (in USD) 837 1.266 0.172 0.045 0.365
(0.114) (0.143)
Spent money on tea, soda, or sweets in past week 837 0.663 0.020 0.017 0.956
(0.036) (0.043)
Spent money on alcohol in past week 837 0.059 -0.036∗∗ -0.025 0.514
(0.016) (0.019)
Transfers (in USD) 837 2.725 -0.006 0.286 0.524
(0.367) (0.470)
Log of transfers (in USD) 837 -0.859 0.216 0.168 0.849
(0.200) (0.251)
Savings (in USD) 837 49.211 -9.496 2.118 0.199
(7.967) (9.783)
Change in savings relative to last year 837 -0.139 -0.169∗∗ -0.156∗ 0.875
(0.072) (0.084)
Paid school fees for self or own child in 2014 837 0.107 -0.003 0.019 0.469
(0.024) (0.030)
Paid school fees for someone else’s child in 2014 837 0.071 0.009 0.124∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.021) (0.034)
Panel G. Time Use on Week Day Prior to Survey
Hours of income-generating activities 837 2.746 0.283 0.498 0.623
(0.356) (0.420)
Self-employment hours 837 0.364 0.287∗ 0.431∗∗ 0.534
(0.163) (0.201)
Hours of paid work for others 837 2.382 -0.004 0.067 0.862
(0.341) (0.398)
Hours of unpaid household work 837 5.544 0.142 -0.055 0.512
(0.258) (0.299)
Hours of unpaid work in a business 837 0.393 -0.085 0.023 0.421
(0.121) (0.141)
Hours of job search 837 0.086 -0.007 0.026 0.670
(0.055) (0.074)
Hours commuting or in transit 837 0.166 -0.062 0.265∗ 0.029
(0.050) (0.155)
Hours of leisure 837 10.260 -0.431 -0.722∗∗ 0.362
(0.276) (0.314)
Hours of education or training 837 0.595 0.071 -0.037 0.571
(0.167) (0.181)
Hours of religious observance, visiting the sick 837 0.154 0.089 0.022 0.481
(0.096) (0.092)
Panel H. Indices Capturing Empowerment, Self-Esteem, etc.
Rosenberg self-esteem scale (0 to 30) 837 19.130 0.363 -0.348 0.056
(0.310) (0.370)
Ladder of Life wellbeing scale (scaled from 0 to 10) 837 6.491 0.139 -0.000 0.280
(0.110) (0.126)
Grit (scaled from 1 to 5) 837 2.006 -0.004 0.006 0.737
Continued on next page
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Treatment Effects
Control Franchise Grant p-value:
Obs. Mean Treatment Treatment F = G
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0.022) (0.029)
Panel I. Empowerment Measures Used in Bandiera et al (2015)
Gender Empowerment Index (scaled 0 to 100) 837 48.352 -0.740 2.171 0.171
(1.749) (2.096)
Business Confidence Index (scaled 0 to 100) 837 71.915 0.589 -2.267∗ 0.015
(0.942) (1.175)
Suitable age for a woman to marry 837 24.828 -0.357∗ -0.205 0.530
(0.207) (0.230)
Suitable age for a man to marry 837 28.281 -0.328 0.085 0.182
(0.263) (0.281)
Desired age of marriage for daughter 788 26.101 -0.226 -0.300 0.759
(0.206) (0.238)
Desired age of marriage for son 813 28.856 -0.283 0.073 0.209
(0.242) (0.280)
Suitable age for a woman to have a child 837 24.891 -0.294 -0.161 0.672
(0.251) (0.291)
Number of children desired 837 2.757 0.039 0.057 0.824
(0.069) (0.084)
Number of boys desired 835 1.494 -0.061 0.044 0.086
(0.054) (0.065)
Desired proportion of male children 835 0.537 -0.030∗∗ 0.021 0.003
(0.014) (0.018)
Panel J. Empowerment Measures Used in Adoho et al (2014)
Self Confidence Index (scaled from 1 to 6) 837 4.257 0.066 -0.094 0.133
(0.087) (0.106)
Respondent has her own money 837 0.805 0.081∗∗∗ 0.066∗ 0.660
(0.028) (0.036)
Controls money she earns from IGAs 644 0.956 0.012 0.013 0.963
(0.017) (0.022)
Needs permission to spend earnings 837 0.050 0.009 0.006 0.912
(0.018) (0.022)
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 90, 95, and
99 percent confidence levels, respectively. OLS regressions reported. All specifications include
controls for baseline household size, education level, and indicators for having given birth, having
received any vocational training, or having any paid work experience prior to the baseline survey,
in addition to survey enumerator and survey month fixed effects. Money amounts are deflated to
July 2013 levels using CPI data from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, then converted to
US dollars using the average exchange rate from July 2013 (84.04 Kenyan shillings to the dollar).
The top 1 percent of values of all hours and income variables are trimmed. The estimated
impacts of the franchise treatment on the likelihood of working in the salon sector (see Panel A)
or having done any vocational training (see Panel C) are significant at the 99 percent level after
implementing the multiple hypothesis testing correction proposed by Benjamini and Hochberg
(1995). Those assigned to the grant treatment are also more likely to have paid school fees for
someone else’s child in the year after receiving the grant (Benjamini-Hochberg q-value 0.01; see
Panel F). No other outcomes are significantly related to either treatment with adjusted q-values
below 0.05.
211
Table 4.B.3: Treatment on the Treated: Labor Market Outcomes after 7–10 Months
TOT Estimates
Started
Control Franchise Received p-value:
Obs. Mean Program Grant F = G
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Involvement in Income-Generating Activities (Previous Month)
Engaged in any income-generating activities 851 0.586 0.032 0.025 0.908
(0.061) (0.047)
Any self-employment activity 851 0.245 0.163∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗ 0.307
(0.055) (0.044)
Paid work for someone else 851 0.382 -0.114∗ -0.073 0.473
(0.059) (0.046)
Panel B. Labor Supply (Previous 7 Days)
Hours worked in last week 851 17.945 1.853 7.105∗∗ 0.140
(3.442) (2.953)
Self-employment hours 851 4.723 6.856∗∗∗ 7.938∗∗∗ 0.680
(2.180) (2.047)
Hours of paid work for someone else 851 13.017 -4.756 -0.903 0.167
(2.893) (2.383)
Panel C. Income Excluding Transfers (Previous 7 Days)
Reports any labor income 851 0.466 0.093 0.062 0.607
(0.061) (0.048)
Income excluding transfers (in USD) 851 5.476 2.720∗∗ 3.278∗∗∗ 0.699
(1.250) (1.198)
Log income (in USD) 851 -1.436 0.842∗∗ 0.582∗ 0.525
(0.407) (0.323)
Self-employment income (in USD) 851 2.617 2.167∗∗ 2.397∗∗ 0.843
(0.988) (1.018)
Log of self-employment income (in USD) 851 -3.158 1.049∗∗∗ 0.733∗∗∗ 0.382
(0.345) (0.282)
Income from paid work for someone else (in USD) 851 2.901 0.154 0.508 0.675
(0.776) (0.661)
Log of income from paid work (in USD) 851 -2.595 -0.143 -0.066 0.825
(0.359) (0.278)
Panel D. First-Stage F-Statistics on Excluded Instruments
Franchise treatment 277.723
Grant treatment 2440.035
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 90, 95, and
99 percent confidence levels, respectively. OLS regressions reported. All specifications include
controls for baseline household size, education level, and indicators for having given birth, having
received any vocational training, or having any paid work experience prior to the baseline survey,
in addition to survey enumerator and survey month fixed effects. Money amounts are deflated to
July 2013 levels using CPI data from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, then converted to
US dollars using the average exchange rate from July 2013 (84.04 Kenyan shillings to the dollar).
The top 1 percent of values of all hours and income variables are trimmed.
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Table 4.B.4: Intent to Treat Estimates: Occupational Sectors after 7–10 Months
Treatment Effects
Control Franchise Grant p-value:
Obs. Mean Treatment Treatment F = G
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Occupational Sectors
Domestic services 851 0.143 -0.045∗ -0.049 0.904
(0.025) (0.030)
Salon and beauty 851 0.146 0.088∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗ 0.000
(0.029) (0.030)
Retail and hawking 851 0.090 0.043∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.055
(0.024) (0.035)
Food service and catering 851 0.026 -0.007 0.006 0.434
(0.013) (0.016)
Sells prepared food or cooked snacks 851 0.061 0.037∗ 0.034 0.916
(0.020) (0.025)
White collar or professional 851 0.020 0.002 0.016 0.373
(0.011) (0.016)
Janitorial work and trash collection 851 0.026 -0.020∗ -0.028∗∗∗ 0.196
(0.011) (0.009)
Sells uncooked fruits and vegetables 851 0.038 -0.021 0.031 0.010
(0.014) (0.022)
Works in light industry (factory work) 851 0.035 -0.009 0.005 0.409
(0.014) (0.019)
Wholesale and distribution 851 0.006 0.018∗ 0.010 0.450
(0.009) (0.009)
Tailoring, sewing, and arts and crafts 851 0.015 -0.000 -0.005 0.667
(0.010) (0.011)
Entertainment or professional sport 851 0.017 -0.015∗∗ -0.009 0.353
(0.007) (0.010)
Construction, security, and manual labor 851 0.009 -0.005 0.004 0.246
(0.006) (0.007)
Farming or agricultural labor 851 0.015 -0.013∗∗ -0.004 0.257
(0.006) (0.011)
Sex worker 851 0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.325
(0.002) (0.001)
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence levels, respectively. OLS regressions reported. All specifications
include controls for baseline household size, education level, and indicators for having given
birth, having received any vocational training, or having any paid work experience prior to
the baseline survey, in addition to survey enumerator and survey month fixed effects..
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pacts of a schooling conditional cash transfer program on the sexual behavior of young
women,” Health Economics, 19(S1), 55–68.
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